On 16th August we moved a few miles farther back across the Canal to La Miquellerie where we had as good billets as we had seen in France. Up to now we had received a few kilts of the large size only, so we had only a few of the biggest men fitted out, and drill order was always trousers. On getting to Miquellerie we found a huge assortment of kilts awaiting us, and the sergeant-tailor (Sergeant Ferguson) had two hectic days fitting the Battalion for the Divisional Church Parade in a field between La Miquellerie and Ham en Artois. The Army Commander, General Sir Wm. Birdwood, was present, and after the service he gave us a most inspiring address, and saw us march past him in fours as we left the field. The two following days were devoted to a detailed inspection by the Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Sir R. Haking, who seemed favourably impressed and made some very complimentary remarks.
On the 24th we moved up into support relieving the 25th R.W.F. The Battalion was disposed in two halves supporting the right and left battalions respectively—A and C Companies at Quentin and B and D Companies in front of Calonne with Battalion H.Q. After spending three quiet days here we were relieved by the 2/6th Battalion D.L.I. (59th Division), and marched back to Molinghem where our transport had been all the time. B Company left that afternoon, and the rest of the Battalion entrained next day on a tactical train for the Somme. We had a very slow journey, and arrived at La Houssoye about midnight and found our billets there. On 31st August the B Team moved to the Divisional Reception Camp at Franvillers, and about midday we got sudden orders to proceed to near Franvillers where buses would be awaiting us. We went by bus to a farm a couple of miles west of Maricourt, dumped our packs there and reached our destination Le Foret about midnight, where to our joy we were run to earth by the transport with rations and ammunition.
Next day, 1st September, was spent in reconnaissance towards Bouchavesnes, out of which the Bosche had been pushed that morning. At 7.30 P.M. we set out for the position of deployment east of Bouchavesnes, and were met by guides who conducted us by the longest possible route over the worst country they could find, and it was 3 A.M. before the relief of the 2/4th London Regiment was complete and our men in the assembly trenches. Zero hour was 5.30 A.M., at which time it was barely light and rather misty. The first objective was the system of trenches (Opera and Monastir Trenches) on the far side of the Canal Du Nord, the second objective the strong system of trenches half way up the slope, and the final objective the crest of the ridge south of Nurlu Village, a good four miles away. We were to advance across the Tortille River keeping Moislains on our left, across the Canal and then swing north-east and push on to the high ground. This meant squeezing through a narrow neck between Moislains and Allaines and then after we were through the neck, changing direction and extending our front to almost double.
After the preliminary bombardment and following the creeping barrage the Brigade moved forward—the Somersets leading on the right with ourselves following. The Devons were to mop up the village of Moislains, and once clear of the village we were to come up on the left of the Somersets and take the first objective. The barrage fell a long way ahead of us and left untouched a party of the enemy holding the trench immediately in front of us. This delayed us but for a moment, but the Somersets were having a good deal of trouble from the direction of Allaines which had to be dealt with and this took them and us more to our right than we should have been. The advance was again momentarily held up by heavy machine-gun fire on the Canal, but pushing on in most gallant style the leading companies got across all right and up the slope, driving the Bosche out of the wooden huts at the point of the bayonet and accounting for a great many at the same time. So far the advance had gone splendidly. The first objective had been taken, and the advance begun towards the second when murderous machine-gun fire was opened upon us from the left and left rear. The battalion of Londoners on our left north of Moislains had withdrawn, the village of Moislains itself was never mopped up, and the eight Bosche machine guns holding Moislains seeing this moved quickly to the south of the village and opened on our backs. In addition to this we were being subjected to very heavy fire on our left flank, which was now completely in the air, and we could actually see their gun teams working the 77’s on the crest of the ridge. The Bosche had paid us the compliment of rushing up his best troops to meet our Division, and certainly the Alpini Corps were most gallant fighters. To advance unsupported was out of the question, and our casualties were by now very heavy, so there was nothing left but to withdraw to the west side of the Canal again and reorganise the remains of the companies. Next day we pushed forward to the trenches south of Moislains and to the Slag Heap on the canal bank, and at dusk on the evening of the 4th we were relieved by the 19th Battalion London Regiment and marched back to rest and reorganise.
Our casualties had been heavy—the C.O. wounded; of the four Company Commanders Captain R.W. Stewart and Captain I.C. Nairn had been killed and Captain J. M’Nab and Mr C.G. Duncan wounded. Mr Darney was killed and C.S.M. Aitken died of wounds—a total of 3 officers and 38 other ranks killed and 14 officers and 157 other ranks wounded. The Battalion got great praise for its gallant performance that day, and though the attack was apparently unsuccessful we had advanced farther than the authorities had expected, and, moreover, had the pleasure of seeing the 230th Brigade, who passed through us, make good about six miles without firing a shot—a peace march, which as Brig.-General Hoare was at pains to point out was entirely due to the offensive spirit of the 229th Brigade.
We were given a day and a half in which to rest and reorganise and then off again on the retreating Bosche. Just as we were leaving we heard that Mr J.C. Drysdale had been hit by a shell which landed right at the mouth of his bivouac, at least six miles behind the line. In him we lost a most efficient and hard-working transport officer. After a night at Aizecourt and another at Longavesnes we were again in the line relieving the 25th (Montgomery and Welsh Horse Yeomanry) Battalion Welsh Regiment in the left sector of the divisional front holding the horse-shoe line of trenches round St Emilie, with Battalion H.Q. behind the railway embankment between Villers Faucon and St Emilie. A Company of the Somersets was attached to us to help to hold the long length of this salient. They linked up with the Devons on our right, while on our left and considerably to our rear was the 58th Division. We had about one and a half miles of half-dug trench to hold with less than 400 men all told. They were probably the worst sited trenches in France, with no field of fire and not continuous, completely dominated by the German guns at Epehy, who could fire down them, and by snipers who, by crawling through the thistles and broken country on our left rear (and the Alpini were bold snipers and deadly shots), could fire right up some portions of the trench. The salient held by the 74th Division was considerably in advance of the line held by the Australians on our right and by the Londoners on our left, and was quite an unhealthy spot until the Bosche were pushed out of Epehy.
9th September passed fairly quietly until evening, when D Company (Mr Brodie Brown) was sent to reconnoitre to the front, and if possible establish themselves on the ridge on the far side of the valley in front of us. They had got about three-quarters of the way when their patrols reported at least two companies of the enemy going into the trenches which D were to occupy and two strong patrols working forward on either side of them. To push on was impossible, so they returned to the trenches they had left. Though this merely confirmed what we already knew—that the enemy were holding that line in strength—and though a report was sent in to this effect, because the Air Force had reported that they could see no signs of the enemy, Corps ordered us to push forward at dawn next morning and occupy the crest of the ridge. These orders were only received at 2 A.M., and though Company Commanders were summoned at once A Company (Sergeant W. Collier) only received his orders at dawn—the runner having missed the way in the dark. The company of Somersets were to attack on the right, keeping touch with the Devons, C Company (Mr I.W. Cruickshank) in the centre, B Company (Mr J. M’Lean) on the left, with D Company (Mr Brodie Brown) in reserve. A Company (Sergeant W. Collier) was to keep in touch with the Londoners (58th Division) on the left and advance in conjunction with them. The time for our barrage opening was postponed, but the wire from Brigade never reached us and we advanced without any preliminary bombardment. C Company and the Somersets almost reached their objectives unobserved when they were met by very heavy machine-gun and rifle fire. B Company on the left were unable to push on which left C Company’s left flank exposed. Into this gap the enemy quickly rushed fresh troops and attacked in force with the result that the two companies were overwhelmed by numbers and nearly surrounded. They were ordered to retire but not more than a quarter got back.
We consequently were forced to hold our old line as a defensive line and get liason with the 58th Division, who also found the enemy in great strength and were unable to hold what they gained. We learned afterwards that a regiment (three battalions) of the enemy were holding the line between Ronssoy and Templeux le Guerard with orders to fight to the last. The Battalion was now very exhausted, the trenches were knee-deep in water, and a great number of Lewis guns and rifles were out of action with mud and water. Major D.D. Ogilvie and Mr Brodie Brown were the only officers left in the line, with Mr J.W. Ormiston doing liaison between Battalion H.Q. and Captain R.H. Colthart at Battle H.Q.—telephonic communication was almost impossible as the line was broken every five minutes. We were consequently very pleased when we were told we were to be relieved by the 10th East Kent Regiment (230th Brigade), who took over from us that night and we moved back to Longavenes.
Here we found a draft of twelve Black Watch officers awaiting us, and the day was spent in cleaning ourselves. Next day (12th September) we moved back to Templeux la Fosse, with Battalion H.Q. in the old Prisoners of War compound and the companies in trenches. Major J.M. M’Kenzie, Royal Scots, arrived to take over command of the Battalion from, Major D.D. Ogilvie, and Brig.-General F.S. Thackeray (H.L.I.) assumed command of the Brigade which Lieut.-Colonel C.J.H. Spence-Jones, Pembroke Yeomanry, had commanded since Brig.-General R. Hoare had been wounded. We had six restful days here and then moved up to Faustine Quarry in reserve for the attack by the Division. A Company (Mr P. Dane) were attached to the Somersets, who had suffered a lot of casualties from gas.
The III. Corps continued the attack on 18th September with a view to securing a position affording good observation on the Hindenburg line. The 1st Australian Division co-operated on our right and the 16th Division on our left. Against us was the 38th Division (German) holding from Templeux le Guerard to Ronssoy.