PREFACE The object of the following treatise is to give an intelligible account of the principal facts of Mind, with a method for the right expression and criticism of Reasoning. It is based on principles not before applied to such a purpose. The current systems of Metaphysic are obscure and difficult simply because they start from false premises, not because the nature and operations of Mind cannot, if properly understood, be made as comprehensible to beginners as other branches of knowledge. The rules of Dialectic are quite within the capacity of any intelligent schoolboy, and should be an essential part of early education, like Arithmetic.
Let not the student be repelled at finding a philosophy reputed to be one of the most difficult taken as the basis of this work. It is Berkeleyism considerably modified. Also it is to be borne in mind primâ facie probability, but by its power of explaining many facts in a coherent and lucid way. A theory that does this should not be rejected for a seeming paradox at the outset.
Most of the theoretical and all the dialectical parts of this work can be adapted to Realistic thinking, by treating the judgments of the two Berkeleyan categories as intuitions instead of inferences.
CONTENTS PAGE. Preface [v] Introduction sect. i [Division of Philosophies into Ideal and Substantial—Substantial subdivided into Mental and Material—Berkeley's philosophy a Mental Substantialism] [1] ii [Ontological principles essential to logical theory—Mind consists of (at least) Self and a Plastic Substance—Functions of each—Perception of Inorganic things discussed—Berkeley's view on this point rejected—Body to be considered an apparatus of Perception] [4] iii [Current Metaphysic is Ideal and therefore incoherent—Substantial alone has a connecting principle—Importance of Categories in Substantialism—Its doctrine of Reason totally different from the Academic] [8] Intellect iv [Origin of Intellect—Its use—Difference between Sentimental and Intellectual consciousness—Intellect not the governing intelligence of Man—Moral education the most important] [11] v [Truth, its various meanings—Veracity—Correct Ideation—Correct Inference—No absolute standard of Truth—Nisi utile est, quod novimus, stulta est Sapentia —Schopenhauer on the function of Intellect] [14] vi [Standard of Truth relating to Bodily welfare different from that relating to Mental welfare—Realism the theory of Perception under the former standard—Its main dogmas—Cause why it is superseded—Superstition of One Truth—Realism and Substantialism both true and yet contradictory] [18] Perception vii [Defined, according to Substantial principles—Noumenon—Subject—Object—Sentiment not excited by Objects, but Objects accompany Sentiments—Subject not passive in Perception—Attention—Kant's opinion on the inconceivability of Noumena refuted—Difficulty of overcoming Realistic prejudices—Science of little use in Philosophy] [23] Ideas viii [How produced—Hume's notion untenable—No innate Ideas—but Sentiment is innate—Division of Ideas into Particular, General, and Imaginary] [27] ix [Memory—Oblivion— Recollection—Images, how preserved and how lost—Good Memory not necessarily advantageous—Recovery of the apparently Forgotten—Sudden extinction of Ideas—'Decay of the mind' in old age—Memory inexplicable on any theory but the Substantial—John Stuart Mill's confession—Memory the chief fact of Mental Science] [28] x [Sentiments may be remembered—Feelings and Emotions—No detailed analysis of Sentiments possible or necessary—Spinoza's list—Can sentiments be noumenally excited without objects?] [34] xi [Analysis of Comparison—It is the principle of Generalisation and Imagination] [36] Generalisation xii [Purpose of Generalisation—Objects classified must be similar and have similar utilities—Inferiority of general] [ideas acquired by definition—Names not essential to general thought—Generalisation resembles composite photography—Classification on mere objective resemblance—neat but superficial—Conceptualism] [38] xiii [Matter the most general notion derived from Objects—Belief in Real Matter a form of Mysticism—A material basis for phenomena unnecessary] [43] xiv [Nominalism—Berkeley's Nominalism, and objections thereto—Concrete Thought expressed in general terms] [46] xv [Generalisation the bane of European philosophy—Plato's theories on General Ideas—Aristotle's 'Essence'—Classification a means, not the end of Reason—The explanatory Unity a unity of service—Evolution a concrete Platonism] [58] Imagination xvi [How distinguished from Recollection and Reverie—Imagination by Simple Combination—By Transfusion—Artistic Imagination—Rational Imagination—Wrong views of Metaphysicians] [63] Dialectic xvii [Recapitulation of the genealogy of Reason—It is the art of conceiving the Future and Unknown—Dialectic the science of Reason—Division of theorems into Arguments and Fallacies—Method of Dialectic] [68] xviii [The Rational Parallel—Rational Conclusions are never certain—Essential parts of an Argument—Rules of Parallel—False conclusions cannot be destroyed but may be stigmatised—In what circumstances we may reason concerning a known fact] [74] xix [Hypothetical Arguments—Current errors with respect to these—Dilemma] [80] xx [Debate is extra-dialectic—How a valid argument may be criticised] [87] Categories xxi [Natural—Realistic—Scientific—Philosophical —Categories of Pythagoreans—of Aristotle—of Kant, etc.] [92] xxii [Category of Inherence—It is a metaphysical analysis of objects—Examples of Judgment and Argument—Use of Standards for Mediate Comparison] [97] xxiii [Category of Association defined—Position—Examples of Judgment and Argument—Movement—Number—Flat Space] [103] xxiv [Perspection or Depth in groups—Perspective degradation—Redintegration, real and ideal—This groupment as a fixed Precedent—Standard of Depth—Sky Perspection] [108] xxv [Concretion of Cubic ideas from flat objects—Backs of things—Resistance—Dr. Johnson on Idealism—Danger of trifling with Idealists, illustrated from the Dabistán—Geographical Concretion—Its superiority to mere Recollection—Sphericity of the Earth, what it means] [118] xxvi [Material Sequence defined, with examples—Time the interval between objects in Sequence—Eternity—Scientific confusion of Sequence with Causation] [126] xxvii [Causation—Its peculiarities—How distinguished from Sequence—Effects are never causes—Cause consists of Motive, Plan, and Power—Generation not causation—Atoms not causes—Sub-categories of Causation—'Conservation' of Energy discussed—Note on Dreams] [130] Redaction of Colloquial Arguments xxviii [Language not naturally an instrument of Argument—How to adapt it to this purpose—Negative words—Partitive words—Redaction does not extend to the correction of faulty observation—Syllogistic Conversion not necessary on the Substantial method] [151] Fallacies xxix [Of Equivocation—Of Imperfect Observation] [157] xxx [Of Parallel Arrangement—Suppressed Precedent—Inferring a negative from Contrast—False Analogy—Doubtful Precedent—Of Accident—Of Division—Of Composition—Dialectical Tautology—Cross Reasoning—Fallacy of No Case—Of Inversion—Suppressed Conclusion—Of No Application—Of Irrelevant Conclusion] [161] Academical Dialectic xxxi [Various notions of Reason entertained by Syllogists—One only true, Analogy] [175] xxxii ['Immediate Inference' is not Argument, but explicitness and emphasis in language] [176] xxxiii [Arithmetic, what it is—The Real and the Symbolic—Reasoning enters only into the Real—The Symbolic a kind of expression] [177] xxxiv [Geometrical Demonstration not a form of Reasoning—The so-called 'deductive reasoning' of Geometry a graduated series of lessons in perception] [182] xxxv [Induction not a special kind of reasoning, but a deduction with suppressed precedent—Other meanings of the word] [185] xxxvi [Aristotle's Dictum explained and refuted] [187] xxxvii [Mediate Comparison not Argument] [189] xxxviii [Syllogism analysed—It is not Argument—Doctrine of the Predicate—Moods of the Syllogism discussed—All moods reducible to One] [191] Studies in Dialectic xxxix [Additional examples to illustrate the Dialectic of Substantialism] [205]
