“Kidd. I shall challenge none. I know nothing to the contrary, but that they are all honest men.”
The greater part of the evidence in this trial has already been given verbatim in the narrative of the voyage of the Adventure Galley. It is clear from it that the crew for some time before the altercation, which led to Moore’s death, had been on the brink of mutiny; that Moore was the spokesman of the mutineers who were prevented by Kidd from seizing the Dutch ship, and that he and his associates had concocted a plan, by which they thought they might have seized her and extorted documentary evidence from the Dutchmen to excuse themselves and Kidd in the event of their being called in question for doing so. The balance of evidence is strongly in favor of Moore’s having upbraided Kidd in the altercation which ended in the fatal blow, for not having allowed the mutineers to have their own way. When Kidd called him “a lousie dog,” his answer practically was that if Kidd had taken his advice, he and his companions, so far from being “lousie dogs,” would have made their fortune and been gentlemen. Kidd seems to have knocked him down in a moment of very justifiable indignation, and without any intention of killing him. It is not even clear from the evidence that Moore died of the blow. The only two witnesses against Kidd at the trial were Palmer and Bradenham. On Kidd’s behalf three of the prisoners, Owens, Parrott, and Barlicorn, gave evidence, and Kidd offered to call the rest of them if necessary. When he asked Bradenham, the principal witness against him, with a view to test the value of his evidence, whether he had not been in the mutiny himself, he was prevented from insisting on an answer by the Lord Chief Baron Ward, who said, “You will not infer that if he was a mutineer it was lawful for you to kill Moore.” Not only was he prevented from eliciting this fact, which would have tended to discredit the chief witness against him, but he was prevented from calling evidence as to his own character. The Lord Chief Baron summed up very summarily against him, being evidently desirous of ending the case as quickly as possible.
“The prisoner is indicted,” said he, “for murder. Now to make the killing of a man to be murder, there must be malice prepense either express or implied. The law implies malice, when one man without any reasonable cause or provocation kills another. You have had this cause opened to you. What mutiny or discourse might be a fortnight or month before will not be any reason for so long continuance of passion.” (Had the Lord Chief Baron ever been in command himself of a mutinous crew, he might have thought otherwise.) “But what did arise at the time, the witnesses tell you.” (As a matter of fact, they were far from agreeing as to the conversation.) “The first witness” (King’s evidence) “tells you, the first words that were spoken were by Mr. Kidd, and upon his answer, Mr. Kidd calls him, ‘lousie dog.’ The reply was, ‘If I am so, you have made me so.’ Now, gentlemen, I leave it to you to consider, whether that could be a reasonable occasion or provocation to take a bucket and knock the deceased on the head and kill him. Now for the prisoner on such a saying, and without any other provocation to take a bucket and knock a man on the head and kill him must be deemed an unjustifiable act. For, as I have said, if one man kill another without provocation or reasonable cause, the law presumes and implies malice; and then such killing will be murder in the sense of the law, as being done of malice prepense. If there be a sudden falling out and fighting and one is killed in heat of blood, then the law calls it manslaughter, but in such a case as this, that happens on slight words, the prisoner calls the deceased a ‘lousie dog,’ and the deceased says, ‘If I be so, you have made me so,’ can this be a reasonable cause to kill him? and if you believe them not to be a reasonable cause of provocation I cannot see what distinction can be made, but that the prisoner is guilty of murder. Indeed, if there had been a mutiny at that time, then there might have been a reasonable cause for him to plead in his defence, and it ought to have been taken into consideration. But it appears that what mutiny there was, was a fortnight at least before.” (There can be little doubt that the crew were on the brink of mutiny for months before and months after this occurrence.) “Therefore, gentlemen, I must leave it to you, if you believe the King’s witness, and one of the prisoner’s own” (Query, and disregard the evidence of Kidd and the others), “that this blow was given by the prisoner in the manner aforesaid, and are satisfied that it was done without reasonable cause or provocation, then he will be guilty of murder, and if you do believe him guilty of murder on this evidence, you must find him so, if not you must acquit him.”
The jury then withdrew, and in about an hour returned and gave in their verdict “Guilty.”
Clerk of Arraigns. “Look to him, keeper.”