John Bell is an honest, upright man, and has been for years one of the ablest members of the U.S. Senate. He has evinced the highest courage in taking his stand against measures which were either proposed by politicians from his own section of the country, or were expected to inure to the benefit of that section. He came out boldly against the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and the Kansas-Nebraska act, although in doing so he exposed himself at home, among his constituents, to the raking fire of his political enemies. He also opposed with great eloquence and vigor the Lecompton bill. For a southern senator to do these things requires pluck as well as principle, and we may be sure that John Bell lacks neither. His enemies will give him credit for both.
In his personal appearance in the Senate, Mr. Bell is noticeable. Though his hair is grey, the fire of his eye is undimmed, and the freshness of his countenance is youthful. Few men in the Senate speak so vigorously as he. His voice is sonorous and loud, and the energy of his tone, his style, and his gesticulation remind one of an orator of thirty. We remember very well how during the Lecompton debate in the Senate, Mr. Johnson, Bell's Democratic colleague, was replying with great severity to his speech against the Lecompton bill. A portion of his remarks were very personal, and must have somewhat irritated the brave old senator. Johnson was fresh from the stump, and its phrases and language were so beaten into his mind that he could not shake them off. So, frequently in the course of his speech in alluding to Mr. Bell, instead of saying "my colleague," he said "my competitor." This was done several times, when Mr. Bell half-rose in his seat, his face flushed red with his indignation, and hurled out at his colleague, "Competitor! I am not the gentleman's competitor!" No one who witnessed the scene will ever forget it. The Senate was convulsed with laughter.
Mr. Bell was born near Nashville, Tennessee, in February, 1797; his father being a farmer in moderate circumstances. He—the son—was educated at what is now Nashville University—afterward studied law, and was admitted to the bar in 1816. He then settled down in Franklin, Tennessee, from which place he was elected to the State Senate, in 1817, he then being but twenty years old. During the next nine years he forsook politics and confined himself to his profession, but in 1826 he ran for Congress, in opposition to Felix Grundy. He had the support of General Jackson, and triumphed by one thousand majority. The canvass was long and exciting, and Mr. Bell was justly proud of his victory. For fourteen consecutive years he remained in the House of Representatives from this district. When first elected he was a follower of Calhoun and an opponent of a Protective Tariff. He afterward, by reading and argument, saw fit to change his position in this respect, and has long been known as an advocate of the old Whig tenets—a high tariff, internal improvements, etc. etc. He was for ten years in the House, chairman of the committee on Indian Affairs, was once chairman of the Judiciary committee. The breach between himself and Jackson was on the question of the removal of the deposits, and the result was that Mr. Bell went over to the Whigs. In 1834, he was made Speaker of the House of Representatives, his opponent being James K. Polk. The Whigs and a wing of the Democrats who disliked Van Buren voted for Mr. Bell, and elected him. Mr. Bell opposed Mr. Van Buren for removing men from office on account of their politics, and he made a strong speech in the House against this policy. He refused to support Van Buren for the presidency and went in for Judge White, who carried the State of Tennessee. Mr. Bell was afterward reëlected to Congress from the Hermitage district, showing that the people even in Jackson's district supported him in the position he had taken. It was at this time that he had the courage to vote in favor of receiving anti-slavery politicians, when many northern politicians voted to strike down this right of the people under the most despotic forms of government. He also voted against Atherton's famous Gag Resolutions. In 1841, Gen. Harrison made him Secretary of War, but he resigned when Tyler came into power. He was soon elected to the United States Senate, where he remained till March 4th, 1859.
Mr. Bell supported the compromise measures of 1850—was opposed to the annexation of Texas—and, as we have remarked, opposed the Kansas-Nebraska act and the Lecompton Constitution. He is opposed to the taking of Cuba or buying it at an extravagant price—opposes all kinds of filibustering. We make a few extracts from Mr. Bell's great speech against the Lecompton bill. Upon Popular Sovereignty he thus expressed himself:
"What is the true doctrine on this subject? I had supposed that there could be no disagreement as to the true principles connected with the rights and powers of the people in forming a State Constitution; but since I have heard the speech of the senator from Georgia, I do not know what principle he agrees to. I say that in no disrespect; but I thought he was particularly wild, shooting extra flammantia mænia mundi, on those high points of doctrine which he, in some parts of his speech, thought proper to enunciate. Does any person here deny the proposition, that the people of a territory, in the formation of a State Constitution, are to that extent—quoad hoc—sovereign and uncontrollable, though still owing obedience to the provisional government of the territory? Will any senator contend that the territorial legislature can either give to the people any power over that subject which they did not possess before, or withhold from them any which they did possess? The territorial legislature cannot dictate any one provision of the constitution which the people think proper to form. Who is prepared to contend that Congress can do anything more in this respect than a territorial legislature? It is usual for the territorial legislature, when the people desire to apply for admission into the Union, in the absence of an enabling act of Congress, to pass a law providing for the assembling of a convention to form a State Constitution. But that is a mere usage, resorted to when Congress has not thought proper to pass what is called an enabling act. What is an enabling act? Nothing more than to signify to the people of a territory, that if they shall think proper to meet in convention and form a State Constitution, in compliance with certain forms therein prescribed, to insure a fair expression of the people's will, Congress is prepared to admit them into the Union as a State.
"But such an act gives no more power to the people over the subject of a constitution than an act of a territorial legislature. But, suppose the people, either under an act of the territorial legislature or of Congress, meet in convention, by delegates chosen by the people, and form a constitution, what then? Has it any vitality as a constitution? Does it transform the territory into a State? Has it any binding force or effect, either upon individuals or upon the community? Nobody pretends that it has any such force. It is only after the acceptance of the constitution, and the admission of the territory into the Union as a State, that there is any vigor or validity in a constitution so formed. Before that time, it is worth no more than the parchment on which its provisions are written, so far as any legal or constitutional validity is concerned.
"But, upon principle, the people of a territory, without any act of the territorial legislature, without an enabling act of Congress, can hold public meetings and elect delegates to meet in convention for the purpose of forming a constitution; and when formed, it has all the essential attributes of a valid constitution, as one formed in any other way. Many senators contend that it is the inalienable and indefeasible right of the people of a State at all times to change their constitution in any manner they think proper. This doctrine I do not admit, in regard to the people of a State; but, in reference to the formation of a constitution by the people of a territory, there can be no question as to the soundness of this doctrine. They can form a constitution by delegates voluntarily chosen and sent to a convention, but what is it worth when it is formed? Nothing at all, until Congress shall accept it and admit the territory into the Union as a State under that constitution. It is worth no more in that case than in the case of a constitution formed under a territorial act or an act of Congress; but it is worth just as much."
Upon the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and the effects which followed the act, he remarked:
"Four years ago, when it was proposed to repeal the Missouri Compromise—to adopt the principle of non-intervention, and concede to the people of the territories the right to settle the question of slavery in their own way—it was said by the advocates of the measure, that, as soon as the principles of it came to be understood, all agitation and discussion upon the subject of slavery in the territories would be localized—excluded from Congress—and the country would be left in undisturbed repose. So boldly and confidently were these views maintained, that the whole southern delegation in Congress, Whigs and Democrats, with seven or eight exceptions, together with many Democrats from the free States, came into the support of the measure. How were these bold predictions verified? In less than one month of the time during which the Kansas-Nebraska bill was pending in Congress, nearly the whole North was in a flame of resentment and opposition. Old men, of high character and great influence, who had for twenty years opposed the policy and designs of the Abolition faction in the North, suddenly became its allies and coadjutors. Thousands of the best citizens at the North, who had exerted all their energies to repress all opposition to the execution of the Fugitive Slave law of 1850, became suddenly converts to Free-Soilism. The religious feelings of whole communities became frenzied. The pulpit was converted into an engine of anti-slavery propagandism, and hundreds of thousands of sober-minded and conservative people at the North, who had never countenanced sectional strife on the subject of slavery, evinced that they had thrown off their conservatism, and were ready to array themselves under the banner of any party leader or faction, to check the progress of the South in what they considered its aggressive policy.
"After that demonstration of opposition at the North, but little more was said in debate of the tranquillizing character of the measure. But its most influential supporters from the South, becoming inflamed and irritated by the fierce invectives with which the measure was assailed, both within and out of Congress, became, in their turn, reckless (apparently at least) of all consequences, and seemed only bent on victory—on obtaining a triumph by passing the bill! It was in vain that they were admonished that they were adding largely to the abolition faction at the North; that they were increasing the free-soil element of political power in that section. They admitted no distinction between Abolitionists and Free-Soilers, and denounced all at the North who opposed the bill as Abolitionists and foes to the South. Some gentlemen declared that the screams of the Abolitionists were music to their ears. It was idle to warn men in such a tempest of passion, that, instead of sowing the seeds of peace, as they had promised, they were sowing dragons' teeth, that would spring up armed men. So intense did the feeling become on the subject, that some southern members of Congress, who had gone into the support of the bill on the idea that the Missouri restriction act was a violation of the treaty with France, and who would not have listened for a moment to the admission of aliens to the right of suffrage in the territories, lost sight of these views under the influence of the furor that was gotten up among the friends as well as the opponents of the measure; and they became even more determined champions of the bill when these grounds of their original adhesion were entirely swept away—one by the rejection of the Clayton amendment, and the other by the Badger proviso—than they were at the outset.