"The same faction, the same headlong spirit, which, under favour of our internal dissensions, led the Prussians fourteen years ago to the plains of Champagne, still prevail in their Councils. If they no longer wish to burn and destroy Paris; they now boast their intention to plant their colours in the capital of our allies. They would oblige Saxony, by a disgraceful transaction, to renounce her independence, by ranking her in the list of their provinces. They seek, in fine, to tear your laurels from your brows. They expect us to evacuate Germany at the sight of their army. What madness! Let them learn that it would be a thousand times easier to destroy the great capital, than to sully the honour of the children of the great people and their allies. In their former attempt the plans of our enemies were frustrated. They found in the plains of Champagne only shame, defeat, and death; but the lessons of experience are forgotten, and there are men in whom the feelings of hatred and jealousy never become extinct.
"Soldiers, there is not one of you who would wish to return to France by any other path than that of honour. We ought not to return except by passing beneath triumphal arches.
"What! have we braved the inclemency of the seasons, the ocean and the desert, have we subdued Europe often united against us; have we extended our glory from East to West, only to return now, like deserters, after having abandoned our allies, and to be told that the French Eagle has fled in dismay before the Prussians.
"But they have already arrived at our advance posts. Let us, then, march upon them, since forbearance will not check their infatuation. Let the Prussian army experience the fate which it shared fourteen years ago. Let us teach them that if it is easy to obtain an increase of territory and power with the friendship of the great people, their enmity (which can only be provoked by the neglect of prudence and reason) is more terrible than the storms of the ocean."
Our soldiers only wished to fight. The Prussians occupied Saalfeld and Schleitz; we charged them, routed them, and made a thousand prisoners. These were the two first engagements which we had with them. I quitted Murat, whom I had been ordered to follow, and went to render an account of the affair of Schleitz to Napoleon, who had established his head-quarters some leagues in the rear, at the residence of a Princess of Reus-Lobenstein. On my arrival I found Napoleon engaged with Berthier. I informed him of the success of the Grand Duke, and of the defeat of Tauenzien. "Tauenzien!" exclaimed Napoleon, "one of the Prussian intriguers! It was well worth our while to urge on the war to such a length." He told me I might retire and take some rest, as I should be roused in a few hours to set out on a mission. I had no idea whither I was to go. I was called about 5 o'clock. The Emperor gave me a letter for King William, who at that time, I believe, held his head-quarters at Sondershausen. "You must go," said he, "as fast as you can after the King of Prussia, and deliver to him this letter from me. I ask him once more for peace, though hostilities have already commenced. You must endeavour to convince the King of the danger of his situation, and the fatal consequences which may result from it. You will return immediately and bring me his answer: I shall now march on Gera." Our baggage was still in the rear. I had no carriage; but I procured one from the coach-house of the Princess of Reus-Lobenstein, put four good horses to it, and started about six o'clock. Before I had proceeded a league on my journey, Napoleon sent after me. I returned and went to his study, where he had been occupied the whole of the night. He desired me to deliver the letter to Berthier. "Upon reflection," said he, "I will not have one of my aides-de-camp charged with such a message. You are persons of too great importance to be exposed to the chance of meeting with a bad reception." The letter was sent two days after by M. de Montesquiou: he started, I believe, from Gera. The treatment he experienced is well known: he was stopped by the Prince de Hohenlohe, at that time general-in-chief of the Prussian army, who obliged him to be present at the battle of Jena, and did not send the letter, as it is affirmed, until after the action.
Several persons in Napoleon's suite were of opinion, that if I had executed the commission with which I was at first charged, I should have come up with the King of Prussia, and the war perhaps would not have taken place. I do not think so. The gauntlet was thrown, there was no alternative but to take it up. I do not even think that Napoleon was more inclined for peace than King William.
CHAPTER XI.
We were now in possession of the whole course of the Saale, and in a fair way to turn the enemy's army. The calculations of the Duke of Brunswick were completely frustrated. He had formed the idea of coming up with us on the Mainc, of occupying our wings by detached corps, and penetrating our centre before we could concentrate our forces. He still possessed all the threads of that vast spy system which had harassed France since the emigrations. He knew the force and the route marked out for several corps which were marching from Meudon, and he did not doubt of anticipating us. Napoleon took a pleasure in cherishing this illusion; he made preparations, and caused reconnaissances to be taken through the whole of that line. The Duke had no longer any doubt of having penetrated our intentions; we were to debouch by Kœnigshaften; he made certain of that; he felt perfectly convinced of it. Our movements on his centre were only a snare, a _ruse de guerre_; we wished to deceive him, in order to prevent him from debouching by the forests of Thuringen, whilst we proceeded towards Coburg and Memmingen, in woody and mountainous countries, where his cavalry would have no opportunity of acting, or at least would be deprived of its advantage. It was of the utmost importance to anticipate us, and he hurried to Kœnigshaften.