The Resolution did not come to a vote in the 81st Congress (1949-1950). Estes Kefauver (Democrat, Tennessee) gravitated to the leadership in pushing for the Resolution in subsequent Congresses; and he had the support of the top leadership of both parties, Republican and Democrat, north and south–including people like Richard Nixon, William Fulbright, Lister Hill, Hubert Humphrey, Mike Mansfield, Kenneth Keating, Jacob Javits, Christian Herter, and so on.
From 1949 to 1959, the Atlantic Union Resolution was introduced in each Congress–except the one Republican-controlled Congress (83rd–1953).
In 1959, Atlantic Union advocates, having got nowhere in ten years of trying to push their Resolution through Congress, changed tactics. In 1959, Streit's Atlantic Union Committee published a pamphlet entitled, Our One Best Hope–For Us–For The United Nations–For All Mankind, recommending an "action" program to "strengthen the UN." This "action" program asks the U.S. Congress to pass a Resolution calling for an international convention which would accomplish certain "fundamental objectives," to wit:
"That only reasonably experienced democracies be asked to participate; and that the number asked to participate should be small enough to enhance the chance for early agreement, yet large enough to create, if united, a preponderance of power on the side of freedom.
"That the delegates be officially appointed but that they be uninstructed by their governments so that they shall be free to act in accordance with their own individual consciences.
"That, whatever the phraseology, it should not be such as to preclude any proposal which, in the wisdom of the convention, is the most practical step.
"That the findings of the delegates could be only recommendations, later to be accepted or rejected by their legislatures and their fellow citizens."
The NATO Citizens Commission Law of 1960 fully carries out the purposes and intent of the new Atlantic Union strategy fabricated in 1959 to replace the old Resolution which had failed for ten years.
The roll-call vote on this law (published in the February 27, 1961, issue of The Dan Smoot Report) shows what a powerful array of United States Congressmen and Senators are for this step toward world government.
The debates in House and Senate (Senate: Congressional Record, June 15, 1960, pp. 11724 ff; House: Congressional Record, August 24, 1960, pp. 16261 ff) show something even more significant.
While denying that the NATO Citizens Commission Law had any relation to the old Atlantic Union Resolution which Congress had refused for ten years to consider, "liberals" in both Senate and House used language right out of the Atlantic Union Committee pamphlet of 1959 (Our Best Hope ...) to "prove" that this NATO Citizens Commission proposal was not dangerous: They argued, for example, that Commission members would be free to act in accordance with their own individual consciences; that the meetings of the Commission would be purely exploratory, and that Commission findings would be "only recommendations," not binding on the U.S. government.