There never was anything substantial in the objections to control from Toronto, as compared with the former conditions. Actual conduct of the Intercolonial centred in Moncton, as much as it always did. What really happened was that Toronto was substituted for Ottawa; and a President and Board of Directors succeeded a Minister. The local superintendents’ proposals for the year’s betterments, as passed upon by the general manager, formerly reached Ottawa, and were there approved by the Minister or rejected, in readiness for the estimates to come before Parliament. Now, by the like process, proposals reached Toronto, before being incorporated in Parliamentary estimates. Fundamentally, that was the change. But, there was the difference that existed between the President and the Minister—as to coming into office and going out, they weren’t both subject to the same powers as determined the choice of the section men.
It would have been vain to look for the instantaneous disappearance of a temper which, during two generations, had been deeply embedded in the political consciousness of three provinces and of half of a fourth. Sir Robert Morier, who was regarded as the ablest British ambassador of the later Victorian era, used to say it was the business of the statesman to be five per cent. ahead of public opinion. How far Sir Robert Borden’s policy was ahead of public opinion in the maritimes—or rather the opinion of the party stalwarts—one cannot say. But as session succeeded session it became clearer and clearer that, in the East, the administration of the National Railways would be regarded from a very different point of view from that which actuated the West.
In the House of Commons there were criticisms of my former relation to the Canadian Northern, and demands for more plentiful financial details of our work. Nothing was ever alleged, or could be alleged, on the first count, of which dignified notice could be taken. The second criticism did raise a question of public policy; and it is as well to say one or two things about it.
Against Parliament’s right to control the expenditures of Parliamentary money no word can be said. But there are limitations, for instance, when competitive contracts and commercial services are concerned. There is, indeed, a question of the use of ordinary common sense, which must not be jettisoned by a railway president, and ought not to be abandoned by a politician.
Look at imperial naval defence for a minute. The House of Commons is asked to vote say two million pounds for a battleship to be built by Vickers-Maxim. Every member of the House, therefore, has the right to inquire into everything relating to the contract. But honourable, experienced, trusted servants of the Crown have been employed to formulate a proposal on which their character, skill and experience are staked. Suppose one member, not to say twenty, began to inquire meticulously into the prices for all sorts of materials—the House would become tired of and then furious with him, and he would be suppressed as a nuisance.
Parliament’s attitude to a national railway must be based on one of two assumptions—that the management is worthy or is unworthy of confidence. The efficiency of its management, like that of any other public management, is to be judged from the methods employed to carry on its business. The first test of these methods belongs to the known character of the administrative chiefs of the railway. On this point I have nothing further to say. The second is in the processes by which financial demands reach Parliament. What were these processes?
In the old days, I believe, the estimates for the Intercolonial were well sifted, first through district officers, and finally by the Minister with whom a committee of the Cabinet was associated. But, based on too abundant experience, there was always the fear, in the railway officials, of political interference from the constituencies; and always the possibility that somebody with a real or fancied grievance would get access to the Minister.
The Board’s method was for the local superintendents’ suggested appropriations to be refined by the officers above them, passed on by the President, submitted by him to the directors; revised by them, and then by the President carried to the Minister and a strong and, as I can testify, a vigilant committee of the Cabinet. Finally they were brought to the House by the Minister, with whom sat his deputy, who was also a director of the railways. Then they were open to the criticism of two hundred and thirty-five members, and were entirely subject to the approval of the House of Commons, which could demand all our reports.
Now let us take a concrete case, not of permanent betterment, but of contracts for one of the most important operating supplies. In 1922 we were summoned before the Public Accounts Committee. What took place is on the record. Inquiry was made by a member for the current cost of a commodity for the supply of which known friends of his were also in the field. I took the position that it would be against the national interest to disclose prices, which, I knew from experience, were apt to be taken by certain firms desiring to get the business, the duty and freight added, and a tender put in for a few cents per ton below the price obtained by absolutely strict competition. I instructed my subordinate not to bring the information demanded.
The member demanding the information is one of the most expert in all the forms of the House. When we pointed out that the subject of his demand had to do with the current year’s expenses, with which Parliament was concerned only as estimates; and did not touch the year’s business then before the Public Accounts Committee, no further effort was made to get the information. It would be inaccurate to say no further effort was made to get me. The episode was typical of many things, as to which men of affairs will need no further elucidations.