We are offered a choice of two theorems. The first is untenable, for we have never had the experience that is given as precedent; it is also tautological, as the 'something' of the case is the 'whatever' of the precedent.
| V. | |
| Whatever exists in the necessity of its own nature | has existed from eternity |
| 'Something' exists in the necessity of its own nature | it has existed from eternity |
It is not inconceivable that something should be self-existent, but we know nothing as to its being eternal. We are not familiar enough with self-existent things and eternal things to warrant us in asserting dogmatically that where the first quality is, there also must be the second.
The next theorem is that everything must be caused, and that causation involves a regressum ad infinitum. On this principle there must have been things for an eternity backwards. According to the theory of causation given in section xxvii, a true beginning is reached when we discover the motive, design and power that produced an effect. It is not necessary to ask next what caused that motive, design and power. The infinite regress is applicable only to material sequence, in which there is no proper beginning or end. The author of the above argument seems to be trying to combine the notion of causation by will with that of infinite regress. But his language is too obscure to make it certain what he means exactly.
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The three following theorems—in a diluted form—occur in an otherwise excellent work on the politics and social life of the ancient Greeks.
'The Athenians who opposed the union of Greece and Macedonia were old men, and the result was mischievous; other similar instances are found in history; therefore the government of old men is always mischievous.'—A fallacy of false generality. Everybody knows that some old men have been wise governors. Cicero, from his experience, drew the opposite conclusion—that the only safe rulers were old men.
'All old political leaders are mischievous; Gladstone is old; therefore he is to be considered politically mischievous.'—Even were the precedent not false the argument is superfluous, for the effect of Gladstone's politics is now matter of fact or history.
'Gladstone is politically mischievous; he advocates Home Rule for Ireland; therefore Irish Home Rule must be mischievous.'—A fallacy of division: a political leader might on the whole be mischievous, but his measures need not on that account be each and every one mischievous.
If dialectic were taught generally and on a rational method, a responsible author would avoid bad reasoning of this sort as carefully as he avoids bad grammar, vulgar imagery, or faulty arithmetic.