No sooner had he discovered how effective was his “K” bullet against the Mark I. Tank, than we confronted him with the Mark IV., against which it was powerless.
The Germans always had rather hazy ideas as to the capabilities and habits of our current Tank. They had had ample opportunity of examining two Tanks which lay derelict in their lines on the Somme, yet until the Battle of Arras they believed that Tanks were largely dependent on the use of roads, and that therefore pits and other obstacles in roads must form a useful anti-Tank defence.
[26]“It was also not till the later stages of the Battle of Arras that the enemy realised from some captured Tanks near Bullecourt that the ‘K’ bullet was effective against the type of Tank that had been in use against them since September 1916.
“By the time the enemy had fully realised this, however, the old Tanks were used up, and at Messines the Mark IV. had made its appearance and the chance of the armour-piercing bullet was over....
“After Messines the Germans began to realise the importance of artillery as a defence against Tanks, and ‘the chief rôle allotted to the infantry was to keep its head’ and leave the rest to the guns....
“Prominence was given to indirect fire[27] of guns of both heavy and light calibres on approaching Tanks. In spite of several dawn attacks the enemy laid great stress on what he called ‘Distant Defence,’ and a few special anti-Tank guns, about two per divisional front, were placed in specially covered positions.”
It was not till the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917 that he was to discover by chance the one effective weapon against Tanks. That is to say, Direct Fire by field guns.
The “Hush” Operation
I
Before it was decided to fight the enemy at Messines there had been an idea of an attack near Lens, and most of the reconnaissance for such a battle had been carried out.
Like many another battle of the War, it was never fought, and remained only the shadow of an operation.