“Castle of Marach, 3d April, 1808.
“Sir and brother.—The auditor D——t delivered to me an hour ago your despatch, dated 22d March. I send a courier who will take this letter to you in Holland.
“The use you have just made of the privilege of mercy cannot but produce a very bad effect. This privilege is one of the finest and noblest attributes of the sovereign power. In order not to bring it into discredit, it must be used only in cases when the royal clemency is not detrimental to the ends of justice, or when it is calculated to leave an impression of being the result of generous feelings. The present case is that of a number of banditti, who attacked and murdered several custom-house officers, with the intention of smuggling afterwards without interruption. These people are condemned to death; and your Majesty extends the royal mercy to them ... to a set of murderers, to men whom nobody can pity. If they had been caught in the act of smuggling; if, in defending themselves, they had killed some of the officers, then you might perhaps have taken into consideration the situation of their families, and their own; and have shewn an example of a kind of paternal feeling, by modifying the severity of the law, by a commutation of punishment. It is in cases of condemnation for offences against the revenue laws, it is more particularly in cases of condemnation for political offences, that clemency is well applied. In these matters the principle is that, if it is the Sovereign who is attacked, there is a certain magnanimity in pardoning the offender. On the first report of an affair of that kind, the sympathy of the public is immediately excited in favour of the offender, and not of him who is to inflict the punishment. If the Prince remits the sentence, the people consider him superior to the offence, and the public clamour is directed against those who have offended him. If he follows the opposite system, he is thought vindictive and tyrannical. If he pardons atrocious crimes, he is looked upon as weak, or actuated by bad intentions.
“Do not fancy that the privilege of mercy can always be used without danger, and that society will always commend the exercise of it in the Sovereign. The Sovereign is blamed when he applies it in favour of murderers or great malefactors, because it then becomes injurious to the interests of the community. You have too frequently, and on too many occasions, extended the royal mercy. The kindness of your heart must not be listened to when it can become prejudicial to your people. In the affair of the Jews, I should have done as you did; but in that of the smugglers of Middelburg, I should not have pardoned on any account. Many reasons ought to have induced you to let justice take its course, and give the example of an execution which would have produced the excellent effect of preventing many crimes by the terror which it would have inspired. Public officers are murdered in the middle of the night—the murderers are condemned. Your Majesty commutes the punishment of death into a few years’ imprisonment! How much will this not tend to dishearten all the persons employed in the collection of your revenue! The political effect produced by it is also very bad, for the following reasons:—Holland was the channel through which England had, for many years, introduced her goods on the Continent. The Dutch merchants have made immense profits by this trade; and that is the reason why the Dutch nation is partial to England, and fond of smuggling, and why it hates France, who forbids smuggling and opposes England. The mercy which you have extended to these smugglers and murderers is a kind of compliment which you have paid to the taste of the Dutch for smuggling. You appear to make common cause with them,—and against whom? Against me.
“The Dutch love you: your disposition is amiable, your manners are unaffected, and you govern them according to their inclination; but you would make a beneficial use of the influence you possess if you shewed yourself positively determined to suppress smuggling, and if you opened their eyes to their real interests: they would then think that the system of prohibition is good, since it is observed by the King. I cannot see what advantage your Majesty can derive from a species of popularity which you would acquire at my expense. Certainly Holland is no longer what it was at the time of the treaty of Ryswick; and France is not in the situation in which it was placed during the last years of the reign of Louis XIV. If, therefore, Holland is unable to follow a system of policy independent of that of France, it must fulfil the conditions of the alliance.
“It is not to the present alone that sovereigns must accommodate their policy; the future must also be the object of their consideration. What is at this moment the situation of Europe? On one side, England, who possesses, by her sole exertions, a dominion to which the whole world has been hitherto compelled to submit. On the other side, the French Empire and the Continental States, which, strengthened by the union of their powers, cannot acquiesce in this supremacy exercised by England. Those states had also their colonies and a maritime trade; they possess an extent of coast much greater than England; but they have become disunited, and England has attacked the naval power of each separately: England has triumphed on every sea, and all navies have been destroyed. Russia, Sweden, France, and Spain, which possess such ample means for having ships and sailors, dare not venture to send a squadron out of their ports. It is, therefore, no longer from a confederation amongst the maritime powers—a confederation which it would be besides impossible to maintain, on account of the distance, and of the interference of the various interests of each with those of the others—that Europe can expect its maritime emancipation, and a system of peace, which can be established only by the will of England.
“I wish for peace; I wish to obtain it by every means compatible with the dignity of the power of France; at the expense of every sacrifice which our national honour can allow. Every day I feel more and more that peace is necessary; and the sovereigns of the Continent are as anxious for peace as I am. I feel no passionate prejudice against England; I bear her no insurmountable hatred: she has followed against me a system of repulsion; I have adopted against her the Continental system, not so much from a jealousy of ambition, as my enemies suppose, but in order to reduce England to the necessity of adjusting our differences. Let England be rich and prosperous; it is no concern of mine, provided France and her allies enjoy the same advantages.
“The Continental system has, therefore, no other object than to advance the moment when the public rights of Europe and of the French Empire will be definitively established. The sovereigns of the North observe and enforce strictly the system of prohibition, and their trade has been greatly benefited by it: the manufactures of Prussia may now compete with ours. You are aware that France, and the whole extent of coast which now forms part of the Empire, from the Gulf of Lyons to the extremity of the Adriatic, are strictly closed against the produce of foreign industry. I am about to adopt a measure with respect to the affairs of Spain, the result of which will be to wrest Portugal from England, and subject all the coasts of Spain, on both seas, to the influence of the policy of France. The coasts of the whole of Europe will then be closed against England, with the exception of those of Turkey, which I do not care about, as the Turks do not trade with Europe.
“Do you not perceive, from this statement, the fatal consequences that would result from the facilities given by Holland to the English for the introduction of their goods on the continent? They would enable England to levy upon us the subsidies which she would afterwards offer to other powers to fight against us. Your Majesty is as much interested as I am to guard against the crafty policy of the English Cabinet. A few years more, and England will wish for peace as much as we do. Observe the situation of your kingdom, and you will see that the system I allude to is more useful to yourself than it is to me. Holland is a maritime and commercial power; she possesses fine sea-ports, fleets, sailors, skilful commanders, and colonies, which do not cost any thing to the mother-country; and her inhabitants understand trade as well as the English. Has not Holland, therefore, an interest in defending all those advantages? May not peace restore her to the station she formerly held? Granted that her situation may be painful for a few years; but is not this preferable to making the King of Holland a mere governor for England, and Holland and her colonies a vassal of Great Britain? Yet the protection which you would afford to English commerce would lead to that result. The examples of Sicily and Portugal are still before your eyes.
“Await the result of the progress of time. You want to sell your spirits, and England wants to buy them. Point out the place where the English smugglers may come and fetch them; but let them pay for them in money and never in goods, positively never! Peace must at last be made; and you will then conclude a treaty of commerce with England. I may perhaps also make one with her, but in which our mutual interests shall be reciprocally guaranteed. If we must allow England to exercise a kind of supremacy on the sea, a supremacy which she will have purchased at the expense of her treasure and her blood, and which is the natural consequence of her geographical position and of her possessions in the three other parts of the globe; at least our flags will be at liberty to appear on the ocean without being exposed to insult, and our maritime trade will cease to be ruinous. For the present we must direct our efforts towards preventing England from interfering in the affairs of the Continent.