In February, however, Stanley despatched a messenger with orders to Lieutenant Stairs to hasten with his column to Kavalli, with a view to concentrate the expedition ready for any contingency. Couriers were also dispatched to Pasha telling him of these movements and intentions, and asking him to point out how they could best aid him—whether it would be best for them to remain at Kavalli, or whether they should advance into the province and assist him at Mswa or Tangura Island, where Jephson had left him. Stanley suggested the simplest plan for him would be to seize the steamer and employ her in the transport of refugees, who he heard were collected in numbers at Tangura, to his (Stanley’s) old camp on the Nyanza; or that, failing with the steamer, he should march overland from Tangura to Mswa, and send a canoe to inform him that he had done so, when, a few days after, he (Stanley) could be at Mswa with two hundred and fifty rifles to escort them to Kavalli. But Stanley demanded something positive, otherwise it would be his duty to destroy the ammunition and march homeward on the 13th of February.
TIPPU-TIB.
The following letter, by a courier, was received by Stanley from Emin Pasha, much to his astonishment, on the very day he had proposed to begin the homeward march, Emin being then actually at anchor just below his camp:—
Camp, February 13, 1889.
Henry M. Stanley, Commanding Relief Expedition.
Sir:—In answer to your letter of the 7th inst., for which I beg to tender my best thanks, I have the honor to inform you that yesterday at three I arrived here with my two steamers carrying the first lot of people desirous to leave this country under your escort. As soon as I have arranged for cover of my people, steamships have to start for Mswa station to bring on another lot of people awaiting transportation. With me there are some twelve officers anxious to see you and only forty soldiers. They have come under my orders to request you to give them some time to bring their brothers, at least such as are willing to leave, from Wadelai, and I promised them to do my best to assist them. Things having to some extent now changed, you will be able to make them undergo whatever conditions you see fit to impose upon them. To arrange these matters I shall start from here with officers for your camp, and if you send carriers I could avail me of some of them. I hope sincerely that the great difficulties you have had to undergo and the great sacrifices made by your expedition to assist us may be rewarded by full success in bringing out my people. The wave of insanity which overran the country has subsided, and of such people as are now coming with me we may be sure. Sig. Casati requests me to give his best thanks for your kind remembrance of him. Permit me to express to you once more my cordial thanks for whatever you have done for us until now, and believe me to be, yours, faithfully,
DR. EMIN.
During the interval between Jephson’s arrival and the receipt of this letter Jephson had written pretty full reports of all that he had heard from Pasha, Signor Casati, and the Egyptian soldiers, of the principal events that had transpired within the last few years in the Equatorial province. In Jephson’s report appear such sentences as the following: “And this leads me to say a few words concerning the position of affairs in this country. When I entered it, April 21, 1888, the first battalion of about seven hundred rifles had been long in rebellion against Pasha’s authority, and had twice attempted to make him prisoner. The second battalion of about six hundred and fifty rifles, though professedly loyal, was insubordinate and almost unmanageable. Pasha possessed only a semblance, a mere rag of authority, and if he required anything of importance to be done he could no longer order, he was obliged to beg his officers to do it. Now, when we were at Nzabe, in May, 1888, though Pasha hinted things were a little difficult in his country, he never revealed to us the true state of things, which was actually desperate, and we had not the slightest idea that any mutiny or discontent was likely to arise among his people. We thought, as most people in Europe and Egypt had been taught to believe by the Pasha’s own letters and Juncker’s later representations, that all his difficulties arose from events outside his country, whereas in point of fact his danger arose from internal dissensions. Thus we were led to place our trust in people who were utterly unworthy of our confidence or help, and who, instead of being grateful to us for wishing to help them, have from the first conspired how to plunder the expedition and turn us adrift; and had the mutineers in their highly-excited state been able to prove one single case of injustice, cruelty, or neglect of his people against Pasha he would most assuredly have lost his life in this rebellion.”
Jephson further says, in summing up his report:—