“Paris, May 31, 1814.”
The great European triumvirate dew up the treaty of Fontainebleau, England acceded to it, a declaration made in the name of the King of France promised its fulfilment in so far as he was concerned; and yet, in spite of all these guarantees, it may be said that scarcely any of the articles were observed. Certainly, it would be difficult to conceive a more flagrant violation of good faith or a more absolute compromise of the august signatures, which, it was to be expected, each party would have been individually interested in preserving unsullied and sacred. On these manifest violations was grounded the moral justification of Napoleon’s enterprise in 1815. This opinion was pretty generally adopted: it was advocated by the most distinguished members of the English Parliament, those indefatigable supporters of great principles, and by eminent statesmen of all countries. I may add to these high authorities an individual opinion, which though somewhat comically expressed, was not perhaps the less just. An Austrian gentleman of rank, who was in Paris in 1815, and who was a furious enemy of Napoleon’s, called on me just at the time when the Emperor’s advance to the capital began to produce a great sensation. The Austrian had already determined to set off, and he said to me, with all possible gravity and sincerity: “Certainly, he hitherto occupied the throne of France as an usurper: that’s unquestionable! But,” added he, quibbling with himself diplomatically, “if he should now conquer France, after all the monarchs of Europe have acknowledged him as a sovereign, and have entitled him to go to war by not observing the conditions they entered into, the case would be very different. And, upon my word! ... for my own part at least ... I think in that case ... there might be some ground for maintaining that he has become legitimate. At least, I think I should myself be inclined to consider him so.”
LETTER FROM LORD CASTLEREAGH TO LORD BATHURST,
RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU.
(Paris, April 15, 1814.)
“... I shall, therefore, on the present occasion, confine myself to an explanation of what has passed with respect to the future destination and settlement of Napoleon and his family.
“Your Lordship has been already informed, by Lord Cathcart, of the Act of Abdication which was signed by Buonaparte, on the 4th instant, and of the assurance which was given him by the Emperor of Russia, and the Provisional Government, of a pecuniary provision of six millions of francs, with a safe asylum in the Island of Elba. The act in question was deposited in the hands of M. de Caulaincourt, and Marshals Ney and Macdonald, to be given up upon the due execution of engagements on the part of the Allies, with respect to the proposed arrangement. These persons were also authorized to agree to an armistice, and to settle such a line of demarcation as might be satisfactory to the Allies, and, in the mean time, prevent an unnecessary effusion of blood.
“On my arrival, I found this arrangement on the point of execution. A convention had been discussed, and would have, in fact, been signed in the course of the day by the Russian Minister, had not the approach of the Allied Ministers been announced. The motives for accelerating the immediate conclusion of this act, were the inconvenience, if not the danger of Napoleon’s remaining at Fontainebleau, surrounded by troops, who still, in a considerable degree, remained faithful to him; the apprehension of intrigues in the army and in the capital; and the importance attached, by a considerable portion of the officers, to some arrangement favourable to their chief, in satisfaction of their personal honour, before they left him.
“On the night of my arrival, the four Ministers had a conference with the Prince de Benevento, on the subject of the proposed convention, to which I stated my objections, desiring, at the same time, to be understood as not urging them then, at the hazard of the internal tranquillity of France, nor in impeachment of what was due, in good faith, to the assurance given, under the exigency of the moment, by Russia.
“The Prince de Benevento admitted the weight of many of the objections stated, but declared that he did consider it, on the part of the Provisional Government, as an object of the first importance, to avoid any thing that might assume the character of a civil war, even for the shortest time:—that he also found some such measure necessary, to make the army pass over in a temper to be made use of. Upon these declarations, and the Count de Nesselrode’s, that the Emperor, his master, had found it necessary, in the absence of the Allies, to act for the best, in their name as well as his own; I withdrew any further opposition to the principle of the measure, suggesting only some alterations in the details. I desired, however, to decline, on the part of my Government, being more than an acceding party to the treaty, and declared that the Act of Accession on the part of Great Britain should not go beyond the territorial arrangements proposed in the Treaty. My objections to our unnecessarily mixing in its forms, especially in the recognition of Napoleon’s title under present circumstances, were considered as perfectly reasonable: and I now enclose the protocol and note, which will explain the extent to which I have taken it upon me to give assurances on the part of my Court.