The brigadier commanding the advanced guard of two squadrons of cavalry, two guns, and a small body of infantry, on approaching this memorable place, espied two or three hundred well-armed Ghilzies on an eminence not far from the road.
Having minutely examined their position, the brigadier pronounced it to be remarkably strong, and prudently resolved to await the arrival of the main body of the army, previously to dislodging the party.
Whilst revolving in his mind the most advisable method of attack, unfortunately, the head of the column hove in sight, and the doubtless brilliant result that might have ensued was precluded by the Ghilzies taking to flight.
It was considered fortunate that the enemy knew not their own strength, or that a more rash officer had not been in command on the occasion, who, in attempting to intercept the retreat of the Ghilzies, might have incurred serious responsibility.
Sir John Keane, on his arrival at the encamping ground, was so satisfied with the arrangements, that he is reported even to have instituted a comparison between the gallant colonel and the Duke of Wellington, in his usual energetic and classical mode of expression.
As we had ascended considerably since leaving Kandahar, and were frequently on high tableland, the heat ceased to annoy us so severely as during the three preceding months, and we considered we had overcome by far our most formidable enemy in the relentless sun.
Various and contradictory rumours continued to pour daily into camp. At one time, it was said that Dost Mahomed, at the head of an army of thirty thousand men, with eighty guns, had taken up a strong position near Caubul; at another, that his chiefs and Kuzzilbaches (Persian mercenaries) having deserted him, he had despaired of making any effectual resistance, and fled towards the Hindoo Koosh. Lastly, we were informed that he had detached two of his sons, with chosen men from the army, to garrison the fortress of Ghuzni; but the same evening, perhaps, merchants would travel through our camp, en route for Kandahar, and declare they had left Ghuzni but a few days, and had not seen a single soldier in the place! These reports, when compared with the actual events, are more reconcilable than appears at a first glance.
Small parties continued to arrive daily, and tender their allegiance to Shah Soojah; and we were authentically informed, that the two before-mentioned Ghilzie chiefs, with about five or six thousand horse each, were moving daily on both flanks, parallel with our line of march, and would neglect no opportunity to harass the army. Of the truth of the latter part of the information, we entertained no doubt, provided they could do it with impunity.
About seventy miles from Ghuzni, we quitted the rich valley of the Turnuk river, and crossed an extensive, well-cultivated plain, thickly studded with small mud forts. The inhabitants of this part of the country dare not dwell in open towns or villages, owing to the numerous bands of marauders infesting the neighbouring mountains, who have no mercy on the defenceless villages.