To provide for the free movement of the trade a small squadron of one line-of-battle ship and a few frigates was stationed early in the year on the east coast of Scotland. Privateers, American and French, had already been active in those waters, and were now to be reinforced by the Dutch, who, when once at war, set vigorously to work to make up for the neglect of their fleet in previous years. Commodore Keith Stuart, who was in command of the small protecting force, found it insufficient. The history of the war in the North Sea during 1781 shows with what difficulty and at what a cost trade is carried on when the command of the sea is disputed. The Artois frigate was appointed to protect the merchant-ships bound to the Baltic. During the spring 200 merchant-vessels collected in the Firth of Forth. They were detained at first by weather, and then by orders from the Admiralty, which feared that they would be captured by Dutch frigates. Their provisions were consumed and heavy expenses incurred. In the meantime another flock of trading-ships had been collected on the east coast, and was sent to the Firth of Forth under the protection of a squadron commanded by the Vice-Admiral Parker whose services in the West Indies have been mentioned. He came up from the Downs collecting the traders on his way. On the 10th June he had collected his charge, 500 merchant-ships in all, at Leith. Before he could see them on their way, the homeward-bound convoy from Jamaica came in—seventy trading-craft under the protection of four sail of the line, one 50-gun and one 44-gun ship—much battered by storms, and infested with scurvy after a long voyage. The West Indiamen stopped only to obtain fresh vegetables, and then continued their voyage to the South. On the 27th June Parker sailed, saw his convoy safe to the Baltic, and then cruised in the North Sea, waiting for the homeward-bound ships.
The condition of Parker’s squadron shows that the Admiralty had indeed been driven to sore straits to provide protection for the North Sea trade. After he had been joined by Stuart with the Berwick, 74, he was able to make up a line of seven vessels in all, but it was only by including two which were not line-of-battle ships—the Preston, 50, and the Dolphin, 44. The Princess Amelia, 80, was nominally a strong ship, but she was so crazy with age that it had been found necessary to reduce her armament. She carried only 24-pounders on the lower deck instead of 32-pounders, and the rest of her guns were 18-pounders and 9-pounders. Parker’s flagship, the Fortitude, 74, and the Berwick represented the solid part of his command. If the Dutch had been able to send an equal squadron of strong ships, it would have gone hard with “Vinegar” Parker. Happily for him and for the interests of British trade, the Dutch had to make shift with the old and weak when they needed the new and strong. On the 20th July a squadron of seven ships, to form the line, and a number of frigates sailed from the Texel with a large fleet of merchant-ships under their protection. The admiral in command was the Schout-bij-nacht Johan Arnold Zoutman, an elderly officer, of the same stamp as his English opponent, an excellent practical seaman beyond doubt, and a stout-hearted man, but nothing more. His line of seven was made by including three ships of 54 guns and one of 40. The largest of his ships was the Admiral Generaal, 74, commanded by Captain Kinsbergen. Zoutman’s flag was in the Admiraal de Ruiter, 68, and one 64-gun ship, the Holland, made up the tale. Other two ships were sent out to accompany the convoy, but were not available for an action with the British squadron.
Contrary winds and the usual obstructions inseparable from the task of convoying a swarm of clumsy merchant-ships delayed Zoutman’s movements. It was not till the first days of August that he was clear of the shallows of the Dutch coast. In the meantime, the British trade homeward bound from the Baltic had collected behind Parker. On the 5th August the Dutchman bound northward, and the Englishman southward, sighted one another on the Dogger Bank, in a north-westerly wind—Parker being to the windward and westward. Each admiral sent his convoy on its way, and both prepared for a fair trial of strength.
The battle which followed has an almost pathetic interest. It was one of the last fought on the old traditional rules, and it was fought by men who played the game with a single heart. Therefore it showed what was best in those rules, their downright manhood, and what was weakest, their hidebound pedantry. Zoutman seeing that Parker had the weather-gage and the option of battle, lay to on the port tack, heading to the north. Sir Hyde Parker bore down to engage from van to rear, every man to take his bird. His flagship was in her orthodox place, the middle, which in a line of seven was the fourth. Zoutman was the fifth in his line. Now the proper opponent for an admiral is an admiral. Parker therefore laid the Fortitude alongside the Admiraal de Ruiter. But as there were three ships ahead of him and three astern, while there were four ships ahead and two astern of Zoutman, it followed that there were three English to four Dutch in the van, and three to two in the rear. The last ship of Parker’s line had consequently no opponent. In the van the Berwick, 74, was very rightly laid alongside the leading Dutchman, the Erzprinz, 54. The second English ship tackled the third Dutchman, and the third the fourth. Therefore the second Dutchman had no opponent. Yet every ship was kept in its position, since the signal for the line was flying. Not a shot was fired by the Dutch as their enemies came down to the attack. They lay quiet, with their marines admirably pipeclayed drawn up on their poops. When the other sportsman was comfortably in his place, Zoutman opened fire. English and Dutch pounded one another with stolid resolution. The loyalty of the seamen of the time to the superstition of the line of battle was wonderfully shown in the van. Commodore Stuart had rightly closed with the leading Dutch ship to prevent her from getting to windward and doubling on the head of our line. The Berwick being a far heavier ship than the Erzprinz, was able to drive her to leeward. In following up the attack the Berwick fell to leeward, and then finding herself out of her proper place, tacked back to resume her station. The battle was a cannonade of three hours and a half. At the end of that time the Dutch drew off, and Parker did not pursue. His ships were severely damaged, and his casualty list, 111 killed and 318 wounded, was a more severe loss than any suffered in action with the French in this war, in proportion to the number engaged. Zoutman returned to port, and Parker continued his voyage home. The safe arrival of the Baltic convoy was a subject of very natural rejoicing, and much was made of Parker’s “victory,” though victory there was none. He for his part was discontented, and resigned his command, saying, we are told, that he wished the king younger admirals and better ships. At a later period he was chosen to command in the East Indies. He sailed in the Cato, 50, for his station. His fate is unknown, for he never reached his destination, and no trace of him was left, save a vague story that a great ship, which may have been his, had been wrecked on the coast of Malabar, and that the survivors of the crew had been massacred by the natives.
While these operations were running their indecisive course in the North Sea, two great armaments had sailed from Spithead and from Brest, each on a distant mission, and each carrying with it subordinate squadrons to be detached for still more remote destinations. On the 13th March Admiral Darby sailed from Spithead with twenty-eight line-of-battle ships. Some were to be detached to the West Indies, and others to sail for the Cape of Good Hope and take it from the Dutch, when Darby’s immediate service was performed. He had also with him the outward-bound East Indiamen. His orders were to collect the vessels laden with provisions in Irish ports for the use of the garrisons of Gibraltar and Mahon, to convoy them to the fortresses, to detach the reinforcements for the West Indies, and the squadron destined to the Cape with the East Indiamen under its charge, and to return to the Channel. To meet the victuallers, he steered for the south coast of Ireland, and was there delayed till they joined him from Cork. While Darby was waiting on the south coast of Ireland the Comte de Grasse left Brest on the 22nd March, with twenty sail of the line, bound for the West Indies, and having with him a small squadron to be detached for an attack on the British settlements in the East Indies. Darby, having collected his victuallers, went on his way, and Grasse on his without a meeting. The strenuous futility which is conspicuous in the operations of all parties in this war was never more visible than in this misuse of two great fleets. If Darby had fallen on Grasse and had driven him back to Brest, the Americans would have been deprived of the aid which enabled them to take Yorktown at the close of the year. If Grasse had been joined by even six or eight Spanish ships in an efficient state, and had fought a whole-hearted battle with Darby off the Old Head of Kinsale, it is possible that the entire naval defence of Great Britain might have been ruined, and it is eminently probable that the relief of Gibraltar would have been stopped—in which case the fortress must have fallen for it was at the end of its resources. But the rulers in London and Paris had their eyes on the end of the earth and could not see that victory at home would mean success all over the world.
The web of naval warfare covered the North Atlantic, the threads crossed, the shuttle flew to and fro. All were players in the same game and each acted on the other. The squadrons detached to the Cape and the Indian Ocean by Darby and Grasse went into a wider field and acted apart. The North Sea was a field by itself, but the other fleets and squadrons from Newport in Rhode Island, down the East Coast of America to the West Indies, across the Atlantic to the Straits of Gibraltar, and north to the Channel, worked together, and on one another in harmony or in conflict. Let us see how the players stood when Darby sailed from the south of Ireland for Gibraltar, and Grasse steered from Brest for the West Indies.
When the year began the French squadron of seven sail of the line and two frigates lay at Newport. It was commanded by Chevalier Destouches, who succeeded to the command on the death of Ternay, on the 15th December 1780. Arbuthnot was in command of the British squadron of eight ships of the line, two 50-gun ships, and twenty-three frigates, with his headquarters at Long Island. His ships had to patrol the coast and to co-operate with the British forces acting in the southern Colonies. In January he sailed to reconnoitre the French, but on the 23rd his squadron was beaten back by a violent gale. The Culloden, 74, was lost on the end of Long Island, and the Bedford, 74, dismasted. The America, 74, was driven out to sea, and did not rejoin his flag for weeks. Washington throughout the year was striving to bring about a concentration of French and American forces on either the northern or southern parts of the divided British. He urged Destouches to put to sea while Arbuthnot was disabled. But the Frenchman was oppressed by anxiety lest the stormy weather should be as fatal to him as to his opponent. He sent Le Gardeur de Tilly with one 64 and two frigates to fall on the British transports of Arnold’s force in Virginia. The French officer found that they had taken refuge in Elizabeth River, and returned. On his way to Rhode Island he captured the Romulus, 44, and a number of prizes. Meanwhile Arbuthnot lay at Gardiner Bay in Long Island. Under the steady driving of Washington, Destouches got to sea on the 8th March, with seven of the line and two frigates—one of them the captured Romulus, and 1500 French soldiers under Viomesnil, to reinforce the Americans in Virginia. On the 10th Arbuthnot followed him with eight ships of the line and two frigates. The two steered for the Chesapeake in squally weather, mists, and driving rain. The English squadron was the quicker of the two. On the 16th March it overtook the French between forty and fifty miles N.E. by E. of Cape Henry. It was in the power of Arbuthnot to put himself to leeward of Destouches, and between him and the coast in the north-easterly wind. But faithful to tradition he let the Frenchman run to leeward of him, and then made two rushes at him in the old style. The Frenchman as usual fired to dismast and slipped away. Yet Arbuthnot was the more pertinacious of the two. After an inconclusive action he anchored at Lynn Haven in the Chesapeake, and Destouches, finding the road still barred, went back to Rhode Island. Arbuthnot came back to Long Island, having at least baffled the enemy’s attempt to carry reinforcements to Virginia, so that at the close of March both were again “as they were” at Long Island and at Newport.
Meanwhile events of no very honourable character had occurred in the West Indies. Rodney had returned to his station, the Leeward Islands, from North America on the 12th of December 1780. He was soon joined by Samuel Hood with reinforcements from Europe. Hood, when the war began, had been commissioner of the dockyard at Portsmouth. The acceptance of this post was by custom held to mark an officer’s final retirement from active sea service. But the Admiralty wished to supply Rodney with a second in command who would work more harmoniously with him than Parker. Hood had served under Rodney’s eye at the beginning of his career. He had been captain of the Vestal, from which Rodney directed an attack on a French flotilla in 1759. The refusal of many flag officers to take commands while Sandwich remained First Lord supplied another reason for departing from usage. Hood, who was no political partisan, or who at least was no Whig, was included in a promotion of flag officers, and was sent with reinforcements and a large trade convoy to the West Indies. Soon after he joined, the Childers sloop brought news of the outbreak of the war with Holland.
No more welcome message could have reached the ear of Sir George, for it brought to a very embarrassed man the hope of infinite prize money. The Dutch Island of St. Eustatius, lying high up in the Lesser Antilles, had been used for the purpose to which the British port of Nassau in the Bahamas was put in the American Civil War. It had become a great dépôt of contraband, by which the French profited largely. It was also the seat of an unwonted trade of more legitimate character. The West Indian planters were under the necessity of buying all the food for their slaves in the North American colonies. As the supply could not be stopped without producing ruin to the British Islands, Government was compelled to relax the rigour of its navigation laws, and permit the planters to obtain supplies through neutral ports. This authorised trade concentrated at St. Eustatius. Maize and pork were brought from America, and British goods were brought to pay for them. Long rows of warehouses sprang up on the usually empty shore of the one landing place of the Dutch island.