[39]. Negro troops were often so styled by their white comrades in the service.—C. T. B.
[40]. Luckily for Graham, just as he fell from his horse Amick’s men charged the Indians, who thereupon retreated. One of the troopers caught the horse and held him until the captain came running up. Carpenter’s prompt action in instantly throwing Amick’s detachment on the savages undoubtedly saved the lives of Graham and his men. As it was, it was a fearfully narrow escape for them.—C. T. B.
[41]. Six wagons on one side, five on the other.—L.H.C.
[42]. General Carr, while he used a rifle efficiently during the whole of the action, did not interfere with Carpenter’s arrangements; with rare self-restraint he refrained even from offering suggestions. Although he showed plenty of nerve and was entirely calm and collected throughout the hot affair, he is reported to have said after the fight that he thought he was in the tightest box in which he was ever caught in his life, and that there was nothing left for them all to do but to sell their lives as dearly as possible. He had never served on the plains with negro troopers before, and had no knowledge as to how they would behave against Indians—nobody had, for that matter.—C. T. B.
[43]. When there are many wagons, the corral is formed with the wagons close together, axles touching, tongues and mules inward; but in this case they had to form an open corral with about twenty feet between the wagons. The horses, to the number of one hundred—the troops being reduced to that number by illness, hard work, and other causes—were forced inside the wagons in columns of four, each set of fours being tied together, with horse-holders detailed to look after them. The duty of the horse-holders was most important. They had always to be on watch to prevent a stampede. If the troops had been deprived of their horses on that open knoll their position would have been hopeless indeed. The dismounted men were formed in front and rear and on both sides of the corral, as Indian attacks must be expected from every direction. The plan made by General Carpenter explains the situation perfectly.—C. T. B.
[44]. Just after the first repulse of the Indians, Graham went to General Carr very improperly (he had no business to communicate with him except through Carpenter, his immediate commanding officer), and suggested that he order the wagons abandoned, the teamsters mounted on the mules, and the whole party to retreat in that fashion as fast as possible. Carr, of course, referred the matter to Carpenter, who promptly refused to sanction any such manœuver. To leave the wagons, which afforded some protection on the hill, would be to enable six or seven hundred Indians to surround the hundred troopers in his command and invite annihilation. Carpenter assured Carr that as he had defeated the Indians once, he was certain that he could do it again. Carr wisely persisted in his determination not to interfere, and Graham had his suggestion decisively negatived by Carpenter. Graham deserved reprobation for his unmilitary action, as well as for his foolish suggestion.—C.T.B.
CHAPTER NINE
A Further Discussion of the Beaver Creek Affair
When General Carpenter’s account of the fight on the Beaver Creek was published serially, General Carr took exception to it in a public letter to the editor of the periodical in which it appeared. I am permitted by the editor to make extracts from this letter, which, with my own comment and General Carpenter’s rejoinder, appear as follows: