The gallant Outram, whose whole life has been a scene of daring exploits, which obtained for him the appropriate designation of Bayard, "Le chevalier sans peur et sans reproche," has sketched, in his "Rough Notes," the details of this expedition, and I shall therefore not presume to trace that ground.
Thus was the object of this singular campaign accomplished, and Shah Soojah, after an exile of thirty years, re-established in his dominions. The feeble resistance offered by Dost Mahomed was a matter of surprise to all the army, considering the character for enterprise, courage, and ability universally assigned him, and which the earlier period of his career fully testified; but he had been many years a king, which may perhaps account for the difficulty. Possessing such strong natural obstacles to the advance as well as maintenance of an invading army, as Afghanistan unquestionably does, he profited by none of them. In the most rugged and formidable defiles, a few marauders only were posted to assail our rear guards and baggage; and even these not always at the suggestion of their prince, but to glut their own appetites for blood and plunder. As we advanced through the inhospitable regions of Lower Afghanistan, the inhabitants generally fled from before us, but often left their standing crops for the maintenance of our cattle. Had these been cut down and carried away to the mountains by the villagers, our horses must all have died, for they endured, even as it happened, starvation enough to destroy half and enfeeble the remainder.
Though many opportunities presented themselves for cutting off our supplies of water, this expedient was only once or twice attempted, and that in so slovenly a manner that a party of twenty or thirty troopers sufficed to restore the water to its channel, unopposed by the enemy. These circumstances amply prove, without entering further into details, that Dost Mahomed had neglected the important opportunities which lay in his grasp, of multiplying our difficulties at the outset. He might assuredly have induced the chiefs of Kandahar (his own brothers) to make common cause against their common invaders, and, in conjunction with the Ghilzie chiefs and Mehrab Khan of Khelat (both of whom, as well as their adherents, showed abundant proofs of their readiness to bear arms against us) dispute the passage of the numerous and difficult passes we were compelled to traverse. This supposition may be fully warranted by the reply which Burnes describes Dost Mahomed to have given on a former occasion to the Kandahar chiefs, when threatened by the Persians. "When the Persians approach, let me know; and as I am now your enemy will I then be your friend."[34]
Such would have appeared the most rational course to pursue; and had he taken these measures and executed them with vigour, there is little doubt that his own army would have remained faithful to him when the prospect appeared favourable, and when an example should be set by other tribes. It is no matter of surprise that an army of lawless tribes should desert a chief whom they deem unable or unwilling to direct their efforts to the best advantage.
The chieftains, whose aggregate force would have been considerable, were allowed to be beaten in detail, or to abandon their position as we advanced. Mehrab Khan, with two thousand brave followers, fell in the defence of his fortress, even after the dethronement of his sovereign. The Kandahar chiefs, with what remained of their army, having lingered to the last moment, were compelled to abandon their city without a struggle. The Ghilzie chiefs were willing enough,[35] as they afterwards proved, to meet their invaders in the field, and their numbers must have been considerable, as more than six thousand were known to be moving on our flanks on the advance to Ghuzni.
Lastly, a garrison of less than three thousand men in a fortress, which, by the modern rules of the art of war, must inevitably fall in a few days, (considering the Gothic tracing of its defences,) was the forlorn bulwark opposed by the monarch himself to the approaches of his capital.
However, this dernier resort, even, was made the least of by his majesty's unaccountable desire to linger near the capital. Had the defile, five miles on the Caubul side of Ghuzni, been selected as a position for his army, they would have been advantageously placed to intercept our advance upon Caubul, and from thence dispositions might have been made for the relief of Ghuzni, or to surprise us by a chupao, or night attack, which mode of warfare has often been successfully practised among the Afghans. What might have been the result of such a manœuvre it is difficult even to conjecture;[36] for in the darkness of night many advantages of discipline are lost, where the enemy is felt before he is seen, and fire is almost as likely to tell upon friend as foe; their habit, it is said, is to attack the rear of camp, where the confused mass of cattle driven from the bazaar into the lines must create no trifling confusion amongst the troops turning out to form on their alarm posts.
The fall of Ghuzni greatly dispirited Dost Mahomed's army;[37] they became distrustful of him, and he of them, and the result was a mutual separation.
Many of his soldiers concurred in stating, that they had assured Dost Mahomed of their faith, and would have abided by him; but when it became known that Jubbar Khan had proceeded to Ghuzni to open a negotiation, they doubted him, and concluded he was about to provide for himself at their expense.