Thus even the Postmaster-General's method of apportioning costs between freight and passenger traffic produces an operating cost in excess of the total pay received by the railways, leaving nothing whatever for return upon the fair value of the property or necessary but non-income producing improvements.
There is no allowance, in any of these estimates of cost, for the large volume of free transportation supplied to officers and agents of the Post Office Department, when not in charge of mail, although this amounts to over 50,000,000 passenger miles annually and, at the low average rate of two cents per mile, would cost the Post Office Department more than $1,000,000 per year.
Moreover, as will presently be shown (pages 13-14) all the figures here discussed are for the month of November, a month which, because of the abnormally low ratio of passenger traffic to freight traffic, substantially understates the cost of the passenger train services, when figures derived from it are applied to an entire year.
It thus becomes evident that any inquiry which takes into consideration the necessary elements of the situation will demonstrate that railway mail pay is too low. It is only by ignoring essential elements of the service and of expense and the fundamental element of a return on the value of the property that any argument to the contrary can be constructed.
Thus the mail traffic does not pay its operating cost. That traffic is a substantial percentage of the total public service performed by the railroads. It should contribute a substantial proportion to the taxes which the railroads have to pay and to the return on railroad property which its owners are entitled to receive. Clearly no fair method can be devised which will fail to show that the existing mail pay is far below a fairly compensatory basis. Certainly this condition ought not to be intensified by adding the injustice of still further reductions. On the contrary, the unjust reductions of recent years should be corrected for the future, and the railroads should be relieved from the strikingly unjust methods by which they are at present deprived of anything approaching fair compensation.
V. THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL'S APPORTIONMENT OF SPACE BETWEEN THE MAIL SERVICE AND THE OTHER SERVICES RENDERED ON PASSENGER TRAINS DID NOT ALLOW TO THE MAILS THE SPACE WHICH THEY ACTUALLY REQUIRE AND USE AND THIS HAD THE RESULT OF UNDULY REDUCING HIS ESTIMATES OF THE COST TO THE RAILWAYS OF THE MAIL SERVICE.
Detailed reference will now be made to the methods and controlling effect of the Postmaster-General's apportionment of passenger train space between the mails and the other services rendered on passenger trains. Such an apportionment was a necessary step in the calculations reported in Document No. 105. Having obtained certain estimates of the cost of the passenger train services, considered together, by methods, producing the lowest results, the next step shown in Document No. 105 was to apportion a part of this cost to the mail service. The accepted method for such an apportionment is to distribute the total cost in proportion to the train space required by each of the respective services. The Postmaster-General obtained from the railways statements which he might have used in applying this method and these statements showed that 9.32 per cent. of the total space in passenger trains was required by the mails, but, instead of using the data showing this fact, he substituted figures of his own which reduced the space credited to the mail service to 7.16 per cent. of the total. The total of passenger train costs which the Postmaster-General estimated should be apportioned among passengers, express and mail, on the basis of space occupied, was $37,074,172.[D] He therefore assigned to the mail service 7.16 per cent. of the last-named sum or $2,654,510.69. If, however, he had used the proportion of space, 9.32 per cent., resulting from the reports he had obtained from the railways, the amount apportioned as cost of the mail service for the month would have been $800,802 greater. Multiplying this by twelve gives an increase in the estimated annual cost of over $9,600,000.
Thus the Postmaster-General arrived at his declaration that the railways were getting an excess profit of $9,000,000 by means of two fundamental errors, omitting for the present reference to any other errors. He understated the annual mail expenses and taxes of the railways by at least $9,600,000, and he ignored entirely the necessary return on the value of railroad property.
This examination of his methods shows that the determination of space was of primary and controlling importance and that the changes in space allotment have destroyed the value of his deductions. These changes were due to his refusal to assign to the mail service the working space and temporarily unoccupied space on trains, which were necessary to the mail service and to his actually assigning much of this space to the passenger service rendered on the same trains.