Presidential Candidates: / Containing Sketches, Biographical, Personal and Political, of Prominent Candidates for the Presidency in 1860

by D. W. Bartlett

"Sir, we may fulfill this sublime destiny, if we will but faithfully adhere to the great maxims of the Revolution; honestly carrying into their legitimate practical applications the high principles of democracy; and preserve inviolate plighted faith and solemn compacts. Let us do this, putting our trust in the God of our fathers, and there is no dream of national prosperity, power, and glory, which ancient or modern builders of ideal commonwealths ever conceived, which we may not hope to realize. But if we turn aside from these ways of honor, to walk in the by-paths of temporary expedients, compromising with wrong, abetting oppression, and repudiating faith, the wisdom and devotion and labors of our fathers will have been all—all in vain.

"Sir, I trust that the result of this discussion will show that the American Senate will sanction no breach of compact. Let us strike from the bill the statement which historical facts and our personal recollections disprove, and then reject every proposition which looks toward a violation of the plighted faith and solemn compact which our fathers made, and which we, their sons, are bound, by every tie of obligation, sacredly to maintain."

Mr. Chase's opinions respecting the independence of the State courts can be gathered from his message to the Ohio Legislature, Jan. 4, 1858. We quote:

"A disposition has been manifested, within the last few years, by some of the officials of the Federal Government, exercising their functions within the limits of Ohio, to disregard the authority, and to encroach upon the rights of the State, to an extent and in a manner which demands your notice.

"In February, 1856, several colored persons were seized in Hamilton County as fugitive slaves. One of these persons, Margaret Garner, in the frenzy of the moment, impelled, as it seems, by the dread of seeing her children dragged, with herself, back to slavery, attempted to slay them on the spot, and actually succeeded in killing one. For this act, she and her companions were indicted by the grand jury for the crime of murder, and were taken into custody upon a writ regularly issued from the Court of Common Pleas.

"While thus imprisoned under the legal process of a State court, for the highest crime known to our code, a writ of habeas corpus was issued by a judge of the District Court of the United States, requiring their production before him. The writ was obeyed by the sheriff, and, contrary to all expectations, and in disregard, as I must think, of principle and authority, the prisoners were taken from his custody by order of the judge, and, without allowing any opportunity for the interposition of the State authorities, delivered over to the Marshal of the United States, by whom they were immediately transported beyond our limits. The alleged ground for this action and order was that the indicted parties had been seized as fugitive slaves upon a Federal Commissioner's warrant, before the indictment and arrest, and that the right to their custody, thus acquired, was superior to that of the sheriff, under the process of the State. This doctrine must necessarily give practical impunity to murder whenever the murderer may be seized by a federal official as a fugitive from service before arrest for the crime under State authority. Imputing no wrong intention to the judge, I am constrained to add that his proceeding seems to me an abuse, rather than an exercise, of judicial power.

"A similar case occurred more recently in the county of Champaign. Several deputies of the federal marshal having arrested certain citizens of this State for some alleged offence against the Fugitive Slave act, a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the probate judge of that county, requiring the arrested parties to be brought before him for inquiry into the grounds of detention. The sheriff of Clark County, while attempting to execute this writ, was assaulted by these petty officials and seriously injured, while his deputy was fired upon, though happily without effect. A warrant was issued by a justice of the peace for the apprehension of the perpetrators of these offences. This warrant was duly executed and the prisoners committed to jail under the custody of the sheriff of Clark County. A writ of habeas corpus was then issued by the same district judge who had interposed in the case of Margaret Garner, requiring the sheriff of Clark County to produce his prisoners before him at the city of Cincinnati. This writ was also obeyed, and the prisoners were discharged from custody by the order of the judge, on the ground that being federal officers, and charged with the execution of a federal writ, they had a right to overcome, by any necessary violence, all attempts made under the process of a State court, to detain them or their prisoners, even for inquiry into the legality of the custody in which those prisoners were held.

"This principle cannot be sound. It subverts effectually the sovereignty of the State. It asserts the right of any district judge of the United States to arrest the execution of State process, and to nullify the functions of State courts and juries, whenever in his opinion a person charged with crime under State authority has acted in the matter forming the basis of the charge, in pursuance of any federal law or warrant. No act of Congress, in my judgment, sanctions this principle. Such an act, indeed, would be clearly unconstitutional, because in plain violation of the express provision which requires that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury.

"It is deeply to be regretted that collisions of this kind should occur. The authorities of Ohio have never failed in due consideration for the constitutional rights of federal courts, nor will they thus fail. But they cannot admit, without dishonor, that State process is entitled to less respect than federal, nor can they ever concede to federal writs or federal officials a deference which is not conceded to those of the State.

"The true course is one of mutual respect and mutual deference. Whenever, in any inquiry upon habeas corpus, by any court, State or federal, it may be ascertained that the applicant for the writ is detained under valid process in pursuance of a constitutional law, he should be remanded at once to the custody from which he may have been taken for trial in due course. No investigation should take place into the guilt or innocence of the party charged, or, what is substantially the same thing, whether the facts were justified by the authority under which the applicant was acting at the time. Inquiries of this character are for juries upon a regular trial and in open court; not for a judge at chambers. If made upon one side upon habeas corpus, they must also be made upon the other. If federal courts are to protect federal officials from prosecution by State courts for alleged violations of State law, State courts in their turn must protect State officers from prosecution in federal courts, under similar circumstances. Hence, dangerous conflicts must arise, and imminent peril both to liberty and union.