[271] "The Origin of Civilization," p. 373.
[272] Superstitious fears are often awakened in savage tribes, and among the ignorant of our own more advanced societies, by attempts at census-taking.
[273] Pike, "History of Crime," I. p. 405.
[274] Essays and Lectures, "The Influence upon Morality of a Decline in Religious Belief."
CHAPTER IX
THE IDEAL AND THE WAY OF ITS ATTAINMENT
Mr. Stephen questions the possibility of our determining at all what a state of ideal morality should be. I should contend, on the contrary, that there would be little disagreement in opinions as to what the ideal should be, but that rather our chief difficulties must lie in the determination of the course to be pursued in order to attain to the ideal. The profligate, it is true, will not be likely to acknowledge that self-control and faithfulness are parts of an ideal condition if he thinks that the acknowledgment binds him in any way to faithfulness and self-control in his own conduct; and the dishonest man will be chary of admitting that honesty is desirable if his consciousness suggests that he ought therefore to practise unvarying honesty himself. But the dishonest man is generally very thoroughly convinced of the desirability of honor and uprightness in every one else; and the profligate also is generally both among the loudest in his denunciation of unfaithfulness in those he feels should be true to him, and sufficiently ready to acknowledge the social advantages of principles opposite to his own, if you can but convince him that it is only a matter of pure theory you are discussing, which will doubtless never be put in practice by society as a whole, and which in no way interferes with your thorough approval of his own action. So, too, the cruel, the rough, and the rude, will easily confess that unselfishness, unfailing kindness, tact, and consideration in the rest of society, are what the world needs. Did these virtues exist, there would be no need of the choice between evils now necessary. That which really troubles us is this choice, the difficulty of ascertaining just what course is the best, which brings us nearest to our ideal, assists most effectually in hastening development towards that goal. For there is no course, under existing conditions, which is wholly advantageous to society, none which does not involve some evil. It follows, from this, that it is insufficient to show that any particular course involves some advantage to some one in order to demonstrate that it is the right one, as also that it is insufficient to show that a course involves evil to some one in order to demonstrate that it is wrong. It is not proved that, because the restraint of any particular desire or passion is attended with pain to the individual, it is wrong. The argument has often been, and is still, advanced—seemingly with the idea that it is conclusive—that the indulgence of physical passion in youth tends to sobriety and steadiness in later years; and, with a similar idea apparently, a dramatic critic falls into a rhapsody over the manner in which the characters in a recent play come out "purified by the evil" they have wrought or endured.[275] But even if this argument were scientifically sound, it would not prove the desirability of self-indulgence, since not the individual alone is to be considered. The argument is, however, erroneous. With advancing years comes in general, in any case, a diminution of passion, or at least a greater admixture of reason; but apart from this, indulgence tends to increase desire and tendency, except as excess may lead to morbid conditions, or the disregard of higher instincts to disappointment and cynicism. When we are told, in another play than the one mentioned above, and apparently with the idea that the statement is an excuse, that the hero could find no other outlet for the exuberance of his youth than the seduction of an innocent girl, we may see no reason to doubt the assertion, but we may question whether society has not a right, nevertheless, to suppress a little of such exuberance or turn it into other channels. The man born with fierce and ungovernable fury in his disposition may likewise feel a strong propensity to express the exuberance of his youth in a murder or two; but I see no reason why society should permit him to do so. The passion of anger is also a perfectly natural one, and the ungovernable fury which led to murder was not an exception with our ancestors of the savage plane, but the rule. Not all natural passion is to be indulged simply because it is natural; and even the fact that a tendency is good in moderation and under certain restrictions is no proof that it is good or to be indulged in immoderation, or without these restrictions. It can have been only by restriction of the natural savage fury that this fury grew less prominent in character. The cannibal transported into civilized society may still have a strong and perfectly natural hunger for my spareribs, but that is no sufficient reason why he should get them. Jack the Ripper is endowed, evidently, with a very passionate love for his human vivisection, and finds it an outlet for an exuberance which also bubbles out otherwise in many ways; yet I think society will be justified in putting a peremptory end to that exuberance, when it gets the opportunity.
Morality is indeed a matter of welfare, and so, of the gratification of desire and tendency; but neither the present alone, nor the single individual in preference to all the rest of society, is to be considered. Effort should be exerted continually for the reduction of pain to a minimum, in every respect possible, with regard to the individual and the minority as well as with regard to the majority, though the greater good and the greater number must always take precedence. The rule of the majority may be asserted to be moral in that it is the best possible expedient where there is disagreement of desires. The necessity for choice between evils is the origin of the principle of the Greatest Good to the Greatest Number, and this, as has been said, covers all the ground, if rightly applied. But it offers a temptation to stop with the mere comparison of two sums of individuals and degrees of happiness for the time being, without taking into the problem the wider results of a particular choice to society as a whole, through habit and personal influence. The consideration of these last important factors has led, on the other hand, to such rules as that of Kant,—"Act so that the maxims of thy will might be taken as the principle of universal action"; and this rule, because it goes deeper, is less likely to lead to error. The moral requirement of continual effort to find the best method of reducing the evil still remaining, of recompensing the individual and the minority for the good of which they are necessarily deprived, needs especial emphasis; for the continual direction of attention to effort for progress, even where no outward change is, for the moment, possible, constitutes an inward progress in character which is ever ready to issue in external progress the instant opportunity presents itself. Present pain to individuals is the sign of imperfection in those permitting it and those suffering it, and must result in increase of tendency in this direction of imperfection unless it takes place only in spite of the most vigorous effort for its prevention. Even the reformer must choose that to which he would chiefly apply his endeavor, with some necessary withdrawal of effort from other directions. Yet the neglect of any present opportunity of reform or benefit, though it may sometimes be necessitated for the gain of some more important future good, is still an outer, and also, especially, an inner evil, which can be compensated only by a high degree of superiority in the future good to be obtained. As the man who, perhaps from the fear of failing in thoroughness, leaves all original work until middle age, is likely to find his power of originality much deteriorated by that time, so the man who is cruel to-day, in order to be kind in some wider respect later on, is likely to find, on the final arrival of opportunity, if the period through which the unkindness is exercised be a long one, that his capacity for kindness has diminished. Every neglect of present opportunity is a loss to character as well as an external loss. When the present good passed over for the sake of the future includes the welfare of whole lives, the question of choice and the postponement of good becomes still graver; when it includes generations, we need to consider earnestly before we take on ourselves the responsibility of a choice that shall prefer the future. I cannot agree with those who believe or practically live out the idea that the present generation is only or chiefly for the sake of the future generation, the parents only for the sake of their children, or the individual only for the sake of society as a whole. We need to remember that the race includes present and future, and parents and children, and has no existence outside the individuals that compose it. It is difficult to reconcile the many conflicting principles; and thus it appears that morality is not easy, even where earnest desire for it exists, and that different views with regard to it may be conscientiously held. The difficulty only increases the duty of continual endeavor to reconcile the many different conditions of happiness and welfare.