To all the positions thus far taken by Dr. Bachman, we most cheerfully subscribe; they are strictly scientific, and by such criteria alone do we desire to test the unity of the human family; but we must enter a decided demurrer to the assertion which follows, viz: that, "according to the universally received definition of species, all the individuals of the human race are proved to be of one species." When it shall be shown that all the races of men, dogs, horses, cattle, wolves, foxes, &c., are "varieties only, whose origin can be distinctly traced to existing and well-known species," we may then yield the point; but we must be permitted to say that Dr. Bachman is the only naturalist, as far as we know, who has assumed to know these original types.
Now, if the reader will turn back and review carefully all the definitions of species cited, he will perceive that they are not based upon anatomical characters, but simply on the permanency of certain organic forms, and that this permanence of form is determined by its history alone.
Professor Owen, of London, has thrown the weight of his great name into the scale, and tells us that "man is the sole species of his genus, the sole representative of his order." But proving that man is not a monkey, as the professor has done in the lecture alluded to, does not prove that men are all of one species, according to any definition yet received: he has made the assertion, but has assigned no scientific reasons to sustain it. No one would be more rejoiced than ourselves, to see the great talent and learning of Professor Owen brought fully to bear on this point; but, like most naturalists, he has overlooked one of the most important points in this discussion—the monumental history of man.
Will Professor Owen or Dr. Bachman tell us wherein the lion and tiger—the dog, wolf, fox, and jackal—the fossil horse, and living species—the Siberian mammoth and the Indian elephant, differ more from each other than the white man and the negro? Are not all these regarded by naturalists as distinct species, and yet who pretends to be able to distinguish the skeleton of one from the other by specific characters?
The examples just cited, of living species, have been decided upon simply from their permanency of type, as derived from their history; and we say that, by the same process of reasoning, the races of men depicted on the monuments of Egypt, five thousand years ago, and which have maintained their types through all time and all climates since, are distinct species.
Dr. Morton defines species—"a primordial organic form," and determines these forms by their permanence through all human records; and Mr. Agassiz, who adopts this definition, adds: "Species are thus distinct forms of organic life, the origin of which is lost in the primitive establishment of the state of things now existing; and varieties are such modification of the species as may return to the typical form under temporary influences."
Dr. Bachman objects very strongly to this definition, and declares it a "cunning device, and, to all intents, an ex post facto law," suddenly conjured up during a controversy, to avoid the difficulties of the case; but we have serious doubts whether these gentlemen are capable of such subterfuge in matters of science, and confess that we cannot see any substantial difference between their definition and those given by Dr. Bachman. Morton and Agassiz determine a form to be "primordial" by its permanency, as proved by history, and the other definitions assign no other test.
Professor Leidy, who has not only studied the "lower departments of zoology," like Mr. Agassiz, but also the "higher forms of animal life," says that "too much importance has been attached to the term species," and gives the following definition: "A species of plant or animal may be defined to be an immutable organic form, whose characteristic distinctions may always be recognized by a study of its history."[199]
M. Jourdain, under the head "Espèce," in his Dictionnaire des Termes des Sciences Naturelles, after citing a long list of definitions from leading authors, concludes with the following remarks, which, as the question now stands before the world, places the term species just where it should be:—
"It is evident that we can, among organized bodies, regard as a species only such a collection of beings as resemble each other more than they resemble others, and which, by a consent more or less unanimous, it is agreed to designate by a common name; for a species is but a simple abstraction of the mind, and not a group, exactly determined by nature herself, as ancient as she is, and of which she has irrevocably traced the limits. It is in the definition of species that we recognize how far the influence of ideas adopted without examination in youth is powerful in obscuring the most simple ideas of general physics."