Battles of Leipsic, (16th, 18th, and 19th Oct.)—“At first fortune seemed to smile on the Emperor. But soon a letter from the King of Würtemberg informed him that the Bavarian army, seduced by the intrigues and the prevailing spirit of the moment, had joined the Austrians, against whom it was intended to be opposed; that it was marching on the Rhine to cut off the communication with France; and that the King of Würtemburg was himself under the necessity of yielding to circumstances. This unexpected event obliged Napoleon to suspend his preparations, and to fall back, in order to secure his retreat. This complication of false movements proved servicable to the Allies, who pressed and surrounded us: a great battle seemed inevitable. Napoleon assembled his forces in the plains of Leipsic. His army consisted of 157,000 men, and six hundred pieces of artillery; but the Allies possessed 1000 pieces of artillery, and 350,000 men. During the first day, the action was furiously maintained: The French remained triumphant and the victory would have been decisive, if one of the corps stationed at Dresden had taken part in the battle, as the Emperor hoped it would. General Merfeld was taken prisoner, but liberated on parole, with an intimation that the Emperor was at length willing to renounce Germany. But the Allies, who were encouraged by the arrival of an immense reinforcement, resumed the engagement on the following day; and they were now so numerous that, when their troops were exhausted, they were regularly relieved by fresh corps, as on the parade. The most inconceivable fatality was now combined with inequality of numbers; the most infamous treachery unexpectedly broke out in our ranks; the Saxons, our allies, deserted us, went over to the enemy, and turned their artillery against us. Still, however, the presence of mind, energy, and skill of the French general, together with the courage of our troops, made amends for all, and we again remained masters of the field.
“These two terrible engagements, which history will record as battles of giants, had cost the enemy 150,000 of his best troops, 50,000 of whom lay dead on the field of battle. Our loss amounted to 50,000 only. Thus the difference between our forces was considerably diminished: and a third engagement presented itself, with changes much more favourable. But our ammunition was exhausted; our parks contained no more than 16,000 charges; we had fired 220,000 during the two preceding days. We were compelled to make arrangements for our retreat, which commenced during the night, on Leipsic. At day-break the Allies assailed us; they entered Leipsic along with us, and an engagement commenced in the streets of the city. Our rear-guard was defending itself valiantly and without sustaining great loss, when a fatal occurrence ruined all: the only bridge across the Elster, by which our retreat could be effected, was, by some accident or misunderstanding, blown up. Thus all our forces on the Leipsic bank of the river were lost, and all on the opposite bank marched in haste and disorder upon Mentz. At Hanau we were compelled to force a passage through 50,000 Bavarian troops. Only the wrecks of our army returned to France; and, to render the misfortune complete, they brought contagion along with them.”
Such was the fatal campaign of Saxony, our last national effort, the tomb of our gigantic power. Opposed to the united efforts of all the forces of Europe, and in spite of all the chances that were accumulated against us, the genius of a single man had, in the course of this campaign, been four times on the point of restoring our ascendancy, and cementing it by peace: after the victories of Lützen and Bautzen, after the battle of Dresden, at the time of the last movement on Berlin, and finally on the plains of Leipsic.
Napoleon failed only by a complication of fatalities and perfidies, of which history furnishes no example. I here note down only those which occur to me on a retrospective view of the events of this period.
FATALITIES.
(A.) Sudden indisposition of Napoleon.
(B.) Unexpected overflow of the Bober.
(C.) Confidential letter from the King of Bavaria.
(D.) Orders which did not reach the corps at Dresden.
(E.) Deficiency of ammunition after the two battles of Leipsic.