In order to understand the events that followed, we have to imagine a victorious but very weary British Army holding a newly consolidated salient against an enemy whom they have just roused to a revengeful fury by a sudden stinging slap in the face.
The enemy had been horribly frightened, and now that he had recovered he realised how urgently his prestige demanded signal vindication. We were, it would seem, half expecting in a tired unimaginative sort of way that he might hit at us on the new Bourlon Wood flank of our salient. On the Gouzeaucourt side were old-established defences. These we held thinly—it never entering our heads apparently that he would attack an old piece of the line.
But the German Army Commander, General von der Marwitz, had an ambitious scheme in his mind. He meant to pinch off our salient and, if possible, to capture the entire third and fourth Corps, who held it. His right wing was to operate from Bourlon southward, and his left from Masnières westwards, the two attacks converging on Havrincourt and Metz.
The attack was launched shortly after daylight on November 30, and failed completely on the right against Bourlon Wood; here the enemy was caught by our artillery and machine-guns and mown down by hundreds. On the left, however, the attack succeeded; first, it came as a surprise; secondly, the Germans heralded their assault by lines of low-flying aeroplanes, which made our men keep down and so lose observation. Under the protection of this aeroplane barrage and a very heavy trench mortar bombardment the German infantry advanced and speedily captured Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt.
It was not till nearly ten o’clock on November 30 that Brigadier-General Courage of the 2nd Tank Brigade received a telephone message warning him of the attack.
The Tanks had been definitely “dismissed,” and were busy refitting, and at that moment every machine was in complete déshabillé. Many of the engines were in process of being tinkered with, and not a single Tank was filled up or contained its battle equipment. Those whom some emergency has obliged to get out an ordinary car on a cold winter’s morning when it has neither petrol, oil, nor water in it, and has half its engine strewn about the garage, will understand the difficulties that faced the Tank Corps. They will realise that when no less than twenty-two Tanks of “B” (2nd) Battalion had started for the battle by 12.40, a very smart piece of work had been done. Very soon fourteen Tanks of “A” (1st) Battalion followed them, and by two o’clock twenty Tanks of “H” (8th) Battalion were able to move up in support.
In the words of Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatch, “Great credit is due to the officers and men of the (2nd) Tank Brigade for the speed with which they brought their Tanks into action.”
By the time the first twenty Tanks reached Gouzeaucourt, however, the Guards, who had been hurried up with all speed, had managed to retake it, and the Tanks were therefore pushed out as a screen to cover their consolidation.
Here they remained all day, beating off enemy counter-attacks.
All day along both sides of the salient the enemy hammered fiercely at our lines. Here and there he penetrated them. Cooks, servants, and signallers, every available man, was given a rifle and put into the line, and the Despatch tells of wonderful individual deeds that were done as the battle surged and eddied confusedly. We did not propose to allow the Germans to hold their new possessions, the points of vantage out of which they had hustled us.