[1034]. Sacrifices might be individual or communal, occasional or periodical. The early organization of society into clans made the communal sacrifice the more prominent[1867]—the clan was the social unit, the interests of the individual were identical with those of the clan, and there was rarely occasion for a man to make a special demand on the deity for his individual benefit. Such occasions did, however, arise, and there was no difficulty in an individual's making a request of the tribal god provided it was not contrary to the interests of the tribe. If the petitioner went to some god or supernatural Power other than the tribal god, this was an offense against tribal life.
[1035]. The great communal sacrifices were periodical. They were determined by great turning-points in the seasons or by agricultural interests. Sowing time; when the crops became ripe; harvest time; midsummer and midwinter—such events were naturally occasions for the common approach of the members of the tribe to the tribal deity. The same thing is true of military expeditions, which were held to be of high importance for the life of the tribe. War was, as W. R. Smith calls it, a "holy function,"[1868] and its success was supposed (and is now often supposed) to depend on the supernatural aid of the deity. The particular method of conducting the ceremonies in such cases varied with the place and time, but the purpose of the worshiper and the general methods of proceeding are the same among all peoples and at all times. Occasions connected with the individual, such as birth, initiation, marriage, death, and burial, are also affairs of the family or clan, and the same rule applies to sacrifices on such occasions as to the great communal periodical offerings.
[1036]. It was inevitable that the ritual, that is, the specific mode of procedure, should receive a great development in the course of history. As colleges of priests were established, ceremonial elaborateness would become natural, and precise methods of proceeding would be handed down from generation to generation. Thus in many cases the worshiper had to be prepared by purificatory and other ceremonies, and the priest had to submit to certain rules before he could undertake the sacrifice. The victim was selected according to certain prescriptions: it had to be of a certain age or sex, of a certain color, generally free from impurities and defects, and sometimes it was necessary that it should show itself willing to be sacrificed.[1869] These details do not at all affect the essence of the sacrifice. They are all the result of the ordinary human tendency to organization, to precise determination of particulars, and while certain general features are easily understood (those, for example, relating to the perfectness of the victim) others are the result of considerations which are unknown to us. It would be a mistake to seek for the origin of sacrifice in such ritualistic details.
Theories of the Origin of Sacrifice
[1037]. Up to a very recent time the institution of sacrifice was generally accepted either as a natural human custom, due to reverence for the gods, or as of divine prescription. In very early documents, as, for example, in the Iliad and in certain parts of the Old Testament, it is assumed that the material of sacrifice is the food of the gods—a fact of interest in the discussion of the origin of sacrifice, never, however, in ancient times formulated as a theory. In the Græco-Roman and later Jewish periods sacrifices seem to have been conceived of in a general way as a mark of respect to the deity and fell more and more into disuse as the ethical feeling became distincter. In the New Testament there is a trace of the view that the victim is a substitute for the offerer: in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said that the blood of bulls and goats could never effect the remission of sin—a nobler victim was necessary.[1870] A similar conception is found in the later Greek and Roman literature, but there is still no distinct theory. In the third century of our era Porphyry, who was greatly interested in religious matters and, doubtless, represents a considerable body of thoughtful current opinion, says simply that sacrifices are offered to do honor to a deity or to give thanks or to procure favors.[1871] The early Christian writers make no attempt to explain the origin of the custom, nor do we find any such attempt in the European philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was not until the spirit of historical inquiry had entered the sphere of religious investigation that the question as to the historical beginning and the significance of sacrifice was fairly put.
[1038]. In discussions of this question a distinction is sometimes made between bloody and unbloody offerings—they are supposed to differ in placatory or expiatory virtue, and one or the other of them is held to precede in order of time. The facts seem, however, not to warrant this distinction. Everywhere the two sorts of offering have equal power to please and placate the deity; the special prominence that may be given to the one or the other is due to peculiar social conditions that do not affect the essential nature of the rite.[1872] As to precedence of one or the other in time the available data offer nothing definite beyond the fact that choice between them is determined by the circumstances of a community—the material of an offering is whatever (food or other thing) seems natural and appropriate in a particular place and at a particular time, and this may vary, of course, in the same community at different stages of culture.
[1039]. Current theories of the origin and significance of sacrifice divide themselves into two general groups, the one laying stress on the idea of gift, the other on the idea of union with the deity. Both go back ultimately to the same conception, the conviction, namely, that man's best good can be secured only by the help of the supernatural Powers; but they approach the subject from different points of view and differ in their treatment of the rationale of the ritual.
[1040]. The conception of an offering as a gift to a deity is found in very early times and is common in low tribes. In Greece the word for "gift," as offering, occurs from Homer on, and in Latin is frequent, and such a term is employed in Sanscrit. The common Hebrew term for sacrifice (minḫa) has the same sense; it is used for both bloody and unbloody offerings, though from the time of Ezekiel (sixth century B.C.) onward it became a technical term for cereal offerings.[1873] The details of savage custom are given by Tylor,[1874] who proposes as the scheme of chronological development "gift, homage, abnegation." This order, which is doubtless real, embodies and depends on growth in social organization and in the consequent growth in depth and refinement of religious feeling. The object of a gift is to procure favor and protection; homage involves the recognition of the deity as overlord, and, in the higher stages of thought, as worthy of reverence—always, however, with the sense of dependence and the desire for benefits; abnegation is the devotion of one's possessions and, ultimately, of one's self; this idea sometimes assumes a low form, as if the deity were pleased with human loss and suffering, or as if human enjoyment were antireligious,[1875] sometimes approaches the conception of the unity of the worshiper with the object of worship.[1876]
[1041]. A special form of the gift-theory, with a peculiar coloring, is that which holds that some object is substituted for the worshiper who has fallen under the displeasure of the deity and is in danger of punishment. This conception, however, is found only in the most advanced religions. The cases in which an animal is substituted for a human victim[1877] are of a different character—they are humane reinterpretations of old customs. In early popular religion the only examples of a deity's deliberately inflicting on innocent persons the punishment of another's wrongdoing are connected with the old conception of tribal and national solidarity—Œdipus, Achan, David, and others, by their crimes, bring misfortune on their peoples; when the guilty have received their punishment the innocent are relieved. A real vicarious suffering is not found in these cases or in any ancient sacrificial ritual—the victim is not supposed to bear the sin of the sacrificant.[1878] It is only in comparatively late theological constructions that vicarious atonement occurs. Some Jewish thinkers were driven to such a theory by the problem of national misfortune. The pious and faithful part of the nation, the "Servant of Yahweh," had shared in its grievous sufferings, and, as the faithful did not deserve this punishment, the conclusion was drawn that they suffered for the iniquities of the body of the people;[1879] their suffering, however, was to end in victory and prosperity. In this conception the theory of solidarity is obvious, but it differs from the old tribal theory in that the suffering of the innocent brings salvation to the whole mass. In the prophetic picture there is no explanation of how this result was to be brought about—there is no mention of a moral influence of the few on the many—only there is the implication that the nation, taught by suffering, would in future be faithful to the worship of the national deity. It does not appear wherein the ethical and religious significance of the unmerited suffering of the pious consisted; apparently the object of the writer is merely to account for this suffering and to encourage his countrymen. In another passage,[1880] suffering is represented as having in itself expiatory power; the view in this case is that a just deity must punish sin, forgives, however, when the punishment has been borne.
[1042]. The view that the efficacy of sacrifice is due to the fact that it brings about a union between the deity and the worshiper has been construed in several different ways according as the stress is laid on one or another of the elements of the rite. One theory represents atonement, the reconciliation of god and man, as effected by the physical act of sharing the flesh of a sacred animal; another finds it in the death of an animal made sacred and converted into an intermediary by a series of ceremonies; a third holds that union with the divine is secured by whatever is pleasing to the deity.