(I.) The chief of the staff of the 3d corps, a Swiss by birth, but educated in our ranks, went over to the enemy a few days before the renewal of hostilities, taking with him all the information he could collect. For this service the Emperor of Russia rewarded him with particular favour and made him one of his Aides-de-camp. It has been said that this officer, who was possessed of great talent, had reason to complain of some injustice; but can any thing palliate such an act, or remove the disgrace attending it?
(K.) Part of Napoleon’s plan of Campaign was that the Bavarian army, stationed on the Danube, should act in concert with the army of Italy stationed in Illyria, and that their combined efforts should be directed upon Vienna. The important effect which these measures must have produced on the fate of the Campaign may be easily conceived. But the chief of the Bavarian army, under some pretence or other, but in reality because he had entered into an understanding with the enemy, remained constantly inactive, and thus paralyzed the efforts of the Viceroy, who had to oppose the great bulk of the Austrian force. It has already been stated that the open defection of the Bavarians, at the most critical moment of the campaign, mainly contributed to bring about our disasters.
(L.) But nothing equalled the infamous and disgraceful treachery of the Saxons, who, though they were then serving in our ranks and were our companions in danger and glory, suddenly turned against us. Whatever might be the fatal effects of their desertion, the disgrace attached to themselves is greater than all the mischief they occasioned to us.
The conduct of Napoleon during this period, when he was described as a monster of deception and bad faith, presents, on the contrary, an example of singular magnanimity.
He had added a corps of Saxons to his Imperial guard; but, on the desertion of their countrymen, he ranged them round their Sovereign, whom he left at Leipsic,[[19]] releasing him from all his engagements. There were also some Bavarians in his army, and he wrote to their chief, informing him that, Bavaria having disloyally declared war against him, this circumstance would authorize him in disarming and detaining prisoners all the Bavarians in his service; but that such a measure would destroy the confidence which Napoleon wished that the troops under his orders should repose in him. He therefore ordered them to be supplied with provisions, and dismissed.[[20]]
(M.) I have before me the notes of a distinguished officer relative to the capitulation of Dresden. Estimating the number of troops which we had left behind us in the fortresses from which we were separated, he concludes that they must have amounted altogether to 177,000. The Emperor had but 157,000 men at Leipsic. How different, therefore, might have been our fate, had those masses, or even a portion of them, been at his disposal in this decisive event. But this unfortunate dispersion was occasioned by extraordinary circumstances, and was not the result of any regular system. The following particulars, relative to the violation of the capitulation of Dresden, are literally quoted from the notes above alluded to:—
“Above all, it is necessary to understand that it was determined in the plan of the coalition against France, of which Prince Schwartzenberg had the credit, that according as offers were made for the capitulation of each of our numerous garrisons, the conditions should be fairly and honourably granted, but without any intention of fulfilling them. This point being established, the reason of the refusal of the capitulation, signed at Dresden by Marshal St.-Cyr and Generals Tolstoy and Klenau, was, that Prince Schwartzenberg could not ratify it, because the Count de Lobau, Napoleon’s aide-de-camp, who was shut up in Dresden with the Marshal, had protested against the capitulation. Some time after, the capitulation of Dantzick, with General Rapp, was declined, under the odiously false pretence that the garrison of Dresden, in spite of the conditions of its capitulation, had entered into service immediately on its arrival at Strasburg, and that, in consequence, the capitulation of Dantzick could not be approved without incurring the risk of similar inconveniences.
“The following is an additional proof of the bad faith of the Allies. The garrison of Dresden, which was composed of two corps d’armée, forming altogether 45,000 men, capitulated on the 11th of November.[[21]]
“According to the terms of the capitulation, the French were to evacuate the fortress in six columns and in six successive days, and to repair to Strasburgh.
“This capitulation was fulfilled, so far at least as regarded our evacuation of the fortress and its occupation by the enemy; but our sixth column had scarcely made a day’s march from the town when it was announced that the capitulation was declined and rejected by the General-in-chief, Prince Schwartzenberg, by an order of the 19th of November.