Meanwhile I had communicated with Colonel Godfrey, who had already furnished me with much data in addition to that contained in his valuable and interesting paper, calling particular attention to some of the statements made by General Hughes in his article in the Journal of the Military Service Institution. From Colonel Godfrey I received the following paper:
Memoranda for Rev. C. T. Brady
A semi-official account entitled “Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians in the Division of the Missouri, from 1868 to 1882,” was published by the Division of the Missouri. This paper is now being reprinted in the United States Cavalry Journal, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The part relating to the Little Big Horn, is in the October, 1903, number. This account reads:
“About two o’clock in the morning of July 25th, the column halted for about three hours, made coffee, and then resumed the march, crossed the divide, and by eight o’clock were in the valley of one of the branches of the Little Big Horn.”
This is misleading and not altogether true. We halted about two A.M., till eight A.M., then marched till ten A.M., halted, and it was not until nearly noon that we crossed the divide. We were in a narrow valley. The march is correctly described in my article. The inference is that Custer was so very eager that he crossed the divide into the valley of the Little Big Horn and put himself where he could be discovered. General Hughes’ article is a special plea to clear General Terry from the odium that he and his family seemed to think was heaped upon him for failure to push forward with the information they had on June 25th and 26th, and that General Custer’s family and friends were supposed to hold him (Terry) responsible for the disaster in a measure. I do not remember a charge of disobedience as having been made at any time during this campaign; nor, on the other hand, do I recall that much was said that Terry and Gibbon did not do as they thought best on June 25th and 26th.
The marching distance from the Yellowstone, where Gibbon’s command was crossed, to the Little Big Horn, was about forty-six miles. East of the Big Horn, the country over which Gibbon’s forces marched, was rough—bad lands. The Second Cavalry on its march June 25th, saw the “big smoke” (from the fire in the bottom at the time of Reno’s attack) and at once sent word to General Gibbon (and Terry) that they thought a fight was going on, or something to that effect. I don’t know when they saw this “big smoke,” but my recollection is that it corresponded or tallied very well with the time of Reno’s attack. The Second Cavalry got to the Little Big Horn, four or five miles above the mouth, about nine-thirty, June 26th. They were then distant from the battlefield about eight or ten miles—an infantry officer says six miles. They arrived in the vicinity of our position about eleven A.M., June 27th, nearly two days after the “signs,” the “big smoke” of the fight, had been communicated.
That the country between the Yellowstone and the Little Big Horn was rough; that the 25th of June was hot; that the water was scarce, we all know; but we thought it strange that, after they learned from the Crow scouts—say at ten-thirty, June 26th, on the Little Big Horn—that a disaster had occurred, it took them so long to get a move. Yet none of us blamed them for being cautious at that time.
General Terry was not an Indian fighter and would never have made a success of getting Indians on the plains. The idea is preposterous[[121]] that a force can march through the open country (a great big country like we had) pass by the Indians fifty or sixty miles south, then turn round and find them in the same place, and crush them between that force and another from the opposite direction. They don’t linger that way. Our march from eleven P.M., June 24th, was in a close country and not exposed—was in a close valley, a branch of the Rosebud. The Indians who discovered us and sent word to the village would have discovered our trail and consequently informed them of our movements.
General Custer did not intend to attack until June 26th, the date Terry was to be at the Little Big Horn.[[122]] Herandeen was the scout that was to take the information through to Terry, but developments made it necessary, in General Custer’s opinion, if we were to strike the Indians at all, that we should do it at once. Even then he expected only a running fight. Their stand and concentration were unexpected, because the chance of “surprise” was gone, and he probably did not send Herandeen, as was intended, to communicate with Terry for the reason that he did not think he could get through.
Now, suppose the Indians had been located on the headwaters of the Rosebud or Tongue, or Powder, and not on the Little Big Horn, and we had bumped up behind them on the north, should Custer have backed away, sent a scout through to Terry, made a detour so as to get to the south side? Terry’s instructions had fairly located the Indians, but it was a mere guess.[[123]] On the 17th they had fought Crook to a retreat, then they concentrated upon the Little Big Horn.