I think it hardly admits of a doubt, that the enemy's flank movement at Loodiana, besides a predatory excursion, was intended to act against our siege train, on its arrival at or near Bussean; for on the approach of Sir Harry Smith's division, the Sikhs advanced to Buddewal, retreating again only to cover the passage of their reinforcements, and again moving forwards towards Jugraon (as it was supposed), on the morning of the 28th of January, when Sir Harry Smith fortunately met them on their march.
Sir Harry has been violently assailed by the Indian press for the operations in the neighbourhood of Buddewal; but it must be remembered that his authority for the enemy occupying that position rested solely on the report of a spy on the line of march; nor did he make any report as to the batteries being manned and ready to open on us; the General, therefore, saw no reason to suppose that it was more than an advanced post, as had been intimated to him the preceding day.
The order for the march, on the morning of the 21st, had already provided for that measure; and a party of irregular horse had been directed "to watch the small fortress occupied by the enemy."
Our gallant General frequently expressed himself in the strongest terms hostile to credulity in rumours, and doubtless acted on this principle on the 21st of January. Had he decided to halt that morning, when the enemy were first discovered, there was an excellent position beyond the reach of their batteries, where the troops might have been assembled, and the march towards Loodiana resumed over the open plain, and out of reach of the Sikhs' heavy artillery.
Sir Harry had resolved upon reaching Loodiana that day, according to the orders for the march; and when it became apparent that the enemy was in full strength, and had unmasked his batteries, the British General immediately perceived the disadvantages under which he must have suffered had a general action ensued, and withdrew his forces with a masterly hand, although the Sikhs exhibited an equally masterly one over our baggage.
Few military men will venture to blame Sir Harry Smith for declining an action with the enemy on the 21st of January, when it is taken into consideration—firstly, that Colonel Godby's force, taking another line of country, had not arrived when the Sikhs were upon us; secondly, that our infantry were nearly exhausted by fatigue, and scarcely able to make their way through the deep sand, whilst the enemy were quite fresh; and, lastly, that the Sikhs could have compelled us to attack them under cover of their batteries in Buddewal, for which operations we had no sufficient ordnance.
When also a great disparity of numbers exists, as on the occasion in question, there can be no doubt of its being incumbent on the General to bring the lesser body at least fresh upon the field, where so much activity is required to counterbalance the opposing force; and in the open plain the Sikhs so far outflanked our line, that Sir Harry was compelled to make a defensive change of front when threatened by a demonstration made by Runjoor Singh against the British left.
The want of heavy guns, and the paucity of our numbers compared to the Sikhs, caused the attack of their post to be deferred, after our bivouac at Loodiana, until the arrival of reinforcements from head-quarters. After the enemy had evacuated their position at Buddewal, and our expected reinforcements had arrived, many were strongly of opinion that no attack could in prudence be attempted until guns of heavier metal were procurable. Sir Harry Smith, however, wisely foresaw the evil effect which must have ensued, should it be promulgated throughout India that the right wing of the British forces had been checked by the Sikhs, and continued inactive at Loodiana, apparently unable to commence offensive operations.
The news of a daring conspiracy[48] at Patna had, at this juncture, reached the Governor-general's camp; and an immediate and decisive blow was especially necessary, to convince the people of India that the British resources were sufficient to crush the invaders and to punish domestic sedition. The whole province of Bengal having been nearly denuded of British troops, any internal disaffection being allowed to develop itself might have led to most disastrous consequences; but this was happily discovered, and repressed in due season.