At any rate, these noble deeds at that critical period, have shed lustre on the ranks of the army rather than on its principal leaders. It would have been well, if, at the moment of that terrible catastrophe, during that fatal crisis, some of our first generals had again exhibited some of those noble acts of courage, those signal efforts, which marked our first triumphs, and which, under Napoleon’s reign, had become almost a national habit; whatever the result might have been, the attempt would have been a source of consolation to our glory, and France would have contemplated with satisfaction the heroic convulsions of her agony. We ought not to have terminated our career by common actions.
At that calamitous period, we had more troops abroad than at home: Dresden contained an army: a second army was shut up in Hamburg; a third in Dantzick; and a fourth might have been easily collected by bringing together the immense number of our soldiers, which formed several other intermediate garrisons. All the efforts of our enemies tended only to keep these brave troops separated from France, and to cut off their return. Oh! that some one of their leaders had been inspired with the thought to take advantage of those circumstances to liberate the sacred soil, by attacking boldly that of the enemy, and obliging him thus to retrace his steps! Would it have been impossible to unite those different corps?
Would not the union of the garrisons of Dresden, Torgau, Magdeburg, Hamburg, have produced a formidable army in the rear of the enemy, capable of breaking through his line, or of placing him in a most critical situation? Might not such an army have taken possession of Berlin, liberated the garrisons on the Oder, gone to the assistance of Dantzick, raised an insurrection in Poland, so well prepared for it, or, in short, done something bold, striking, unexpected, in a word, worthy of us?
What then was required to give a favourable turn to our destinies? the most trifling event, before the Allies entered France, would have sufficed to enable us to conclude a peace on reasonable terms at Francfort; and, at a later period, when the enemy was already in our own territory, the slightest cause of uneasiness in his rear at the time of the heroic actions of Champaubert, Montmirail, Vauchamp, Craon, Monterau, would probably have determined the hasty retreat of the Allies, and insured our triumph, and perhaps their destruction. And, if the general who had thus dared to devote himself had failed in the attempt, it would not have been the worse for us, since we have ultimately fallen; and he, in the spirit of our national character, would have gained the reputation of a hero and rendered his name immortal.
Instead of this, about one hundred thousand men were lost to France, by tamely adhering to the letter of their instructions; a system which we had long since abandoned. But perhaps I speak inconsiderately and without due knowledge of the subject; perhaps local circumstances and objections of which I am totally ignorant might be adduced as conclusive answers against me; such as the health of the troops, the state of destitution in which they were; the non-reception of orders from the Emperor, who did endeavour to give some orders of that kind; the fear of deranging the main plan; the dread of incurring too great a responsibility, &c. But is it not rather that the source of these high conceptions, and the cause of their heroic execution, were to be found in Napoleon alone, and that where he was not, as it may have been often observed, affairs were suffered to sink to the level of their ordinary course? Be that as it may, something of the kind was however suggested to the General commanding the army in Dantzick, at the time of the capitulation of that town. The idea came from an officer of inferior rank, it is true, but from one whose courage and intrepidity, and the success with which they had been crowned, entitled him perhaps to give such an opinion: it was Captain de Chambure, the leader of that renowned company of partisans which covered itself with glory during the siege. This company had been formed for that particular service, of one hundred picked men chosen out of the most notoriously intrepid, throughout all the corps of the army; it fulfilled, and even exceeded, all the expectations which it had raised; and the besiegers, struck with terror at its exploits, honoured it with the epithet of infernal. It would sometimes land at night in the rear of the Russian army, slaughter their sentinels, spike their guns, burn their magazines, destroy their parks, threaten the lives even of the generals, and return to the town through the enemies’ camp over the bodies of all who opposed its passage. These facts and several others are recorded in the general orders of that army.
It cannot be denied that, in ordinary times, in the days that preceded ours, every one of these actions would have been sufficient to immortalize every individual who had a share in them, and that even amidst the wonders of our age they are deserving of particular notice. On his return from Elba, Napoleon was desirous of seeing the brave Chambure, who was covered with wounds: he was accordingly introduced to the Emperor by the Minister of War, and was immediately appointed to the command of a partisan corps on the eastern frontiers of France, where he again shewed himself worthy of his fame. Two English officers fell into his hands in the very heart of France, and at the moment of the violent exasperation produced by the recent disasters which had again befallen us. De Chambure protected these officers from the fury of his own soldiers, and preserved their equipages and even their baggage. Will it be believed? Some time afterwards, this officer, whose courage, loyalty, and above all, whose noble conduct were deserving of the highest recompense, was by a French tribunal condemned to the galleys for life, and to be branded and exposed in the pillory, for having, it was said, stopped and robbed two officers of the enemy’s army on the highway! Such is the justice of party-spirit! Such the monstrous aberrations to which the judgment and the consciences of men can be reconciled by the effervescence of civil commotions!
Under these circumstances, no alternative was left to Colonel de Chambure but a speedy retreat from his own country: it was in vain that from his exile he endeavoured to make the truth known; it was in vain that the two English officers gave the most extensive publicity to the testimonials of their gratitude: a considerable time elapsed before Colonel de Chambure could seize the opportunity of a moment of political calm, to deliver up his person to the tribunals, and call for a revision of his trial.—That revision took place, and this time the result was a declaration that there were not even any grounds of accusation against him! This is indeed one of the peculiar signs of the times!
THE EMPEROR’S IMAGINARY PLANS FOR THE FUTURE.—NAPOLEON LITTLE KNOWN EVEN BY HIS HOUSEHOLD—HIS RELIGIOUS OPINIONS.
From Friday 7th to Saturday 8th.—During a long private conversation, this morning, the Emperor reverted to all the horrors of our present situation, and enumerated all the chances which hope suggested of better days.
After his remarks on these topics, which I cannot repeat here, he gave the rein to his imagination, and said that the only countries in which he could reside for the future were England and America. His inclination, he added, prompted for America, because there he should be really free, and independence and repose were all he now sighed for: then followed an imaginary plan of life: he fancied himself with his brother Joseph, in the midst of a little France, &c. Yet policy, he observed, might decide for England. He was bound perhaps to remain a slave to events—he owed the sacrifice of himself to a nation which had done more for him than he had done for it in return; and then followed another imaginary plan for the future.