Colonel Wade commanded a few companies of native infantry and some raw levies, and was supported by a Sikh auxiliary brigade.
Before Colonel Wade entered the Khyber Pass, the Afghan force under Mahomed Akbar had been recalled by Dost Mahomed, under the urgent circumstances then pressing upon him; and the Khyber was entrusted to the defence of the wandering tribes of Khyberees who infest those extensive ranges of mountains.
Our own effective force now scarcely amounted to two thousand eight hundred European cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and about four thousand sepoys: so much had the army been reduced by sickness, death, and the detachments left to garrison the places we had passed through—viz., Bukkur, Shikarpore, Quetta, and Candahar.
Exclusive of these, of course, were the Shah's troops, whose contingent, in case of an action, would, it was conjectured, be fully employed in watching the numerous Afghan rabble which flocked around Shah Soojah. These had now swelled to a large amount by the daily influx of armed horsemen, who were as likely to be spies and adherents of Dost Mahomed, as friends of Shah Soojah.
At the best, the bare suspicion of treachery from this armed host rendered it necessary to keep a force on the watch, and the contingent must have been used for that purpose in case of a general engagement.
On the morning of the 22nd of July, Sir John Keane and the engineers were actively employed in reconnoitring the fortress.
Captain Thompson, the chief engineer, having completed his observations, and remarked that a communication was kept up by the garrison with the exterior, through the Caubul gateway, gave it as his opinion that apparently the most practicable means of assault were presented by a coup-de-main, in lieu of a regular assault, (for which we were not provided,) and suggested as a method to attain this purpose, that the Caubul gate should be destroyed by bags of powder.
Some officers were in favour of an immediate escalade, but as that method would necessarily involve a greater loss, and might still remain in reserve, in case of the failure of the former and more expeditious method, Sir John Keane resolved on adopting Captain Thompson's suggestion.
During the morning of the 22nd, we were most of us endeavouring to make amends for the two days and nights of almost unremitting vigilance that had been exercised, when the shrill tones of the alarm trumpet rang confusedly from many quarters of the camp, and caused us all to start up and prepare for the saddle. A smart rattling fire of musketry, interrupted by the occasional roar of cannon, was heard, apparently near the foot of the hills, on our left flank, and a hurried report ran along the lines, that Dost Mahomed, with his whole army, had come suddenly upon us.
We were now become too well used to our harness to take long in preparing, and a very few minutes served to show us formed, on our alarm posts.