The enemy had launched a strong attack against the Front held by these troops at 6 a.m. on the morning of the 26th, under cover of the usual heavy mist. Very soon, however, a section of Tanks under Captain Groves got right in amongst the advancing Germans and inflicted heavy casualties upon them. The French Colonial infantry, who had been obliged to fall back, immediately rallied and brought the German assault to a standstill. In the course of the action Second Lieutenant Wilson’s Tank found itself among some German heavy guns, which it attacked with case shot[61] and machine-gun fire, wounding most of their crews and killing the rest. Mr. Wilson then patrolled up and down some trenches held by the enemy and cost them very heavy losses by his enfilading fire. Eventually, having fired every round of ammunition in his Tank, he decided to go back, but while he was on his way, his magneto broke down. However, he sent back a messenger to fetch a new magneto, and after this had been fitted, he returned to the rallying point, his Tank having suffered the total casualties of two men slightly wounded.
On the 28th, another Company of the same Battalion again co-operated with the Moroccan Division. This time it was the Allies who were the attackers, their objective being the Hangard Wood. Owing to a mistake, the four Tanks did not get into action until rather late. Second Lieutenant Jones’ Tank, however, fought a very good action, clearing out a great number of machine-gun nests in the Wood, and generally giving a great deal of help to the Moroccan infantry in their advance. The Tank stayed in the Wood, until all its ammunition had been expended, and then, the infantry deciding not to make a further attack, it was withdrawn and rejoined its Company.
Except a small action of the 1st Battalion on May 2, the Tank Corps saw no fighting for the next six weeks, and it was not till July 4 that they fought again in any considerable action.
II
The general situation in May was still such as to cause our High Command a certain anxiety. It is easy to be wise after the event and say that the Germans must obviously have outrun their transport and overtaxed the limited road capacity of the devastated area which lay behind them. In early May this, though true, was not obvious. Meanwhile, we had been too much weakened by the disasters of the last six weeks to be able to counter-attack. Consequently, the enemy had the same opportunities for reconstruction as we had ourselves, and although we felt confident that after such a hurricane of battles there must be a breathing space for both Armies, we were by no means certain what would be the respective rôles of the two opposing sides when the struggle came to be resumed. Our most pressing need was the filling of the gaps in our Divisions and the closing of the huge breaches which the German advance had made in our defensive systems. The greatest need was for men. We had, it is true, to lay out new trench lines and reconstruct such old systems as already existed, but it was not likely that the enemy would afford us time to establish new defences comparable with those which he had already proved his power of overrunning. Therefore it was to procuring new and well-trained troops that our chief efforts must be directed. The men procured, there must be railways upon which to move them.
[62]“The depth to which the enemy had penetrated in the Somme and Lys valleys had disrupted important lateral lines of railway, and had created a situation of extreme gravity with regard to the maintenance of communications in Northern France. At Amiens, Béthune, and Hazebrouck, much-used railway junctions had been brought under the effective fire of the enemy’s guns, while the railway centre at St. Pol was threatened. To relieve the situation a comprehensive programme of railway construction was undertaken.”
Some 200 miles of broad-gauge track was laid between April and July and a complete series of new defences were built, involving, incredible as it may seem, 5000 miles of trench. Nor were Tanks left out of the scheme of reorganisation. But, alas! owing to the extreme need of infantry reinforcements, and the difficulty of immediately re-arming Battalions which had lost their Tanks during the Retreat, this “reconstruction” all but took the form, not of augmentation, but of diminution. It was proposed to reduce the number of Tank Brigades from six to four. The appearance of enemy Tanks, however, soon quashed this project. Not only had the Corps lost heavily in machines, but the fighting done by the Lewis gun Units had been of a particularly strenuous kind, and several Battalions had sustained such casualties in trained and experienced men as to cause great anxiety at Tank Headquarters. However, the Tank Corps were only in the same predicament as the rest of the British Army, and there was nothing for it but to gather up the bits with as much grace as possible and to start away as quickly as might be on the work of reconstruction. All through May, Mark V. machines were arriving in France at the rate of about sixty a week. Some of the Battalions which had not taken any part in the Retreat had been left in their original areas, in case the Germans should attack, so that we find Battalions (for example of the 1st Brigade) doing “Savage Rabbit” as late as the middle of May. For the most part, however, the Corps was gathered together undergoing intensive training in the Bermicourt area. All Tank Units were to be ready for action—re-armed, re-equipped and re-trained—by August 1.
The Central Workshops set to work in early June to prepare sledges for supply haulage, bridges upon which the Whippets could cross wide obstacles, and “Cribs” for the heavy Tanks. There “Cribs” were big hexagonal oaken crates, reinforced with steel, which were an improved and lighter version of the fascines which were improvised for the Battle of Cambrai. Training grounds and workshops hummed with the preparations, and when, in the last days of July, the call came, it was, as we shall see, found possible to launch 400 Tanks at little over a week’s notice.
It was while the Corps was training at Bermicourt that the foundation of the excellent relations which ever afterwards existed between Tanks and the French infantry was laid. A great number of French troops happened to be billeted in and around the Tank Corps area, and their keenness to learn all they could about our machines and their tactics afforded great pleasure to the men of the British Tank Corps. General Le Maistre, commanding the 10th French Army, particularly asked that Tank demonstrations should be held for the Units of his command. This was done, and all through May and June two or three of these demonstrations were given weekly. Besides French troops, representatives from a number of British and Colonial Corps, and the Canadian and Australian Corps, also came to watch, to their great edification.