A commander never uttered a more unfounded libel against his soldiers than Gen. Hood when he published that his troops were demoralized and could not be trusted in battle. Even when his half-starved legions left one-fourth their number on the battle-field of Franklin, after fighting for hours against a superior force, strongly entrenched, and at one time penetrating the enemy’s line, he was not satisfied, but is reported to have said, in private conversation, that if his old Texas brigade had been with him he would have won the battle. In his book, however, he gave the troops who fought at Franklin a scanty meed of praise.
CHAPTER XI.
GEN. HOOD’S DISASTROUS CAMPAIGN IN TENNESSEE—THE FATAL MISTAKE—BEFORE FRANKLIN—SCHOFIELD’S STRONGHOLD—EATING HIS LAST RATIONS—THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN—THE REBEL YELL—TERRIFIC MUSKETRY—LOCKED BAYONETS—ONE-THIRD HOOD’S ARMY LOST—CO. K WIPED OUT—LOSSES OF THE “FIRST”—FAITHFUL UNTIL DEATH—THE RETREAT FROM TENNESSEE—THE LAST ROLL CALL.
It was raining slowly as, on Sunday, November 20, the First Alabama formed and marched down to the Tennessee river, crossed the long pontoon bridge, and went into camp four miles beyond. Monday, there was a light fall of snow, and the command advanced but seven miles. At night it turned off very cold, and Tuesday morning the roads were frozen hard. During the day the army crossed the State line of Tennessee, marked by a rough board sign placed by the roadside, every regiment cheering heartily, Tennessee troops being especially enthusiastic. The day’s march was thirteen miles. Wednesday saw us twelve miles on our journey. The day was cold and wintry, and the soldiers, thinly clad and generally without overcoats, suffered keenly. It was slightly warmer on Thursday. As on Wednesday, the route lay through a hostile, mountainous country, and the slow progress made by the artillery and wagon trains, as well as the necessity of keeping the men well closed up, delayed the army, and only twelve miles were made. The mountaineers were mostly Union men, and showed no mercy to stragglers, either killing them outright or horribly maltreating them. On Friday the roads were better; the mountains were behind us; and as the troops passed through Henryville they were met with friendly greetings. The First Alabama went into camp two miles beyond Henryville, having marched fifteen miles, the best score since crossing the river. Saturday, the people were still more cordial, and the troops were cheered at Mount Pleasant. Sixteen miles had been tramped when the First went into camp eight miles from Columbia. On Sunday, the 27th, Stewart’s corps arrived at Columbia, invested by Lee’s corps the preceding day. At dusk the First Alabama were sent to the skirmish line. During the night the enemy evacuated the town, taking position on the other side of Duck River. The regiment remained in camp Monday. Gen. Forrest crossed four miles above Columbia on that day; and, a pontoon bridge having been put down, Cheatham’s and Stewart’s corps and Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps followed on the 29th. Schofield at once withdrew, and now began a spirited race for Franklin on parallel roads, the Federals having the advantage of holding the regular pike, while the Confederates marched over rough by-roads and through the fields. There was brisk skirmishing throughout the day between the flankers; but Cheatham, who had forged far enough ahead to have thrown his corps across the pike, failed to execute Hood’s positive orders to do so. Hood then ordered Stewart’s corps to the front to make the attack, but by the time they got up it was dark, and the men could not be got into proper position to ensure success. The two corps bivouacked at Spring Hill, and Schofield’s army, unmolested, filed by so near that their wagons could be heard on the stony pike. This blunder lost Hood the Tennessee campaign. Gen. Hood states that Gen. Cheatham afterwards magnanimously acknowledged his error. Even Hood did not place any blame upon the army for this failure to attack. The soldiers were greatly fatigued after the twenty miles’ march of the day; but would have gallantly responded to the order to attack, and themselves wondered why it was not given.
On the morning of November 30th the race was renewed, but Schofield had the advantage of being ahead of his foes. He was so hardly pushed, however, that he was obliged to sacrifice a considerable portion of his wagon train, overturning and burning the wagons or cutting down the wheels, and shooting the animals whenever they blocked the retreat of the infantry. In some cases whole teams could be seen lying dead in the traces. At another point a quartermaster’s wagon had been overturned, and for rods around the road and fields were strewn with blankets. About noon, when four miles south of Franklin, the Federal cavalry deployed along a wooded crest running at right angles to the Columbia pike, and covered the wearied infantry while filing into the entrenchments at Franklin.
These entrenchments had been carefully constructed, and had already received their baptism of blood the year prior (April 10, 1863), when Gen. Van Dorn attacked Gen. Granger and was repulsed. The inner line was a regularly constructed earthwork, with a ditch on the outside about three feet deep and five feet wide. From the bottom of the ditch to the top of the parapet was at least six or seven feet. Heavy timbers or head logs crowned the top of the parapet, space being left between the logs and earth to allow the soldiers to fire. An abattis of black locust protected the front. Two hundred and fifty or three hundred yards in front of this—an open field with gentle slope intervening—was another connected line of earthworks, made by digging a ditch about eighteen inches or two feet in depth, and throwing the earth to the front. Outside of this, again, were detached rifle pits. This was the nature of the works on each side the Columbia pike, where the heaviest fighting took place. The works extended around Franklin in a semi-circle, touching Big Harpeth River above and below the town, a length of a mile and a half.
As Stewart’s corps, which was in the advance, came up, the Federal cavalry also withdrew into Franklin. The Confederate forces rapidly deployed, Stewart’s corps forming the right and Cheatham’s the left, Johnston’s division of Lee’s corps being still in the rear. Stewart’s corps was formed in line of battle between the Nashville and Decatur Railroad and the Lewisburg pike, about one and a quarter miles from Franklin and three-quarters of a mile from the Union lines. The corps was so fronted that an advance would take it across the railroad, striking the enemy’s main line near the Columbia pike. Walthall’s division was in the centre, with Quarles’ brigade on the right. In front of Walthall was a deep cut in the railroad, which was not discovered till the advance had begun, and which necessitated his moving by the left flank, as subsequently stated, to avoid the obstacle. Much straggling had been caused by the forced marches of the two preceding days, and probably not over 15,000 or 16,000 men of Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps were engaged in the battle, and Johnston’s division, say 2,000 or 3,000 men, did not take part till the main attack had failed, about 7, P. M. The artillery, with the exception of a section of two Napoleon guns, did not participate in the battle. Forrest’s cavalry was held in reserve on the flanks, Gen. Forrest himself being with the infantry during the charge.
Gen. Schofield’s force was composed of the Fourth Corps, which was officially reported ten days after the battle to have numbered 14,172 men, the Twenty-third Corps, 10,207 men, and the Forty-fourth Missouri and Seventy-second Illinois unassigned. A Federal officer present stated that they had more men than could stand at the works, the lines being in some places six deep, those in rear loading for those in front.