A partial change of front was made on the British side to meet this, and the cavalry advanced against the enemy's right flank; which threatened attack, Sir Hugh Gough states, in his despatch, he intended to have supported with infantry. The fatal crisis had now apparently arrived; but our soldiers had become of late too intimate with death to think of avoiding it. At all events, the Sikhs would not have obtained a bloodless victory, though our ammunition was expended; but at this critical moment the battle was ended in the most unexpected and sudden manner, by Tej Singh withdrawing his forces from the field. Although not suffering from a hostile fire, nor in any way incommoded in his operations or intentions, the enemy suddenly converted his threatened attack into a precipitate retreat, and fell back towards the fords of the Sutlej, where the main column of his army had already preceded him.
This extraordinary conclusion of the battle was soon ascertained by our cavalry reconnoitring parties to be no feint on the part of the enemy, but a final retreat.
The only means of accounting for Tej Singh's extraordinary departure, after having beforehand stood his ground so manfully, is on the supposition that his second advance with the reserve force under his personal direction, was meant only to cover the retreat of the main column, and that he knew not the extent to which the British forces were crippled.
The supposition that the movement of Colonel Harriott's brigade of cavalry towards Ferozepore alarmed the Sikh general, lest we should intercept his retreat by that manœuvre, is almost too wild a conjecture to be entertained.
No attempt, of course, was made to pursue the enemy: he had already been sufficiently obliging, and such a proceeding would have been ungrateful.
The cannon taken from the enemy in this action amounted to seventy-three pieces, which, added to their loss at Moodkee, made a total of eighty-eight captured during the two actions. Some were afterwards discovered thrown into wells in the village, when rendered unserviceable.
The return of killed and wounded on the British side was not published for some time afterwards, which caused an injurious effect, when the news of the battle reached the provinces, as it opened a path for much exaggeration. It was confidently whispered amongst the natives of Hindostan that the British had met with their match at last; and though the Sikhs had recrossed the river, that they had left their opponents in such a condition, as to be unable to reap any advantages from their victory. The state of suspense in which the friends and families of those engaged at Ferozeshuhur were kept, for want of authenticated returns of the casualties may be well imagined; but the mystery which enveloped this sanguinary engagement was, for a time, so impenetrable, that the reserve force under Sir John Grey were actually unaware of the killed and wounded amongst their comrades, when they crossed the field of battle a fortnight afterwards, and recognised amongst the corpses many of which yet lay unburied, the friends of whose fate they had been ignorant.
The forces engaged on the British side in this action were, seven troops of Horse Artillery, and four companies of foot; one regiment of British Dragoons, seven regiments of British Infantry, seven regiments of Native Cavalry, and fourteen regiments of Native Infantry.
The casualties were, 694 killed, and 1721 wounded; but, of these, the British regiments suffered a heavy proportion, losing nearly 500 killed, and more than 1100 wounded. These losses, added to those at Moodkee, gave a sum total of 3287 hors de combat, out of an army amounting altogether to about 16,000 actually engaged.
Those who had fallen in action were only partly interred in the trenches, for the wounded demanded all the attention that could be bestowed.