“I think it incumbent on me to declare that this correspondence has been obtained and published without my knowledge. The high sources whence the author affirms he has derived his materials confers a degree of historical importance on his work; and therefore in so far as I am concerned, I cannot allow myself to sanction, by my silence, the errors it contains. Most of the details relative to the negotiations which took place subsequently to the 31st of March, are incorrect.
“With regard to the Congress of Chatillon, if events have justified the desire I entertained for the establishment of peace, it would be wrong to withhold from France and history the motives of national interest and honour which prevented the Emperor from subscribing to the conditions which foreigners wished to impose on us.
“I therefore fulfil the first of duties, that of acting justly and candidly, in developing these motives, by the following extract from the Emperor’s orders to me.
“Paris, January 19, 1814.
“.... The point on which the Emperor most urgently insists is the necessity of France retaining her natural limits: this is my sine qua non. All the powers of Europe, even England, acknowledged these limits at Frankfort. France, if reduced to her old limits, would not now possess two thirds of the relative power which she had twenty years ago. The territory she has acquired in the direction of the Rhine does not balance what Russia, Prussia, and Austria have acquired merely by the dismemberment of Poland; all these states have increased in magnitude. To restore France to her old limits would be to humble and degrade her. France without the departments of the Rhine, without Belgium, Ostend, and Antwerp, would be nothing. The plan of limiting France to her old frontiers is inseparable from the restoration of the Bourbons; for they alone can offer a guarantee for the maintenance of such a system. England knows this; with any other government, peace on such a basis would be impossible, and could not endure. Neither the Emperor nor the Republic (should revolution again restore it), would ever subscribe to such a condition. As far as regards his Majesty, his determination is irrecoverably fixed: he will not leave France less than he found her. Should the Allies wish to alter the bases that have been proposed and accepted,—namely, that France should preserve her natural limits, the Emperor finds only three courses open to him: to fight and conquer; to fight and perish gloriously; or, finally, if the nation should not support him, to abdicate. The Emperor attaches but little importance to sovereignty; he will never purchase it by degradation.”
“I hope. Sir, that your impartiality will induce you to grant this letter a place in your Journal, and I take this opportunity of presenting to you assurances of my respect,” &c.
“CAULAINCOURT,
Duke of Vicenza.”
[2]. I had but one copy of it at St. Helena, and this was constantly in his bed-room. If I happened to fetch it for reference, or to make corrections, it was asked for again almost immediately. At the moment of my departure, Count Bertrand begged me to leave it him, for the instruction of his children. He has since told me that he could never use it. The Emperor took entire possession of it, and when in his last moments, he pointed out the books which were to be selected from his private library for his Son, the Atlas was among them. If I could not refrain from mentioning such a signal mark of approbation, I hope I shall be forgiven.
[3]. Since my return to Europe, some Letters from St. Helena have been published, in which the above anecdotes are related, almost word for word. This and other circumstances induced me to make some inquiry respecting the publication; and I am enabled to affirm that, though anonymous, its contents are derived from the most authentic sources, and are entitled to full credit.