[1170]. The development of the sense of obligation to do right (conscience) is due to so many different influences that it is hard to say exactly what part any one of these has taken in the process. But obviously religion has been an important factor in the result so far reached. By its distinct connection of the favor of the deity with conduct it has tended to fix attention on the latter and to strengthen the feeling that righteousness is the sovereign thing. Though such regard for right-doing is at first mainly egoistic, it easily becomes an ideal, reverenced for its own sake, and more powerful because it is identified with a person and colored by the sentiments of gratitude and love that religion calls forth. Religion, especially in the earlier forms of society, though not only in them, has been a pedagogue to lead men to the acknowledgment of the supremacy of the moral law. It differs from other such guides in the tone of mingled humility and enthusiasm that it gives to this fealty.
[1171]. As to the existence of moral evil in the world, religion can only regard it as the work of supernatural Powers. In the savage period the question does not come up—moral evil is taken as a part of the nature of things and is not curiously inquired into. In later times it is ascribed to some malevolent spirit or deity who is either independent of the supreme deity (as in certain half-civilized tribes) or is tolerated by him (Angro Mainyu, Satan), or to a subordinate employed by him (lies put into the mouths of prophets by a deity),[2117] or to a quite separate divine Power, not necessarily malevolent (as in some philosophical theories). Religion may adopt some philosophical explanation—as that evil is only failure to reach the good, or only the lower step to which we look back from a greater height, or an inevitable accompaniment of a scheme of life characterized by struggle and intended to recognize the freedom of the will and to develop moral autonomy—but, from its own resources it can only say that it is a thing inexplicable by man, belonging to a divine plan that the devout soul accepts as right because God has ordained it.
[1172]. The theory of man's native incapacity to do right (total depravity), held by some religious bodies, is antimoral since it denies human freedom. The attempt to modify it by the supposition of divine impartation of moral power is inadequate unless such power is held to be given to every person, and this amounts to an indirect affirmation of freedom and denial of moral impotency. The theory is, however, practically innocuous, being rejected or ignored by the universal consciousness of freedom.
[1173]. To the questions, raised by philosophy, whether the world is essentially good or bad and whether life is worth living, theistic religion gives a simple answer: a perfect God implies a perfect universe; this answer is germinal and confused in early religion, and is definitely stated only in the higher systems. The great theistic sacred books, Jewish, Christian, Mazdean, and Moslem, all teach that though there are present limitations and sufferings, there is to be a happy issue for the faithful out of all distresses, and the Buddhistic view, though nontheistic, is essentially the same as this; as for other persons, they are sometimes included in a final restoration, when moral evil is to disappear, sometimes are excluded from the happy outcome, but in both cases the scheme of the world is regarded as good. Leaving out of view the question as to the exact interpretation of the facts of life, this optimism is ethically useful as giving cheerfulness and enthusiasm to moral life, with power of enduring ills through the conviction of the ultimate triumph of the right. It may pass into a stolid dogmatic ignoring or denial of the existence of evil, and then tends to become inhuman and therefore ethically bad.[2118] It is, however, commonly saved from such an unfortunate result by common sense and the instinct of sympathy. And it is so general a conception and its goal is so remote that it cannot be a strong and permanent moral force for most persons—immediate experiences are as a rule more powerful than remote expectations. But, so far as it is a living faith, religious optimism is in the main a healthy ethical factor in life.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] That is, phenomena regarded as special acts of a superhuman Power; in the larger conception of religion all phenomena are at once natural and divine acts.
[2] In early religion they are usually ghosts, beasts, plants, or inanimate objects; rarely living men. Cf. Marett's remarks on pre-animistic religion in his Threshold of Religion.
[3] Appeal to the Powers carries with it a certain sense of oneness with them, in which we may reasonably recognise the germ of the idea of union with God, which is the highest form of religion. This idea is not consciously held by the savage—it takes shape only in highly developed thought (Plato, the New Testament, Christian and other mysticism). If the impulse to religion be thought to be love of life (so Leuba, in the Monist, July, 1901), this is substantially desire for safety and happiness.
[4] Spencer and Gillen, Native Tribes of Central Australia, p. 170.