On the 20th of November, Major Broadfoot[17] communicated to the governor-general that the information which he had received from Lahore led him to suppose that the Sikhs had resolved on an advance towards the Sutlej, for the purpose of invading the British territories, and the next day's accounts tended to corroborate this statement.
On the 24th and 25th of November, a great portion of the Sikh army were on their march towards the Sutlej, openly proclaiming their intentions of crossing the river. On this news reaching the governor-general's camp, the Sikh Vakeel (ambassador) was called upon for an explanation of this hostile attitude, and being unable to give any satisfactory answer, was ordered, on the 4th of December, to quit the governor-general's camp at Umbala, and return to the Punjaub.
After the Vakeel's departure, Sir Henry Hardinge continued to advance peaceably towards the frontier, visiting the protected Sikh states; nor were orders issued for the movement of any portion of the army until the 8th of December, which order did not reach army head-quarters before the 10th of that month.
Sir Henry, in common with the primates in office, had unhappily so far misjudged the Sikh character, as to suppose it was the intention both of their government and soldiery to provoke, but not to commit, hostilities.[18] The attitude and operations of the enemy, when once the war broke out, evidently displayed the aggressive policy which guided their efforts. One cause of ill-feeling engendered in the Punjaub against the British Government, may be traced to a journal published in the north-western provinces of India, whose inflammatory articles had long-pointed out the Punjaub as a worthy object of cupidity, and such sentiments, when circulated amongst the proud and suspicious Sikhs, were doubtless mistaken for an exposition of the views of Government, and must have gone far to stir the national jealousy.
When the Sikh forces had actually quitted Lahore in progress to the Sutlej, there could remain no doubt of the object of their march, however sceptical many might be of the continuation of their humour; and had it then been decided to move the Merut force[19] towards the frontier, the features of the subsequent operations must have undergone a material change by such an accession of strength, and especially of cavalry, of which there was a sad deficiency. In lieu of being moved on the 26th of November, the main column of that force did not quit cantonments until the 16th of December, only two days before the action fought at Moodkee. In the governor-general's dispatch, it is stated that all troops destined for service on the frontier had marched by the 12th of December. Sir John Grey's division of the army were not all on the line of march before the 16th, as before stated.
When the Sikhs had moved six brigades towards the Sutlej, on the 25th of November, the most prudent and fastidious of the peace party could not have reasonably objected to the advance of the reserve to Kurnal, which would have brought them eighty miles nearer the scene of action, and within three or four days reach of Umbala.
The force at army head-quarters having moved, pursuant to orders, under the personal command of his Excellency Sir Hugh Gough, on the 11th and 12th of December, all doubt of the requisition of their services was cleared up on the 13th, by receipt of intelligence at the governor-general's camp, that the Sikhs, who had been assembled in great force, for some days, at Hureeka ford, about twenty miles above Ferozepore, had at length commenced the passage of the Sutlej. For two or three days previously to their crossing, their hostile spirit was fully evinced, by firing upon our reconnoitring parties from Ferozepore.
Sir John Littler, who was in command at Ferozepore, immediately occupied a defensive position, but was not in sufficient force to oppose the passage of so numerous an army as the Sikhs displayed, and amply provided with heavy artillery to cover their landing.