In the southern parts of Celebes, horses of a very good description are to be met with, which the natives manage with considerable skill. A cushion stuffed with cotton, and laid upon the animal's back, forms their saddle, on which they sit cross-legged, and with this simple contrivance their seat is so firm that they take bold leaps, and scour across the country in a manner truly surprising. When a chief is killed, his relatives and slaves do not care to survive, but a case of this sort rarely takes place, as the former usually remain on spots free from danger. The Bughis will carry their slain off the field of battle at every risk, and will submit to great loss rather than fail in this object. It is difficult, however, to draw them into making an assault en masse.
We anchored off the town of Macassar on the 5th of July, 1824, the king of the northern part of the state of which this is the capital, having by this time followed the example of the Bughis of Boni in rising against our government. On the 14th of the same month we sailed for Tannette, (a town on the west coast of Celebes,) with troops and munitions of war, our vessel forming part of a flotilla consisting of the brigs Sirene, Nautilus, Jacoba-Elizabeth, and Dourga, with the corvette Courier, two gun-boats, and some prahus with native auxiliaries; the naval force being under the orders of Commander Buys, while the troops were led by Lieutenant Colonel De Steurs. Having assembled before Tannette, we formed into line and cannonaded the enemy's fortification, while at the same time the troops were landed and some gained possession of the forts and villages, together with some strongholds farther up the country. The loss on our side was small, but the enemy suffered greatly in killed and wounded. After sustaining this defeat, the king retired into the interior, and refused to submit. On the 22nd, Colonel De Steurs departed with the troops towards Macassar, with the intention of chastising the treacherous inhabitants of Labakang and Pankalina, those towns lying in the route. The squadron followed their march along the coast, with the view of affording assistance should it be required. The number of reefs and banks render the navigation of the coast hazardous and difficult; but the fishermen of the islands piloted us through them with safety. During the passage our armed boats were constantly employed on the coasts, more for the purpose of checking the plundering propensities displayed by our native allies from Goa, than for the annoyance of the enemy. Plunder, indeed, seemed to be the chief object of these auxiliaries, for when they were required to fight, they either remained idle or took to their heels.
On the 24th we reached Macassar, the inhabitants of the intermediate coast having speedily been brought under subjection. The expedition had been fortunate and successful in every respect, and inspired us with so much confidence that we eagerly desired to be again led against the enemy.
An expedition consisting of 200 troops, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Reder, was now set on foot to attack the Raja of Supa, the squadron being again employed in conveying them to their destination. On the 4th of August we anchored in the bay of Supa, and as the enemy obstinately refused to negociate, no other course remained for us than to land the troops, and prepare to carry into effect the orders of our Government. It immediately became apparent that the resources of the enemy had been incorrectly reported to us, and that more difficulty would be experienced in reducing the place than we had been led to believe would have been the case.
Supa, the capital, is extended near the shore on the north-east side of the bay, and is difficult of approach from seaward. The town, which lies low, is bounded on the south side by extensive rice fields, while to the south-west, in which direction the squadron lay, it is separated from the sea by a ridge of hills.
On the morning after our arrival, the troops, with detachments of seamen from the ships, were landed in good order under cover of the guns of the squadron. Our attack upon the well-fortified town of Supa was unsuccessful, the troops being driven back to the hills, of which, however, they maintained possession; the enemy returning into the town, with the exception of a number of horsemen, who remained at the foot of the hills, and some detachments which took up positions to the southward. Towards evening some mortars and brass six-pounders were landed, and placed in battery against the town. The firing was at first attended with little loss on either side, but the war-cries of the Bughis convinced us that they were assembled in great force.
Repeated attempts were now made to set fire to the strongholds of the enemy, but they were unsuccessful, and attended with considerable loss. The vessels employed in keeping up the communication with Macassar had by this time brought a number of native auxiliaries furnished by the king of Sidenreng, but these took up a position to the southward, and never emerged from their hiding places.
Information which was now received of our garrisons at Pankalina and Labakang, consisting of sixty men each, having been overpowered and massacred to a man, spread dismay and dejection among the troops, while, through the weak indulgence of our commandant, military discipline was often disregarded, and our operations consequently, were deficient in point of combination. A second general assault was not determined on until the men had been wearied by useless skirmishing. All the men that could be spared from the ships were now ordered on shore, and on this as on the previous occasion I served with them; the command of the left wing of the battery being entrusted to me, while the right was under the direction of Commander Buys.
At daylight on the 14th, after our batteries had for some time played with vigour on the town, Lieutenant-colonel Reder advanced to the attack with one hundred and fifty soldiers, one hundred seamen, and forty marines, whom the enemy allowed to approach close under the wall without firing a shot. Their cavalry had in the meantime been posted out of sight on the south side of the town, and when our troops had reached the walls, and commenced a sharp combat with those within, the cavalry fell upon them in flank, penetrated right through them, and even close up to our breast-works. The confusion created by this movement was so great, that notwithstanding the efforts of the officers the flight soon became general, and the disorder communicating itself to the reserve, the enemy were enabled to cause us considerable loss. The superior courage of Europeans soon, however, restored matters to order, for the fire of case-shot from our batteries checked the career of the enemy, and our troops having by this time rallied became the assailants in their turn, and drove the Bughis back to their batteries. Our advantage over the enemy was limited to this, so that our attack was attended with much bloodshed without being successful. We had to lament the loss of two brave officers, Lieutenants Van Pelt and Bannhoff, together with nearly one-third of the men engaged, six of my own crew being killed on this fatal occasion. During the engagement our auxiliaries remained in the positions they had taken up, and did not stir a foot to assist us.
On the evening after this occurrence we were joined by Mr. Tobias, the commissioner, Colonel De Steurs, and the Raja of Sidenreng, the latter bringing with him a number of native auxiliaries. The arrival of Colonel De Steurs gave great joy to our troops, this officer being universally beloved and esteemed, but of what avail was his presence now that the pith of our force had been expended in ill-directed attacks? The enemy occasionally made night attacks on our position, but were always driven back, our auxiliaries showing on these occasions more courage than usual, repeatedly pursuing their adversaries close up to their forts.