[94]“The artillery start line, as originally planned, was to hold good, and the troops of the 27th American Division would form up for the attack on a line as far forward as possible, and would be assisted by an additional number of Tanks. The strength in Tanks was augmented to such an extent as should easily overwhelm the enemy resistance west of the start line. It was thought that this, with the slow rate of barrage, would enable the Americans to carry out their task.”
But there was yet one more difficulty, a serious obstacle of which we were serenely unaware. A British anti-Tank minefield, consisting of rows of buried heavy trench-mortar bombs, each holding 50 lb. of ammonal, had been put down just prior to our loss of the area in March 1918, and of this minefield no information had reached the Tanks.
It will thus be seen that the dice were very heavily loaded against success on this part of the front before day dawned on the eventful 29th of September, 1918.
The whole attack was to be on a twelve-mile front. The infantry were to take advantage of a number of foot-bridges, which our bombardment had prevented the enemy from getting out to destroy, and in some places our men were prepared to wade or swim through the water.
It was expected, however, that the chief resistance would be offered on the famous three and a half miles.
Altogether about 175 Tanks, including the new American Battalion, were to be launched, and four Corps were to be involved.
To the 9th Corps on the right, the 5th, 6th and 7th Tank Battalions of the 3rd Brigade were allotted.
In the centre, with the Australian and American Corps, the 1st, 4th and 301st American Battalions of the 4th Brigade were to fight.[95]
The 8th, 13th and 16th Battalions of the 5th Tank Brigade were to be held in 4th Army Reserve.
Almost up to zero hour on the 29th we still hoped to get news that we held the Knoll and Quennemont. But no reassuring message came through.