Squadron in "Line on a Bearing" or "Bow and Quarter Line"
Observe the first position of the five battleships A, B, C, D, E (shaded). Each can fire right ahead, right astern, and on both broadsides. They are steering due west. Now suppose they all turn directly south. They will then be in similar formation, as indicated by a, b, c, d, e (unshaded).
At the present time, perhaps what is known as the "line on a bearing"—i.e. compass bearing—or "bow and quarter line" as it is sometimes called, is the favourite formation, and there is a very great deal to be said in its favour. It is what is known as an "echelon" formation when applied to the manœuvres of soldiers. The word "echelon" is derived from the French echelle, a ladder, and the ships in this case are disposed in a way suggestive of the steps of a ladder or stair. Thus, suppose the flagship leading, the next ship would follow her on a parallel course, not immediately in her wake but some way astern on her port or starboard quarter, the next in a corresponding position with regard to the second ship, and so on, as indicated in the annexed diagram.
If you look at this you will at once see its advantages over "line ahead". Every ship can bring its broadside to bear either to port or starboard, as in that formation, but, in addition, every ship can fire directly ahead or astern as well. If ships in "line ahead" all turn together to the right or left, or, to use the correct wording, alter course together eight points to starboard or port, only the leading and rear ship could use their broadsides, and only one of them at that. But a similar turn in "bow and quarter line" can be made without any loss of fire effect.
In the Great War we have not, at the time of writing, yet had a fleet action. The German Navy has shown itself most determined—to take no risks. It seems to be imbued with the principles impressed by the French Government on its sea commanders in the old wars with us.[73] Never, on any account, are ships to be hazarded against superior force, or, in other words, the ships of the "admiral of the Atlantic" are not to fight unless in very superior force to their antagonists, as was the case in the action off Chile. The German squadron, starting out on the second raid on our coasts, no sooner clapped eyes on Admiral Beatty's ships—which only numbered one more ship than the German squadron—than it turned tail and made off for all it was worth. So the British had no chance of crossing the "T", or of any manœuvre other than a stern chase. Such a chase is proverbially a long one, but in this case it was long enough to enable our seamen and marines to sink one German and badly damage at least two others, who only got away "by the skin of their teeth", thanks to the intervention of their mine-fields and submarines.
CHAPTER XV
The Manning of a Ship