"M. de Romanzoff, who had maintained communications at Paris, and who some time afterwards, when the Russians experienced reverses, was very severely treated by Alexander for the course he had induced him to pursue, had assured the Russian Emperor, that the moment was come when Napoleon, in his embarrassments, would readily make some sacrifices to avoid war; that the favourable opportunity should not be allowed to escape; that it was only necessary to assume a bold attitude, and a tone of firmness; that indemnity would be obtained for the Duke of Oldenburg; that Dantzick might be gained, and that Russia would thus acquire immense weight in Europe.
"Such was the cause of the movement of the Russian troops, and of the insolent note of Prince Kourakin, who, doubtless, was not in the secret, and who had been foolish enough to execute his instructions in too literal a way. The same mistaken notions, and the same system also, occasioned the refusal to receive Lauriston at Wilna. This was an instance of the errors and misfortunes which attended my new diplomacy. It stood insulated, without affinity or contact, in the midst of the objects which it had to direct. Had my Minister for Foreign affairs been a member of the old aristocracy, and a man of superior ability, no doubt he would have observed the cloud that was gathering, and might have prevented our going to war.
“Talleyrand,[“Talleyrand,] perhaps, might have done this: but it was above the powers of the new school. I could not make the discovery myself; my dignity precluded personal explanations. I could form my judgment only from documents, and in vain did I turn them over and over, for I was sure at last to arrive at a point where they could make no reply to my enquiries.
"Scarcely had I opened the campaign, when the mask fell, and the real sentiments of the enemy were developed. In the course of two or three days Alexander, alarmed at our first successes, despatched a messenger to me, to say that if I would evacuate the invaded territory, and fall back as far as the Niemen, he would enter upon negotiations. But I in my turn took this for a stratagem. I was elated with success; I had taken the Russian army in the very fact, in the critical moment; I had cut off Bagration, and I had reason to hope that I should destroy him. I thought, however, that the enemy merely wanted to gain time for the purpose of rallying his forces. Had I been convinced of Alexander’s sincerity, I should doubtless have acceded to his proposition of falling back to the Niemen. In that case, he would not have passed the Dwina; Wilna would have been neutralized: and there Alexander and myself, accompanied by a few battalions of our guards, would have negotiated in person. How many arrangements[arrangements] should I not have proposed!... Alexander would have had only to take his choice, and we should have separated good friends.
"Yet, in spite of the events which succeeded, and which left my enemy triumphant, is it quite certain that the measures I have just hinted at would have been less advantageous than those which have since been pursued? Alexander marched to Paris, it is true, but he came accompanied by the forces of all Europe. He has gained Poland: but what will be the result of the shock given to the whole European system; of the agitation into which every nation has been thrown; of the increase of European influence over the rest of Russia through the accumulation of new acquisitions: the expeditions in which the Russian troops are engaged in remote quarters; and the influence of the incongruous mass of men and knowledge which have taken refuge in Russia from foreign parts?
“Will the Russian sovereigns be content to consolidate what they have acquired? If, on the contrary, they should be influenced by ambition, what extravagant enterprises may they not attempt! And yet they have lost Moscow, her wealth and resources, and those of many other cities! These are wounds which will bleed for half a century. But at Wilna we might have entered into arrangements for the advantage of all, subjects as well as sovereigns!”
On another occasion, the Emperor said, "I might have shared with Russia the possession of the Turkish empire. We had oftener than once contemplated the idea, but Constantinople was always the obstacle that opposed its execution. The Turkish capital was the grand stumbling-block between us. Russia wanted it, and I could not resign it. Constantinople is worth an empire of itself. It is the real keystone of power; for he who possesses it may rule the world.
“What then?” said the Emperor, resuming the former question, “what has Alexander gained, which he might not have secured to better advantage at Wilna?”—Some one present replied, “Sire, he has conquered, and he remains triumphant.”—"That may be the vulgar opinion," exclaimed the Emperor, "but no Sovereign should entertain such an idea. A monarch, if he himself governs, or his councillors, if they govern for him, must, in vast enterprises of this nature, attach less importance to the victory than to its results. And even though the case be limited to vulgar considerations, still I maintain that the wished-for object has not been attained. Even here the palm must be awarded to the vanquished party. Who will pretend that my victories in Germany were equalled by the successes of the Allies in France? Will any thinking man, will any historian pronounce such an opinion?
"The Allies advanced with all Europe in their train, against a force which might be almost counted as nothing. They had 600,000 men in the line, and nearly an equal number in reserve. If they had been beaten, they had nothing to fear, they could have fallen back. I, on the contrary, in Germany, 500 leagues from home, had hardly a force equal to my enemy’s. I was surrounded by sovereigns and people repressed only by fear, and who, on the first disaster, were ready to rise against me. But I triumphed amidst dangers constantly increasing; I was incessantly compelled to exercise an equal degree of address and energy. In all these enterprises I found it necessary to display a strange character, strange views and a strange confidence in my own plans, which were disapproved perhaps by every one around me.
"What deeds on the part of the Allies can be compared with these? If I had not conquered at Austerlitz, I should have had all Prussia on me. If I had not proved victorious at Jena, Austria and Spain would have assailed me in my rear. If I had not triumphed at Wagram, which by the by, was a less decisive victory, I had to fear that Russia would abandon me, that Prussia would rise against me; and meanwhile the English were already before Antwerp.