Their policy was masses of men rather than mechanism, quantity rather than quality.
The best men went to machine-gun units and to assault troops. In many cases the remainder of the infantry were of little fighting value, though many of the men might have been otherwise usefully employed in a war which, if not one of material, was at least one in which economic factors played a large part.
The German Higher Command was able, however, to look at an order of battle, showing some 250 Divisions on paper.
But the Germans were thus naturally not in a position to find the labour for the construction of additional material, such as Tanks; they were, besides, concentrating any labour and any suitable material they possessed upon the work of submarine making.
It seems clear that the whole policy, at least as far as Tanks was concerned, was regretted before the end of the War.
The following now well known extracts from German documents indicate the effect of our Tanks on the German Army:
“Staff officers sent from G.H.Q. report that the reasons for the defeat of the Second Army[81] are as follows:
“1. The fact that the troops were surprised by the massed attack of Tanks, and lost their heads when the Tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken through under cover of natural and artificial fog.
“2. Lack of organised defences.
“3. The fact that the artillery allotted to reserve infantry units at the disposal of the Higher Command was wholly insufficient to establish fresh resistance with artillery support against the enemy who had broken through and against his Tanks.