General Robertson, commanding Hood's old Texas Brigade, was arrested for indulging in mutinous conversation with his subaltern officers, claiming, it was said, that should General Longstreet give him certain orders (while in camp around Lookout Mountain), he would not recognize them, unless written, and then only under protest. He was relieved by General Gregg.
General McLaws was relieved of his command from a want of confidence [338] in General Longstreet, and more especially for his inactivity and tardiness at the assaults on Fort Sanders, at Knoxville. On ordinary occasions, General McLaws was active and vigilant enough—his courage could not be doubted. He and the troops under him had added largely to the name and fame of the Army of Northern Virginia. He had officers and men under him who were the "flower of chivalry" of the South, and were really the "Old Guard" of Lee's Army. McLaws was a graduate of West Point, and had seen service in Mexico and on the plains of the West. But General McLaws was not the man for the times—not the man to command such troops as he had—was not the officer to lead in an active, vigorous campaign, where all depended on alertness and dash. He was too cautious, and as such, too slow. The two Georgia brigades, a Mississippi brigade, and a South Carolina brigade, composed mostly of the first volunteers from their respective States, needed as a commander a hotspur like our own J.B. Kershaw. While the army watched with sorrow and regret the departure of our old and faithful General, one who had been with us through so many scenes of trials, hardships, and bloodshed, whose name had been so identified with that of our own as to be almost a part of it, still none could deny that the change was better for the service and the Confederacy.
One great trouble with the organization of our army was that too many old and incompetent officers of the old regular army commanded it. And the one idea that seemed to haunt the President was that none but those who had passed through the great corridors and halls of West Point could command armies or men—that civilians without military training were unfit for the work at hand—furthermore, he had favorites, that no failures or want of confidence by the men could shake his faith in as to ability and Generalship. What the army needed was young blood—no old army fossils to command the hot-blooded, dashing, enthusiastic volunteers, who could do more in their impetuosity with the bayonet in a few moments than in days and months of manoeuvering, planning, and fighting battles by rules or conducting campaigns by following the precedent of great commanders, but now obsolete.
When the gallant Joe Kershaw took the command and began to feel his way for his Major General's spurs, the division took on new life. [339] While the brigade was loath to give him up, still they were proud of their little "Brigadier," who had yet to carve out a name for himself on the pillars of fame, and write his achievements high up on the pages of history in the campaign that was soon to begin.
It seems from contemporaneous history that President Davis was baiting between two opinions, either to have Longstreet retire by way of the mountains and relieve the pressure against Johnston, now in command of Bragg's Army, or to unite with Lee and defend the approaches to Richmond.
A counsel of war was held in Richmond between the President, General Bragg as the military advisor of his Excellency, General Lee, and General Longstreet, to form some plan by which Grant might be checked or foiled in the general grand advance he was preparing to make along the whole line. The Federal armies of Mississippi and Alabama had concentrated in front of General Johnston and were gradually pressing him back into Georgia.
Grant had been made commander in chief of all the armies of the North, with headquarters with General Meade, in front of Lee, and he was bending all his energies, his strategies, and boldness in his preparations to strike Lee a fatal blow.
At this juncture Longstreet came forward with a plan—bold in its conception; still bolder in its execution, had it been adopted—that might have changed the face, if not the fate, of the Confederacy. It was to strip all the forts and garrisons in South Carolina and Georgia, form an army of twenty-five thousand men, place them under Beauregard at Charleston, board the train for Greenville, S.C.; then by the overland route through the mountain passes of North Carolina, and by way of Aberdeen, Va.; then to make his way for Kentucky; Longstreet to follow in Beauregard's wake or between him and the Federal Army, and by a shorter line, join Beauregard at some convenient point in Kentucky; Johnston to flank Sherman and march by way of Middle Tennessee, the whole to avoid battle until a grand junction was formed by all the armies, somewhere near the Ohio River; then along the Louisville Railroad, the sole route of transportation of supplies for the Federal Army, fight a great battle, and, if victorious, penetrate into Ohio, thereby withdrawing Sherman from his intended "march to the sea," relieving Lee by weakening Grant, as [340] that General would be forced to succor the armies forming to meet Beauregard.
This, to an observer at this late hour, seems to have been the only practical plan by which the downfall of the Confederacy could have been averted. However, the President and his cabinet decided to continue the old tactics of dodging from place to place, meeting the hard, stubborn blows of the enemy, only waiting the time, when the South, by mere attrition, would wear itself out.
About the 10th of April, 1864, we were ordered to strike tents and prepare to move on Bristol, from thence to be transported to Virginia. All felt as if we were returning to our old home, to the brothers we had left after the bloody Gettysburg campaign, to fight our way back by way of Chickamauga and East Tennessee. We stopped for several days at Charlottesville, and here had the pleasure of visiting the home of the great Jefferson. From thence, down to near Gordonsville.