When opposing the drawing up of an article to specify the causes for which divorce would be admissible, he said; "But is it not a great misfortune to be compelled to expose these causes, and reveal even the most minute and private family details?
“Besides, will these causes, even in the event of their real existence, be always sufficient to obtain divorce? That of adultery, for instance, can only be successfully maintained by proofs, which it is always very difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to produce. Yet the husband, who should not be able to bring forward these proofs, would be compelled to live with a woman whom he abhors and despises, and who introduces illegitimate children into his family. His only resource would be separation from bed and board; but this would not shield his name from dishonour.”
Resuming the support of the principle of divorce, and opposing certain restrictions, he continued; "Marriage is not always, as is supposed, the result of affection. A young female consents to marry for the sake of conforming to the fashion, and obtaining independence and an establishment of her own. She accepts a husband of a disproportionate age, and whose tastes and habits do not accord with hers. The law then should provide for her a resource against the moment when, the illusion having ceased, she finds that she is united in ill-assorted bonds, and that her expectations have been disappointed.
"Marriage takes its form from the manners, customs, and religion, of every people. Thus its forms are not everywhere alike. In some countries, wives and concubines live under the same roof; and slaves are treated like children: the organization of families is therefore not deduced from the law of nature. The marriages of the Romans were not like those of the French.
"The precautions established by law for preventing persons from contracting unthinkingly at the age of fifteen or eighteen an engagement which extends to the whole of their lives, are certainly wise. But are they sufficient?
"That after ten years passed in wedlock, divorce should not be admitted but for very weighty reasons, is also a proper regulation. Since, however, marriages contracted in early youth are rarely the choice of the parties themselves, but are brought about by their families for interested views, it is proper that, if the parties themselves perceive that they are not formed for one another, they should be enabled to dissolve a union on which they had no opportunity of reflecting. The facility thus afforded them, however, should not tend to favour either levity or passion. It should be surrounded by every precaution and every form calculated to prevent its abuse. The parties, for example, might be heard by a secret family council, held under the presidency of the magistrate. In addition to this, it might, if thought necessary, be determined that a woman should only once be allowed to procure divorce, and that she should not be suffered to re-marry in less than five years, lest the idea of a second marriage should induce her to dissolve the first; that, after married persons have lived together for ten years, the dissolution should be rendered very difficult, &c.
“To grant divorce only on account of adultery publicly proved, is to proscribe it completely; for, on the one hand, few cases of adultery can be proved, and, on the other, there are few men shameless enough to expose the infamy of their wives. Besides, it would be scandalous, and contrary to the honour of the nation, to reveal the scenes that pass in some families; it might be concluded, though erroneously, that they afford a picture of our French manners.”
The first lawyers of the council were of opinion that civil death should carry along with it the dissolution of the civil contract of marriage. The question was warmly discussed. The First Consul, with great animation, opposed it in these terms; "A woman is then to be forbidden, though fully convinced of her husband’s innocence, to follow in exile the man to whom she is most tenderly united; or, if she should yield to her conviction, and to her duty, she is to be regarded only as a concubine! Why deprive an unfortunate married couple of the right of living together under the honourable title of lawful husband and wife?
"If the law permits a woman to follow her husband, without allowing her the title of wife, it permits adultery.
"Society is sufficiently avenged by the sentence of condemnation, when the criminal is deprived of his property and torn from his friends and his connections. Is there any need to extend the punishment to the wife, and violently to dissolve a union which identifies her existence with that of her husband? Would she not say:—‘You[‘You] had better have taken his life, I should then have been permitted at least to cherish his memory; but you ordain that he shall live, and you will not allow me to console him in his misery.’[misery.’] Alas! how many men have been led into guilt only through their attachment to their wives! Those therefore who have caused their misfortunes should at least be permitted to share them. If a woman fulfils this duty, you esteem her virtue, and yet you are allowing her no greater indulgence than would be extended to the infamous wretch who prostitutes herself!" Volumes might be filled with quotations of this sort.