A Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution

by Cora May Williams

From what has been said it appears that happiness cannot be defined as "satisfaction of the desires." Such satisfaction may have unhappiness as its result. Not all desires are to be satisfied simply because they are desires.

The study of the history of moral conceptions appears to show us that most changes in this province are the result of a change of views concerning the effects of actions with regard to the welfare of society; hence, that they were the fruit of experience. This process of change takes place, however, very gradually; the rules which are the result of experience are handed down, for the most part, without statement of reasons; and only in a very limited measure do the new generations labor for a progressive development of moral conceptions. We cannot wonder that a clear consciousness of the highest reasons of moral precepts is seldom to be found. Yet in civilized societies, the conviction is general that at least an average conformity to rules of morality is the indispensable condition of the safety and the good of society. The answer to the question: What would happen if every one were to act thus? has been regarded, from earliest times, as decisive with regard to the moral quality of an act.

When we recognize that actions which we call good and bad are so called because of their causal relation to pain and pleasure, the belief must arise in us, that the worth of qualities of character depends on the promise they contain of future action. The most important power for the happiness or misery of humanity is the character of human beings. Hence the morally good, excellence of character, is to be regarded as preëminently Good. And so it appears that our instinctive judgments are justified by the deliberations of calm reason.

The question: Why shall I act in accordance with the general welfare? is answered by these considerations; because such action is right and reasonable, enjoined by conscience and reason, by human nature itself in its higher development. He who does not recognize this fact, who does not find in it the highest and holiest of commandments, and who yet desires to act reasonably and well, recognizing duties to all men, does not see what he himself really will.

The conception of right-doing is the motive of the human being, in so far as he is good. The teacher who desires to have moral influence will endeavor to awaken this motive in his hearers or readers. For this purpose he must appeal to their actual characters. And it is as much a petitio principii to assume, in Ethics, the existence of moral feelings, as to assume, in Optics, the existence of sight. Just as there are blind persons, so there are persons without moral feelings. These are, however, comparatively few; some trace of moral feeling, of conscience, is to be found in almost every member of society.

The general welfare, that is, the greatest possible true happiness of all, not the greatest happiness of the smallest number which is often the ruling principle of state laws, nor the greatest happiness of the greatest number without consideration of the minority,—is the highest ethical criterion. It may be difficult to ascertain wherein this happiness consists; Bentham demands, for the determination of the worth of an action, a calculation of the intensity, duration, certainty, fecundity, and purity, of the feelings produced by it. But the happiness and misery of mankind is surely the most important object of mankind; it must be, therefore, our highest care to ascertain the results of an action as far as we are able. And, in fact, the most important results of any form of action are generally ascertainable.

To make endeavor after one's own and others' perfection the criterion of morality is to set up a false standard, a form without a content, since "perfection" designates merely a state that accords with some preconceived concept or end. The question is: What end shall human perfection realize? The criterion of general welfare alone can define human perfection. It is such a constitution of man's bodily and spiritual characteristics as conduces in the highest degree to general happiness.

Too long and detailed a consideration of possible results is not desirable in every case where action is called for. There is seldom time for a consideration of the intensity, duration, etc., of resulting pain and pleasure. It is well, in most cases, to follow the general moral rules we have attained to through previous reflection. In cases of doubt, we need to appeal to our highest criterion. Often such doubt may be caused by selfishness, by the hidden desire to act, after all, for our own benefit; we need, therefore, to put to ourselves the question: How would we judge the action of another in our own position? Thus we arrive at the highest moral commandment, which is: So act that thy conduct, if made general, would be for the good of mankind. And the force of example is here one of the factors to be considered.

It has been asked what right one has to assert the rule that each one is to count for one, and no one for more than one, in moral decisions. May not one human being's capacity for happiness be greater than another's, and his happiness, therefore, more to be considered? It may be answered that bad men have never been embarrassed for an excuse for selfishness, but that the arrogance of regarding one's own happiness as of greater worth than that of others has brought incalculable harm into the world, and that the only safe method of calculation for the purpose of furthering the general welfare, is the rule above given,—that each one shall count as one and no more.