THE AXIOMS AND POSTULATES

The interest as well as the value of geometry lies chiefly in the fact that from a small number of assumptions it is possible to deduce an unlimited number of conclusions. With the truth of these assumptions we are not so much concerned as with the reasoning by which we draw the conclusions, although it is manifestly desirable that the assumptions should not be false, and that they should be as few as possible.

It would be natural, and in some respects desirable, to call these foundations of geometry by the name "assumptions," since they are simply statements that are assumed to be true. The real foundation principles cannot be proved; they are the means by which we prove other statements. But as with most names of men or things, they have received certain titles that are time-honored, and that it is not worth the while to attempt to change. In English we call them axioms and postulates, and there is no more reason for attempting to change these terms than there is for attempting to change the names of geometry[42] and of algebra.[43]

Since these terms are likely to continue, it is necessary to distinguish between them more carefully than is often done, and to consider what assumptions we are justified in including under each. In the first place, these names do not go back to Euclid, as is ordinarily supposed, although the ideas and the statements are his. "Postulate" is a Latin form of the Greek αιτημα (aitema), and appears only in late translations. Euclid stated in substance, "Let the following be assumed." "Axiom" (αξίωμα, axioma) dates perhaps only from Proclus (fifth century A.D.), Euclid using the words "common notions" (κοιναὶ εννοιαι, koinai ennoiai) for "axioms," as Aristotle before him had used "common things," "common principles," and "common opinions."

The distinction between axiom and postulate was not clearly made by ancient writers. Probably what was in Euclid's mind was the Aristotelian distinction that an axiom was a principle common to all sciences, self-evident but incapable of proof, while the postulates were the assumptions necessary for building up the particular science under consideration, in this case geometry.[44]

We thus come to the modern distinction between axiom and postulate, and say that a general statement admitted to be true without proof is an axiom, while a postulate in geometry is a geometric statement admitted to be true, without proof. For example, when we say "If equals are added to equals, the sums are equal," we state an assumption that is taken also as true in arithmetic, in algebra, and in elementary mathematics in general. This is therefore an axiom. At one time such a

statement was defined as "a self-evident truth," but this has in recent years been abandoned, since what is evident to one person is not necessarily evident to another, and since all such statements are mere matters of assumption in any case. On the other hand, when we say, "A circle may be described with any given point as a center and any given line as a radius," we state a special assumption of geometry, and this assumption is therefore a geometric postulate. Some few writers have sought to distinguish between axiom and postulate by saying that the former was an assumed theorem and the latter an assumed problem, but there is no standard authority for such a distinction, and indeed the difference between a theorem and a problem is very slight. If we say, "A circle may be passed through three points not in the same straight line," we state a theorem; but if we say, "Required to pass a circle through three points," we state a problem. The mental process of handling the two propositions is, however, practically the same in spite of the minor detail of wording. So with the statement, "A straight line may be produced to any required length." This is stated in the form of a theorem, but it might equally well be stated thus: "To produce a straight line to any required length." It is unreasonable to call this an axiom in one case and a postulate in the other. However stated, it is a geometric postulate and should be so classed.

What, now, are the axioms and postulates that we are justified in assuming, and what determines their number and character? It seems reasonable to agree that they should be as few as possible, and that for educational purposes they should be so clear as to be intelligible to beginners. But here we encounter two conflicting ideas. To get the "irreducible minimum" of assumptions is to get a set of statements quite unintelligible to students beginning geometry or any other branch of elementary mathematics. Such an effort is laudable when the results are intended for advanced students in the university, but it is merely suggestive to teachers rather than usable with pupils when it touches upon the primary steps of any science. In recent years several such attempts have been made. In particular, Professor Hilbert has given a system[45] of congruence postulates, but they are rather for the scientist than for the student of elementary geometry.