Memoirs of General Count Rapp, first aide-de-camp to Napoleon

by comte Jean Rapp

We immediately began our march, and reached the Souffel, two leagues in advance of Strasburg. The fifteenth division had its right on the river Ill, its centre at Hoenheim, its left at Souffelweyersheim, and extended to the road from Brumpt; the sixteenth occupied Lampertheim, Mundolsheim, the three villages of Hausbergen, with its left resting on the road from Saverne: lastly, the seventeenth was in columns on the road from Molsheim, with two regiments of cavalry; two others were placed in the rear of the fifteenth division at Bischeim. Such was the situation of our troops on the morning of the 28th, when the enemy attacked with impetuosity the village of Lampertheim, which was occupied by a battalion of the 10th, under the command of General Beurmann. This battalion alone sustained for a long time the attacks of 8000 infantry, and the continued firing of six pieces of cannon. However, as the number of the assailants was continually increasing, it withdrew behind the river, and, conformably to its orders, stationed itself at Mundolsheim.

The enemy's columns, from 40 to 50,000 men strong, advanced immediately by the roads from Brumpt and Bishweiller. All these arrangements, and the masses of cavalry which covered the first of these roads, announced that their project was to separate the divisions of Generals Rottembourg and Albert, in order to overwhelm the latter. I did not mistake the design of the Allies, but I had not the power of uniting my troops, which had deployed in an immense plain, and were already engaged throughout the whole line. There only remained one expedient; I adopted it immediately, fortunately it was a most fatal one for the enemy. I closed the 10th regiment into columns, in the very midst of the firing; I ordered the 32d to advance; and I moved it en echelon after having formed it into a square. The rest of the division of Albert remained in reserve on the height of Hiderhausbergen.

Defending the ground foot by foot, General Rottembourg changed the front of his division, throwing his left wing into the rear, and proceeded to cover the villages of Hoenheim, Bischeim and Schittigheim, threatening the flank of the troops which were engaged between these two divisions. This was according to his orders.

The 103d was placed on the road from Brumpt, and the 36th left Souffelweyersheim to support it; but scarcely had it begun to march when the Allies attacked the village. I immediately despatched a company to defend this important position. Our soldiers advanced to it, running, but our adversaries had taken possession of it before they could arrive. Captain Chauvin supported with extraordinary courage the fire of a cloud of sharpshooters, and thus gave time for General Fririon to come up. This officer left a battalion and four pieces of cannon to cover the road, and advanced in charging time with the rest of his forces. General Gudin seconded this movement, and manœuvred on the road from Bischweiller: the Austrians gave way, and withdrew; but the reinforcements which they every moment received left our troops no chance of maintaining their position. On the other hand, the assailants had outflanked the 10th, and the moment had arrived for effecting the movement which I had ordered. Consequently the 16th division wheeled back its left wing perpendicularly to the rear, while it preserved the head of Hoenheim, from whence our artillery raked the enemy in flank and rear. At the same time the gallant General Beurmann, attacked on every side and already surrounded, sallied forth from Mundolsheim at the head of the 10th, and retreated without disorder towards the division.

The Austrians on their side advanced on the road from Brumpt with enormous masses of cavalry and infantry, supported by a formidable artillery. They penetrated between the two divisions, and arrived without obstacle on four pieces of cannon which had been continually pouring discharges of grape-shot on their columns. They were taken; but the enemy presented his flank to the troops of General Rottembourg, and to two regiments of cavalry which were on his front. I took advantage of this circumstance: put myself at the head of the 11th dragoons, and the 7th horse chasseurs. I made a rapid charge: I routed the first line, penetrated the second, and overthrew every thing that offered me any resistance. We made a dreadful slaughter of the Austrian and Wurtemburg cavalry. At the same time the 32d came up at the charge in close columns, and prevented them from rallying. They were thrown back on their own infantry, whom they put to flight.

General Rottembourg, on his side, pushed forward his right wing, and opened on the enemy, who defiled in confusion before his columns, a most destructive fire of artillery and musquetry; in an instant the field of battle is covered with the slain, and the immense army of the Prince of Wurtemburg is routed. The defeat was so complete that baggage, which was two leagues in the rear, was attacked and plundered, and the Prince himself lost his equipages. The confusion extended itself as far as Haguenau, and would have gone still farther if 30,000 Russians, who came up from Weissembourg, had not by their presence encouraged the fugitives. The night which came on, and the risk that there would have been in adventuring against forces so superior to our own, prevented us from profiting by our successes. We could not retake our artillery, the enemy had made haste to remove it to his rear.

It cost him very dear to keep it. He had from 1500 to 2000 men killed, and a still more considerable number wounded. On our side there were about 700 killed and wounded. Of this number were two Captains of light artillery, Favier and Dandlau, both wounded in defending their cannon, and Colonel Montagnier, who performed such signal service on this occasion.

The enemy's General revenged himself for this defeat by devastation. The day after the battle he set on fire the village of Souffelweyersheim, under pretext that the peasants had fired on his troops. This was not the fact, and the name of the Prince of Wurtemburg will remain for ever sullied by an action which plunged a multitude of families into misery.

Whether the vigour with which we had repulsed all their attacks had given them a distaste for making new ones, or from some other motive, our adversaries remained some days without undertaking any thing. I took advantage of this repose to provision Strasburg, and to fortify myself in my positions. I also had time to give to all commanders of places, who were under my command, the most precise instructions.

Meantime the allied army continued to increase; fresh corps arrived every day to swell its numbers: very soon 70,000 men deployed before us, and pressed us on every side. Flags of truce came one after the other, without having any marked object in view. I proposed to the enemy's General a suspension of arms, during which I might send an officer to Paris, and receive orders from the government. The Prince of Wurtemburg refused, without however renouncing the system of communication that he had adopted.