First: A division of the command into practically four separate columns while still some fifteen miles from the battle-field, and without accurate knowledge as to the exact location or approximate strength of the enemy, and the separation of those columns so that at a critical period of the fight no two of them were in supporting distance of one another.
Second: The fact that Custer came into the presence of the enemy practically twenty-four hours ahead of time.
Third: The loss of the horses and with them much of the surplus ammunition of Custer’s command.
This subject has been so often discussed by men much abler than myself that I will not attempt it here.
My experiences with Gen. Custer always led me to look upon him as somewhat recklessly brave, disposed to take chances without fully considering the odds against him.
I have always felt that one possible reason for the course he followed, in the face of the orders he received, might be attributed to the fact that he was feeling keenly the apparent disgrace of the treatment accorded him by the President, and that he thought that by a brilliant dash and a decided victory, similar to his Washita fight, he might redeem himself and once more stand before the people as a leader and an Indian fighter second to none. Whatever may have been his motive, we must all admit that he made a most gallant fight and gave his life at the side of the comrades who had ridden with him to victory in many a previous battle.
Very truly yours,
Theo. W. Goldin.
[92]. Mr. Goldin’s recollection is in error, according to Colonel Godfrey, who is positive that the box contained hard bread. However, the difference is not material—it was a box, anyway!—C. T. B.