"Art. III.—The imperial courts of Austria and Russia and the Royal court of Prussia shall appoint Commissioners to reside in the place which his Britannic Majesty’s Government shall assign as the residence of Napoleon Bonaparte, and who, without being responsible for his security, shall assure themselves of his presence.
"Art. IV.—His most Christian Majesty is invited in the name of the four Courts above mentioned, also to send a French commissioner to the place of Napoleon Bonaparte’s detention.
"Art. V. —His[—His] Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland pledges himself to fulfil the engagements assigned to him by the present convention.
"Art. VI.—The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be exchanged in the space of a fortnight, or sooner if possible.
"In virtue of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention, and have affixed their seals thereto.
“Given at Paris on the 20th of August, in the year of our Lord 1815.”
When I had finished translating this document, the Emperor asked me what I thought of it.
“Sire,” I replied, "in the situation in which we are placed, I would rather depend on the interests of a single one, than on the complicated decision of four. England has evidently dictated this treaty. You see how carefully she stipulates that she alone shall answer for and dispose of the prisoner. She has been labouring to provide herself with the lever of Archimedes, and therefore it is not probable that she w¡ll entertain any idea of breaking it."
The Emperor, without explaining his ideas on this subject, adverted to the different chances which might bring about his liberation from St. Helena, and he made the following remarkable observations: “If the Sovereigns of Europe act wisely, and should succeed in completely restoring order, we shall not be worth the money and the trouble which it must cost to keep us here, and they will get rid of us. But our captivity may still be prolonged for some years, perhaps three, four, or five. Otherwise, setting aside the fortuitous events which are beyond the reach of human foresight, I calculate only on two uncertain chances of our liberation: first, that the Sovereigns may stand in need of me to assist in putting down rebellion among their subjects; and secondly, the people of Europe may require my aid in the contest that may arise between them and their monarchs. I am the natural arbiter and mediator in the immense conflict between the present and the past. I have always aspired to be the supreme judge in this cause. My administration at home and my diplomacy abroad all tended to this great end. The issue might have been brought about more easily and promptly; but fate ordained otherwise. Finally, there is a last chance, which perhaps is the most probable of all; I may be wanted to check the power of the Russians; for, in less than ten years, all Europe may perhaps be overrun with Cossacks, or subject to republican government. Such however are the statesmen who brought about my overthrow.” Then, reverting to the decision of the Sovereigns respecting him, he observed that it was difficult to account for the style of the document, and the malignant spirit which pervaded it.
“The Emperor Francis,” said he, “is a pious sovereign, and I am his son-in-law.—As for Alexander, we once loved each other. With regard to the King of Prussia, I doubtless did him much harm, but I might have done him much more; and after all, might he not have found real glory and self-satisfaction in distinguishing himself by generosity? As to England, it is to the animosity of her Ministers that I am indebted for all. But it remained for the Prince Regent to observe and interfere, or to be branded as a fool, and a protector of vulgar malignity.—One thing however is certain, namely: that the Allied Sovereigns have compromised, degraded, and lost themselves, by their treatment of me.”