When the loose earth, which hides the tenement of the dead from the last sad gaze of the living, was cast on his coffin, the sullen roar of the cannon, which awakened from their reverie the abstracted group of mourners, and ran, telling their tale of woe, amongst the craggy precipices of the mountains of Caubul, found an echo of melancholy which thrilled in the hearts of his bereaved friends. I turned from the grave with the oppressive feeling of destitution which every soldier must experience on losing as gallant a colonel as ever drew a sabre, and as warm-hearted and accomplished a gentleman as even England can produce:
"Requiescat in pace."
Reports were in daily circulation that Dost Mahomed had crossed the Hindoo Koosh, and taken up his quarters with his brother-in-law, the King of Bokhara, who had promised his aid to the fugitive monarch in regaining the sovereignty, of which he had been deprived. Improbable as this was,—for had such been the intentions of the King of Bokhara, he would surely have advanced to the assistance of Dost Mahomed before his kingdom had been wrested from him,—Dr. Lord, of the political department, was sent with a military escort to cross the Indian Caucasus, and convey despatches, as well as gain intelligence, in that part of the country. The doctor had not reached Bameean, when, from the exaggerated reports of the inhabitants, he was led to suppose that Dost Mahomed, with a considerable force, was already between him and the mountain-pass. Not desiring a personal interview with the deposed Shah, whose arguments in favour of his own cause were likely to be weighty and incontrovertible, the political doctor wheeled about, and hastened to Caubul, where the intelligence induced Sir John Keane to order a force, under Colonel Sale, to be in readiness to move towards Bameean.
Two days after these orders were issued, news arrived that Dost Mahomed, so far from crossing the Hindoo Koosh, was hastening in an opposite direction, with as much speed as the worthy doctor had used in his return to the capital. The force was consequently countermanded; and a detachment only, consisting of part of the Shah's goorkhas, and a few guns, were sent to occupy Bameean, which lies about eighty miles from Caubul, at the foot of the mountainous barrier, which divides Afghanistan from Bokhara. The road to this outpost was exceedingly bad; and even the small force of artillery which accompanied the party, delayed them nearly a fortnight, in crossing the rugged mountains and ravines which obstruct the road from Caubul to Bameean.
So much paper has been already wasted on the Russo-phobia, that it would be superfluous to enter on a discussion of the obstacles which might oppose a march from the Caspian to the Indian Caucasus, over a country of which the little that is known has been gleaned from the scanty details of a few adventurous travellers, stealing in disguise over these inhospitable regions, and necessarily gleaning but meagre information. But of the difficulties which would present themselves to an army, on its arrival at the Hindoo Koosh, I think a very simple estimate may be formed. The pass over those mountains, on account of its elevation, and the heavy falls of snow which constantly occur during the greater part of the year, is only practicable in the summer months, which would ensure the advantage of knowing at what time to expect an enemy. The road, by Herat, does not possess this advantage, being the easiest and most frequented passage into Afghanistan; but thence to Kandahar, the country possesses all the obstacles which opposed our progress through Lower Afghanistan, which would seriously affect a force whose strength and resources must have been materially weakened during a laborious march from the shores of the Caspian, even unopposed by an enemy. When arrived in the heart of Afghanistan, the greatest difficulties would oppose themselves to the maintenance of so numerous an army as would be requisite for so important an enterprise; and the palpable truth, that amongst these barren mountains a small army would be annihilated and a large one starved, must obtrude itself on the minds of all who are qualified to canvass the dilemma.
But an army which, by an effective commissariat and consummate fortune, advanced with its efficiency but little impaired, towards the frontiers of Hindostan, from the centre of Afghanistan, need not hastily congratulate itself on the charms of ultimate success, for the passages out of that country present as formidable barriers as the entrance into it, and these are the true outposts to the defensive frontier line of our Eastern Empire.
The intricate pass of the Kyber on the one side, and that of the Bolan, with the neighbouring Gundava, on the other frontier, being the sole outlets for an effective army,[42] form the natural outworks to the Indus, taken as a base of operations; and the policy which suggested the isolated position taken up in Afghanistan, with the far distant and imperfect lines of the Sutlej and lower Indus, was surely at variance with the admitted principles of military defence.
In either of the above-named passes, a small British force would maintain their ground against any odds; for the defiles being in many places not five yards in width, and flanked by craggy mountains which rise nearly perpendicularly on each side in many places, the numbers of the enemy would advantage him nothing, the heights being in our possession, whilst a strong palisade and battery, thrown across the road and covered by musketry from the adjacent heights, ought effectually to check his progress.[43]
That Russia did meditate hostilities in the East may be inferred from the detection of her envoy's intrigues at the courts of Persia and Caubul; but the reliance to be placed on the faith and promises of these agents may be fairly estimated from the observance of the following article in a treaty between the Shah of Persia and the Ameers of Kandahar.