The Battle of Messines did not prove one in which Tanks were able to show to any particular advantage; this not because of adverse conditions, but because of the battle’s very success. It was throughout an extremely well-planned little action, and would probably have been perfectly successful even without the co-operation of Tanks.
An expert military critic has said of it:
“The Battle of Messines, one of the shortest and best mounted limited operations of the War, was in no sense a Tank battle.”
It was perhaps a little hard on the 2nd Brigade, who fought throughout with particular gallantry, that more of the laurel could not fall to them.
For not only was the 2nd Brigade’s maiden battle notable for gallantry in the field, but also for the very high standard of the Staff work—the administrative arrangements indeed long remaining the model for subsequent Tank operations.
So inspiring a little action was it, so well planned and executed in every stage, that the 2nd Brigade themselves felt that they had been privileged in playing even a relatively minor part in such an assault.
Though Tanks proved useful in several phases of the battle, Tank Commanders are the first to attribute the successes of the day to the artillery, the tunnelling companies and the infantry.
They had early established particularly cordial relations with the infantry, and it is said that a Maori Unit of the 2nd Anzac Corps gave expert help to the 2nd Tank Battalion in camouflaging its machines.
Messines was to be a prelude to a more considerable attack in the Ypres Salient. The village of Messines itself and the Wytschaete Ridge were to be taken, thus securing the British Right for the Ypres attack, and depriving the enemy of dominating ground.
The advance was to be a very short one, and the rôle of the Tanks was to be subsidiary to that of gunners, sappers and infantry.