After the fall of Napoleon, Alexander on several occasions manifested a marked and decided dislike to him. In 1815 he was the promoter of the second crusade against Napoleon; he directed every hostile measure with the utmost degree of animosity, and seemed to make it almost a personal affair; alleging, as the cause of his aversion, that he had been deceived and trifled with. If this tardy resentment was not a mere pretence, there is every reason to believe that it was stirred up by an old confidant of Napoleon’s, who, in private conversations, had artfully wounded the vanity of Alexander, by statements, true or false, of the private opinion of Napoleon with regard to his illustrious friend.
In 1814 there appeared reason to believe that Alexander would not be averse to see young Napoleon placed on the throne of France. After the Emperor’s second abdication, he seemed far less favourably disposed to the continuance of Napoleon’s dynasty.
In the second crusade, the Emperor Alexander marched at the head of innumerable forces. He was heard to declare, at that period, that the war might last for three years; but that Napoleon would nevertheless be subdued in the end.
On the first intelligence of the battle of Fleurus, the chiefs of all the Russian columns immediately received orders to halt; while all the Austrian and Bavarian corps instantly turned off, with the view of detaching themselves and forming a separate force. Had the Congress of Vienna been broken up on the 20th of March, it is almost certain that the crusade would not have been renewed; and had Napoleon been victorious at Waterloo, it is also tolerably certain that the crusade would have been dissolved.
The news of Napoleon’s landing at Cannes was a thunderbolt to the French plenipotentiary at Vienna. He indeed drew up the famous declaration of the 13th of March; and, virulent as it is, the first draft was still more so: it was amended by other ministers. The countenance of this plenipotentiary, as he gradually learned the advance of Napoleon, was a sort of thermometer, which excited the laughter of all the members of the Congress.
Austria soon knew the real state of affairs: her couriers informed her admirably well of all that was passing. The members of the French Legation alone were involved in doubt: they were still circulating a magnanimous letter from the King to the other Sovereigns, informing them that he was resolved to die at the Tuileries, when it was already known that Louis had left the capital, and was on his way to the frontier.
A member of the Congress and Lord Wellington, in a confidential conversation with the members of the French Legation, with the map in their hands, assigned the 20th or the 21st for Napoleon’s entry into Paris.
As the Emperor Francis received the official publications from Grenoble and Lyons, he regularly forwarded them to Schöenbrunn, to Maria Louisa, to whom they afforded extreme joy. It is very true that, at a somewhat later period, an idea was entertained of seizing young Napoleon, in order to convey him to France.
The French Plenipotentiary at length quitted Vienna, and proceeded to Frankfort and Wisbaden, whence he could more conveniently negotiate either with Ghent or Paris. Never was a time-serving courier thrown into greater embarrassment and anxiety. The ardour with which he had been inspired, on receiving the intelligence of Napoleon’s landing at Cannes, was very much abated when he heard of the Emperor’s arrival at Paris; and he entered into an understanding with Fouché that the latter should be his guarantee with Napoleon, pledging himself, on the other hand, to be Fouché’s guarantee with the Bourbons. There is good ground for believing that the offers made by this Plenipotentiary to the new Sovereign went very great lengths indeed; but Napoleon indignantly rejected them, lest, as he said, he should degrade his policy too far.
In 1814, before M. de Talleyrand declared himself for the Bourbons, he was for the Regency; in which, however, he himself wished to play the principal part. Events fatal to the Napoleon dynasty prevented this moment of uncertainty from being turned to good account. Every thing tends to prove that the result which was at that period adopted was far from being agreeable to the intentions of Austria; that power was duped, betrayed, or at least carried by assault.