The Germans could have stretched out their hands at any moment for this bit of coast.
They chose not to grasp it until they imagined that our plans, whatever they might be, were complete, and when their attack would probably cause us the maximum of inconvenience. Therefore, it was on July 10 that, after a tremendous bombardment, they attacked the position in overwhelming force. Our defence was gallant but vain, and by the evening the Germans had captured the northern part of our bridgeheads.
It is true that we succeeded in holding Nieuport itself, but the loss of even the small strip of ground to the north of it rendered the assembly of troops in that area for our own attack, which was to co-operate with the coast landing, almost impossible.
The second and more weighty circumstance was the fatal slowness of our main advance at Ypres.
In the next chapters we shall consider these tragic months, whose slow passage swept away so many schemes and hopes, and made unfruitful so much thought and labour.
Enough that the “Hush” operation was swept silently away with the rest. As late as the beginning of October, however, the men who had planned so cunningly, whose minds had surmounted so many difficulties, still hoped that their work might not prove barren.
But by the middle of the month it had become clear that the landing could not take place, and the end of October the special Tank detachment was finally disbanded.
CHAPTER VIII
THE FLANDERS CAMPAIGN—PREPARATIONS FOR THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES